Iran Essay Contest (2nd Place): The Prospect of Change

EA has been honoured to support the essay contest run by Iranian Progressive Youth, "What are the Ways to Bring About Democratic Change?".

Yesterday we published the third-place essay by Raha Bahreini, "Integrating Human Rights --- Politics, Sexual Orientation, and Poverty". Today we post the second-place essay by an author who has requested that his name not be published:

The 2009 presidential elections in Iran created the conditions for the emergence,within the existing political framework, of a domestic civil rights movement questioning the legitimacy of the regime and demanding significant role of the electorate in the political dynamics. The emergence of the Green movement in June 2009 brought to the attention of the international community the vibrant nature of the Iranian civil society and the opposition of a wide segment of the population towards the regime’s present political status quo. The massive popular mobilizations taking place in the streets of the main cities of the country alimented the unprecedented belief that change from within will soon come about in the Islamic Republic. The sense of optimism which characterized the weeks immediately after the last presidential elections took place further amplified in the last few months, when the Middle East and North Africa regionwitnessed the uprisings of the Arab civil society and the eradication of the existing ruling powers in the case of Tunisia and Egypt.

Recent demonstrations in Iran proved that, despite the regime’s violent crackdown on the opposition movement throughout the last year, the Green Movement has not died. The protests in the Arab world reenergized the mobilization of part of the Iranian population and boosted its presence in the streets. The theory that a domino effect would characterize future developments in the Middle East brought many experts and scholars to conclude that it is only a matter of time until popular demonstrations will engender change from within in Iran. It is therefore interesting and extremely relevant to examine the real prospect that change will effectively come about in the Islamic Republic, particularly taking into consideration the key domestic factors in this sense: the role of the civil society and the political structure of the regime.

The Green Movement and the Civil Society

The Green Movement is often said to represent the Iranian civil society. Succeeding in rallying a variety of social groups across political orientations, social classes, religious beliefs and ethnic roots, the movement therefore claims to represent the Iranian nation.

This belief is subject to two main criticisms. First, it must be taken into consideration that, notwithstanding the successful mobilization of a big portion and social range of the Iranian population, the movement remains a phenomenon mostly limited to the middle-upper class, the intellectuals, the educated, professional and urban elite.

Participation certainly includes women, youth, ethnic and religious minorities and workers. However, the Green Movement leaders only recently formalized and recognized the importance of all the above-mentioned groups in the mobilization. Probably conditioned by the nature and requests the Arab civil society presented through its recent uprisings, on February 23 the leaders of the Green Movement released a new version of its Manifesto. In four of its twelve strategic pointsm the leaders of the movement addressed their attention officially to the key role of women, workers, lower classes, and religious minorities in the Iranian civil society and the necessity to include this groups in the opposition movement. It is now more likely that the platform presented by the Greens will include some social and economic aspects, previously absent from the picture.

At first the concerns and demands of the movement were limited to the contested 2009 elections, with the main slogan being ‘Where is my vote’. With time slogans assumed a wider language, however they never included social and economic issues, therefore precluding the active involvement of workers and the labor unions in the mobilization. As demonstrated by the uprisings in the Arab streets, only the combination of social, economic and political requests will succeed in widening the range of social groups involved and represented by social movements.

The parallel mobilization of social and economic classes of the population ensures a stronger impact of the mobilization on the regime’s ability to survive without converting popular demands into concrete structural changes. Therefore, only strategically widening its platform and requests the Green Movement can claim to represent the whole Iranian civil society and aspire to have an impact on reforming the Iranian regime. This is even more necessary now that the action space for civil society actors might be further reduced. The Iranian government recently passed a bill that strictly limits the activity of NGOs, the only organization in the Islamic Republic capable and legally allowed to promote civil society. If change in Iran is the goal, the Green movement should cover issues and involve classes of individuals and issues left unrepresented because of the NGOs’ restriction.

Another important point to be made about the Green movement role in the prospect for change in Iran concerns the conglomeration of different ideas under the same umbrella. Although this is normally assumed to be the strength of the Green Movement, it can very well be considered a weakness of it. The belief of the major section of the movement, represented by the ideas of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, envisions the necessity of a reform within the system in order to guarantee free elections and the ousting of the current government. However, some within the Green Movement aspire to a radical change of regime through the abolition of the velayat-e- faqih and the whole political structure.

