Iran Analysis: Which Way Forward for US Policy?

Marc Lynch, one of the leading analysts of US foreign policy on the Middle East and Iran, posts this challenging piece in Foreign Policy.

I appreciate Lynch's attempt to find an "off-ramp" to get out of confrontation with Tehran, but I can't help feeling, after reading and re-reading, that he is locked into the dilemma that "we have to do something" to head off those pressing for military action against Iran. Unfortunately, because Lynch can't find a "something" that will work, he winds up back at the default position --- with a shrug of his shoulders --- of intensified conflict and a probable strike on Iran.

The alternative? Instead of "do something", a bit of patience might be in order, as well as a recognition that internal developments in Iran --- while likely to change the situation significantly --- take time. So, instead of "doing something" directed at Tehran, perhaps "doing something" directed at the US policymakers and chattering classes might be advisable: don't give in to an inevitability that talk of military action means military action; instead, head it off and knock it back.

What happens in Iran should be led by Iranians, not by Washington. And it certainly should not be directed by or be dependent on the nuclear-military setting: 

This morning, at a small meeting with various Washington-based analysts and European diplomats, I was asked to speculate on the future of Iran policy.  While it's of course impossible to predict, I don't expect to see military action by the U.S. or by Israel.  Nor do I expect to see any serious progress towards a political bargain, either a narrow one about the Iranian nuclear program nor an expansive one about Iran's place in the Middle East.  Nor do I expect Iran to test a nuclear weapon.

---

More likely than either is a relentless slide towards a replay of the Iraq saga of the 1990's:  a steady ratcheting-up of sanctions, which increasingly impact the Iranian people but fail to compel change in the regime's political behavior;  episodic and frequent diplomatic crises which consume the world's diplomatic attention and resources;  the growing militarization and polarization of the Gulf;  ongoing uncertainty about Iranian intentions and capabilities. Eventually, as with Iraq, the choices may well narrow sufficiently and the perception of impending threat mount so that a President -- maybe Obama, maybe Palin, maybe anyone else -- finds him or herself faced with "no choice" but to move towards war.  "Keeping Tehran in a Box" is not a pretty scenario, nor one which I think anyone especially wants, but it seems the most likely path unless better "off-ramps" are developed to avert it. And such "off-ramps" are the most glaring absence in the current Iran policy debate.  

The current policy debate is framed, explicitly or implicitly, around four tracks. First is the nuclear clock, with everyone keeping a close eye on how much progress they believe Iran is making towards a nuclear weapon and how successful sanctions and other disruption efforts can be in delaying it. Second is the Israel clock, this summer's obsession, with the U.S. attempting to prevent Israel by attacking unilaterally by demonstrating that it takes the threat seriously and is succeeding on the nuclear front. Third is the Iranian domestic politics track, which is not about "regime change" as many people seemed to think last summer but which is really about the sanctions and internal Iranian tensions combining to shift the political coalitions and calculations in Tehran. Finally, there's the U.S. domestic political track, where it seems likely that the Republicans will seize upon Iran as a major theme in attacking Obama's foreign policy "weakness," and may well have one or both houses of Congress as an institutional base to press their case.  

The Obama administration's strategy has been fairly successful in terms of maneuvering within these clocks and carrying out its chosen "pressure track" strategy.  Its success at standing up relatively tough sanctions has demonstrated international consensus, has pushed back the nuclear and Israeli clocks, and is perhaps building political pressure inside of Iran to move away from Ahmedenejad's foreign policy strategy. There seem to be signs that the sanctions have proven unexpectedly painful for the Iranian economy, and that they are exacerbating  internal political rifts (i.e. Rafsanjani's recent warning to "stop treating the sanctions like a joke").  Still, I don't think that anyone should be overly optimistic that this will lead to significant changes.  It buys time, and shifts incentives on the margins, but absent some clear "off ramp" for Iranians to take it doesn't do more than that.   

Read full article....