Iran Special Analysis: Grand Ayatollahs, Rafsanjani, and the Supreme Leader's Struggle for "Authority" (Azadi/Lucas)

Co-written, from sources in Iran, by Mr Azadi and Scott Lucas:

The Through-the-Looking-Glass pronouncements of the regime continue. Somehow the fervent declarations that the Government has triumphed, vanquishing post-election opposition, and has rebuffed even the strictest of sanctions lives alongside daily warning of continued sedition.

Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami gives the latest testimony to the phenomenon. In comments on Friday, he declared, "The enemies are pursuing the theory of separating Islam and the clergy from politics."

As Press TV notes, Khatami's line echoes that of the Supreme Leader, who has warned that the enemy's objective is to promote an Islam minus the clergy and Islam minus politics, thus sowing discord among the clerics.

But Khatami goes farther, as Press TV summarises: "[He] warned against those who, posing as clerics, are the mouthpiece of the enemy and seek to deceive people."

You know, if I was a cynic rather than an eager believer in these statements, I might think that Ayatollah Khamenei --- or least some leading mouthpieces in the Iranian system --- are worried that the Supreme Leader's three trips to Qom in the last month have failed to bring "unity" and ease the concerns of senior clerics.

All of the discord was supposed to be resolved during Khamenei's ten-day venture to Qom in early October, but he has paid two subsequent one-day visits for further discussions.

So why no resolution? The broad context is that the Supreme Leader, after more than 20 years, is still trying to get recognition of his Islamic knowledge as that of the highest-ranking clerics (maraje, or sources of emulation).

It has long been a simmering issue that Ayatollah Khamenei rose to his position in 1989 without holding these credentials. The most prominent clerical opponent of the regime, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, held this rank. His passing last December may have seemed an opportunity for the Supreme Leader to finally claim religious supremacy.

The complication, however, is the continuing crisis over political authority. Almost 18 months after the disputed 2009 election, the opposition of some senior clerics --- possibility extending to a majority of the 12 Grand Ayatollahs --- to the Government is growing, not lessening.

This summer tensions had risen to the point where senior clerics were ready to defy Khamenei publicly over pro-Government attacks on the homes and offices of Ayatollahs like Bayat Zanjani, Sane'i, and the late Montazeri, as well as the public humiliation of Ayatollah Khomeini's grandson Hassan.

The Supreme Leader tried to assuage these concerns with promises that the attacks would ease --- and they have. He also, in the visits to Qom, has tried to forge a compromise over the worries of senior clerics that controls would be imposed on the howzah, Qom's seminaries, restricting their traditional independence. 

However, some of the maraje are still unsettled about the economic situation and, perhaps more strikingly, are expressing concern about the Government's repressive measures against opposition. Indeed, in a recent telling episode, Grand Ayatollah Shobeiri Zanjani intervened --- with a personal appeal to the Supreme Leader --- to get the release of leading reformist politician Ali Shakouri Rad from detention.

And that brings us to the latest complication: former President Hashemi Rafsanjani.

Rafsanjani has been a foe of Ahmadinejad for years, losing to the President in the 2005 election but retaining posts as head of the Assembly of Experts and of the Expediency Council. So Ahmadinejad, in the 2009 election, targeted Rafsanjani as well as his nominal challengers like Mir Hossein Mousavi, accusing the Rafsanjani family of fraud and corruption.

That tension has not eased since the election. Threats to remove Rafsanjani from his posts have not come to fruition, but Ahmadinejad's camp have continued to use the former President's family as a pressure point. In particular, official after official has declared that Rafsanjani's son, Mehdi Hashemi, will be arrested if he ever returns to Iran from his current self-imposed exile in London.

Meanwhile, Rafsanjani has sought his own pressure point against the Government. He continues to be politically cautious --- he has not appeared to lead Tehran Friday Prayers since July 2009, for example, and his public statements are always carefully framed and coded --- but this autumn he began pushing the cases of political prisoners. 

Rafsanjani went so far as to take the files of more than 20 detainees to the Supreme Leader's office. He pushed for and got an audience with Khamenei, only to be rebuffed in his demands that some action be taken not only to ensure fair treatment of the political prisoners but to get some admission of responsibility from the Government.

Rebuff does not mean defeat, however. Rafsanjani is still present and in his political posts. So the Government and its supporters have to persist in their efforts to keep the former President in a box. Thus, the threats against Mehdi Hashemi have spiralled in the last month, with figures from Ayatollah Jannati, the leader of the Guardian Council, to Iran Prosecutor General Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei re-stating that Rafsanjani's son must be prosecuted.

But here's the twist: there have been escalating rumours that Mehdi Hashemi --- and possibly his father --- will challenge the Government by flying to Tehran.

If that happens, then the Ahmadinejad camp either has to back off, losing face, or follow through on its promise of arrest, bringing the conflict with Rafsanjani to a public showdown.

If it chooses the latter course, then there is a dangerous convergence. Now there is one more significant detainee to add to the list of those concerning the senior clerics. And, as Rafsanjani is an Ayatollah, the challenge is to one of their own rather than to an outside figure of "sedition".

Let's do the maths. The Supreme Leader has already been publicly snubbed by Grand Ayatollahs Bayat Zanjani, Sane'i, and Vahid Khorasani, who refused to meet him during his 10-day visit to Qom. Three more Grand Ayatollahs --- Javadi Amoli, Shobeiri Zanjan,i and Makarem Shirazi --- have "politely" criticised Khamenei for not challenging Ahmadinejad's attitude toward Rafsanjani. Grand Ayatollah Mousavi Ardebili did not visit the Supreme Leader on the latest trips to Qom, generally because of Khamenei's support for the Government and specifically concern about the "insults" to Rafsanjani. 

(This is a growing issue for Mousavi Arbdeli. In the last year, despite illness, he has met with Khameni to discuss the freedom of political prisoners and to support Rafsanjani’s plans for "unity".)

Add in recent signs of upset from Grand Ayatollah Safi Golpayegani, Makarem Shirazi, and Sobhani over the handling by Khamenei's office of the 10-day show in Qom, with "private" meetings turned into photo opportunities to show the Supreme Leader's authority. (Makarem Shirazi  had decided not to got to the session with Khamenei at all, but changed his mind after intervention by conservative clerics.)

That means at least nine of Qom's 12 Grand Ayatollahs have either rejected the Supreme Leader or have serious issues with him and/or his handling of the Government. Those are not good numbers for a Khamenei who wants to, once and for all, establish his authority atop the Iranian system.

Some might say that the senior clerics are peripheral in a political contest where the President and institutions like the Revolutionary Guard are trying to express and sometimes impose power. However, as long as Iran is an "Islamic" rather than "Iranian" system, the maraje carry at least a significant symbolic role.

The Supreme Leader knows that, which is why the path to Qom has been worn out in the last few weeks. And now he has another date to ponder: the 1st anniversary of the passing of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri is next months, coming only days before the religious ceremony of Ashura. Those who cannot come out on the streets to express political frustration and opposition may be considering such a display for the religious commemoration of Montazeri's death.

Security is declared, but so is the threat of sedition. Current Presidents cannot completely vanquish former Presidents. The dead still retain authority and acclaim while the living desperately seek it.

It is a most curious "stability".