It is understandable that the movement’s leaders were strategically forced to affirm their loyalty to the Islamic Republic and appeal for limited change. However asking the population to risk its life in the name of limited reform is not a formula likely to widen the mobilization and to generate mass support. The split in the final goals within the movement engenders action and strategy which at times are not coherent and increase the probability of a lack of any concrete impact on the political status quo. This is emphasized by the nature of the Iranian regime’s political structure which, among other features impeding political change, does not allow for the creation of a single political organization representing the Green Movement, which could take the leading role in the mobilization’s process from within the legal framework of the political system.

The Influence of the Political Structure

As mentioned above, there is a number offeatures in the Iranian political structure that significantly reduce the margins for change in Iran.

Notwithstanding the galvanized opposition, many still have a stake in maintaining the current status quo in the Islamic Republic. The main explanation lays on the oligarchic nature of the regime which, with its multiple institutions and leaders involved in ruling and managing the county, does not have only one center of power. Therefore the social and economic interests of the institutions and individuals with a direct stake are strongly intertwined with the survival of the regime.

This is particularly true for the military and paramilitary corps, loyal to the Islamic Republic and directly under the supervision of the Supreme Leader.The military is central to the survival of an authoritarian regime as a necessary tool to keep the power through repression. So far the Iranian regime has demonstrated its willingness to resort to violence to preserve its hold on power, and this has been possible because, differently from the Arab cases, the Iranian military did not take the stand of the Iranian people in demonstrations, playing a major role in successfully containing the Green movement. The military is indeed aware that the dismantlement of the Islamic Republic would mean the end of its own existence as well. Therefore, hoping for the alignment of the IRGC and the Basij on the side of the Iranian civil society, with the consequent change in the Iranian political structure, is a mere utopia.

Many experts and scholars rely on the outcome of the next Parliamentary elections, which will be held on March 2012, to witness some concrete developments in Iran. These will be the first elections in the country after the presidential ones in June 2009. It will therefore be interesting to observe the dynamics that will characterize the whole electoral process, from the campaign to the voting.

However, there are few effective possibilities that significant changes will be brought about in the Iranian system. As most Iran observers know, the political structure of the regime is based on a complex hybrid of unelected and elected institutions. Notwithstanding the importance given in the Constitution to elected institutions such as the President and the Parliament, the predominant role in the decision-making process is maintained by the Supreme Leader, the Council of Guardians and the Assembly of Experts, all unelected institutions. Therefore the 2012 Parliamentary elections will once again be part of the general game, in which the vote is mainly used to prove the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic on the basis of turnout and popular support.

Not only is the role of the Parliament marginal with regards to the eventual change in the Iranian political system. Candidates in the elections will also be vetoed by the Council of Guardians, whose 12 members will most likely avoid the participation of individuals oriented towards the reform of the existing system.

What we are witnessing in Iran is the realignment among the various institutions of the State, particularly since the beginning of the second term of Ahmadinejad’s presidency. The paramilitary is increasingly becoming more visible in domestic politics than perhaps at any other time. But also factions within the regime’s institutions are progressively realigning, eliminating the margin of space for reformists and attempting to close the gap between traditional and hard liner conservatives. The possibility of witnessing a change from within the existing political framework of the Islamic Republic is therefore gradually decreasing. A significant proof of it is the recent removal of reformist Rafsanjani, replaced by hardliner Mahdavi Kani as the chair of the Assembly of Experts, the only institution of the regime able to control and possibly to dismiss the Supreme Leader.

Conclusion

Although the picture with regards to prospects for change in Iran is not as optimistic as many wish it would be, positive outcomes cannot be excluded. What is taken into consideration in this essay are the roles and present capabilities of the civil society and of the political structure in respectively facilitating and impeding the political transformation that will occur in the Islamic Republic.

If the Green Movement will follow the examples of the social movement in the Arab countries, widening its appeal and determining its political, economic and social platform, the situation might turn favorably for the opposition movement. It is also particularly important to not exclude the key role that the international community and its coercive vs. engagement policy towards the Islamic Republic play in the domestic game. The progressive substitution of the dual track policy of sanctions and negotiations with an approach more oriented towards dealing with the violation of human rights in Iran might completely change the cards on the table.

What is certain is that, although change might not be attainable in the immediate future, the constant engagement and debate outside and inside of the Iranian society around these matters will in the long run be beneficial for the achievement of this goal.