Afghanistan-Pakistan Special: Obama's Review Upgrades Situation from "Quagmire" to "Morass"

My initial reaction to the much-touted Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review, both in the release of five unclassified pages summarising the study and in the unclassified video conference of President Obama and his advisors, was the one that my father and grandfather would give to any grand proclamation --- be it by a politician, a TV pundit, a salesman, a kid on the street corner --- that meant far less.

Big Damn Deal.

Perhaps that is too jaded. Maybe the better approach is to try the wit of The Borowitz Report: "Defense Dept. Upgrades Afghanistan from Quagmire to Morass". Perhaps a twist of an aphorism might do, as in this from the Afghanistan Analysts Network: "Stamping Out the Fire by Pouring on Gasoline". Or, if you are going to be jaded, go all-out like Josh Mull:

[US commander in Afghanistan] General Petraeus has pretty much lost his damn mind, and his strategy now consists of a two-pronged approach. One, beg and plead and whine and stamp his feet for more time. And two, pulverize the shit out of Afghanistan.

Maybe, in the end, it is best just to rely on the rhetoric of the Administration. For it is here that you have diversions: the claim that "al-Qa’ida’s senior leadership in Pakistan is weaker and under more sustained pressure than at any other point since it fled Afghanistan in 2001" misses the range of other insurgent groups, let alone the range of public discontent, in areas of the country. You have platitudes: "In Pakistan, we are laying the foundation for a strategic partnership based on mutual respect and trust, through increased dialogue." And you have outright lies: "In Afghanistan, the momentum achieved by the Taliban in recent years has been arrested in much of the country and reversed in some key areas."

(Yes. lies. Just have a look at The New York Times article, fed by some inside Washington who are not as secure about the Administration's public assessment, printed on Wednesday: "Intelligence Reports Offer Dim View of Afghan War". Or read Joshua Foust's savage take-down of a We-Are-Winning puff-piece by Max Boot and Pete Mansoor.)

Those diversions, platitudes, and lies come have come from the text of President Obama's message in December 2009 when --- after months of debate --- he accepted/compromised/caved-in to the military's demand for a large injection of US troops. The only difference this time was that the rhetoric was to cover a new Obama acceptance/compromise/cave-in, as the President gave up his goal of a July 2011 withdrawal and the prospect of a US stay in Afghanistan beyond 2014 was established:

Our strategy in Afghanistan is setting the conditions to begin the responsible reduction of U.S. forces in July 2011. This review also underscores the importance of a sustained long-term commitment to the region – in Pakistan, by way of our growing strategic partnership; and in Afghanistan, as reflected by our own long-term commitment, as well as the NATO Lisbon Summit’s two outcomes: the goal for Afghans to assume the lead for security across the country by 2014, and NATO’s enduring commitment beyond 2014.

That rhetoric opens up the space for the counter-insurgency industry to offer more clever solutions for the US dilemmas. Foreign Policy, for example, featured the five-point plan of Andrew Exum which including a cut in development aid (because it is wasted through mismanagement and corruption), a "compromise in combat enablers", threatening the "many Afghan power brokers and their families" for whom "a Western passport is [the] escape plan...should the country descend into a chaotic civil war", and keeping 25,000 to 35,000 US Special Operations forces in Afghanistan far beyond 2014.

But for all this counter-insurgency fiddling and twiddling, the reality is that the Obama Administration simply put out a demand for a Stay-the-Course extension while trying to blast away the enemy in Pakistan. Spencer Ackerman got to the point on Thursday:

The aim of the wider campaign, reiterated in the summary, is to crush al-Qaeda across the border in Pakistan’s tribal areas, defined as taking away their bases and the “elimination of the group’s remaining leadership cadre.” In other words: whacking moles, all through massively stepped-up CIA drone strikes, despite years of warnings that they won’t lead to victory. “Significant progress” has been made in killing al-Qaeda leaders, the summary says, but there isn’t any real attempt to connect any of that to what U.S. troops are doing in Afghanistan.

A day later, the headlines testified to Ackerman's insight: "Over 50 Killed in 3 Drone Strikes" in Pakistan.

But here's a coincidence of even greater significance. The Administration's scattering of the press release on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Review came only hours after what was supposed to be another important announcement: the State Department's first Quadrennial Defense and Development Review.

For many years, the US Government has had a Quadrennial Defense Review to assess military capabilities and objectives. But for those who were advising Presidential candidate Obama and who now serve in the Adminstration of President Obama, this was too much focus on "hard power". The possibilities and plans of development needed to be included for an American "smart power".

This past spring I was told by a British diplomat that the QDDR would offer a dynamic US policy to take us beyond the hard-power difficulties of recent years. So on Thursday, I read the introduction by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: "[This is a sweeping effort that asks a simple question: How can we do better? How can we adapt to a world of rising powers, changing global architecture, evolving threats, and new opportunities? How can we look ahead, prepare for, and help shape the world of tomorrow?”

Hours later, Clinton was standing on the podium as President Obama gave his answer to her "How can we do better?" True, he had nine words for her QDDR mission: "our civilian effort to promote effective governance and development. But this came well after his opening statement of the goals:

It’s important to remember why we remain in Afghanistan. It was Afghanistan where al Qaeda plotted the 9/11 attacks that murdered 3,000 innocent people. It is the tribal regions along the Afghan-Pakistan border from which terrorists have launched more attacks against our homeland and our allies. And if an even wider insurgency were to engulf Afghanistan, that would give al Qaeda even more space to plan these attacks.

And that’s why, from the start, I’ve been very clear about our core goal. It’s not to defeat every last threat to the security of Afghanistan, because, ultimately, it is Afghans who must secure their country. And it’s not nation-building, because it is Afghans who must build their nation. Rather, we are focused on disrupting, dismantling and defeating al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and preventing its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.

More military offensives in Afghanistan. More drone attacks in Pakistan. The prospect of an inconclusive US intervention well beyond 2014.

Big Damn Deal.