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Entries in Palestine (9)

Sunday
Feb282010

The Latest from Iran (28 February): What Do The Statements Mean?

2045 GMT: Sunday Absurdity. A slow day, which leading to a perusing of opinion in the newspapers. Unfortunately, that turns up a piece of anti-Muslim diatribe posing as analysis by Ephraim Karsh in The New York Times: "Muslims Won't Play Together". The slurs have to be read to be believed, but here is the policy recommendation: "A military strike must remain a serious option: there is no peaceful way to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions, stemming as they do from its imperialist brand of national-Islamism."

NEW Iran: Understanding the Assembly of Experts Statement “Crisis Continues”
NEW Iran Document: Mousavi’s Interview “Reform Within the Current Framework” (27 February)
Iran Analysis: Now It Gets Interesting….
The Latest from Iran (27 February): The Mousavi Interview


1700 GMT: Where's Mahmoud? President Ahmadinejad has been at a conference in Tehran attended by Palestinian leaders such as Hamas' Khaled Meshaal, Islamic Jihad's Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, and the head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (General Command), Ahmed Jibril. Ahmadinejad offered this commentary:


With God's grace and thanks to the Palestinian resistance the occupying Zionist regime has lost its raison d'être. [Israel's] presence even in one inch of the region's soil causes threat, crisis and war. The only way to confront them (Israelis) is through the Palestinian youths' resistance, and that of the regional nations.

1435 GMT: US-Israel Front (cont.). Haaretz has more on Israel Defense Minister Ehud Barak's Iran manoeuvres after his US trip (see 0955 GMT). Barak had indicated earlier that Israel would not pursue military action but would look for tougher sanction; however, in a talk in Washington, he returned to the formula that "everything is on the table":
It's clear to me that the clock toward the collapse of this regime works much slower than the clock which ticks toward Iran becoming a nuclear military power. And this is the reason why simultaneously with diplomacy and effective sanctions, we recommend to all players not to remove any option from the table and we adopt this attitude for ourselves as well.

1400 GMT: Political Prisoner News. Journalist Ali Hekmat, editor-in-chief of the banned newsaper Khordaadhas been released after two months in detention. Civil rights activist Jamshid Zarei has also been freed.

1325 GMT: That Larijani Fellow. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, continuing to grab headlines after his trip to Japan, has spoken to the Majlis about the capture of Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi, "Fortunately, his confessions confirmed our previous information on the close cooperation between the US and NATO and the terrorist grouplet."

1300 GMT: No Protests. A day after Mir Hossein Mousavi called for the regime to allow rallies, Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi has given a sharp rejection:
Even though some go on trying to agitate the atmosphere in society with statements... they've been given the answer by the people. We will not witness street demonstrations and we will not allow anyone to come to the streets to disrupt public security without proper permits....

Even though threats against the revolution will not come to an end, we will not succumb and certainly one day in the not so distant future despair will take them and they will surrender. The file on the election has been closed and law enforcement agencies have been asked to preserve security.

Having wielded a large stick, Doulatabadi offered a small carrot with the promise that some post-election detainees would be released before the Iranian New Year.

1220 GMT: O" the Economic Front. Kalemeh denounces President Ahmadinejad's slogan of bringing oil income to people's tables, comparing it with "vanished billions" in revenues.

Rah-e-Sabz reports on a protest at an Isfahan steel plant over seven months of unpaid wages.

1215 GMT: Bluster of Day. Deputy Revolutionary Guard commander Hossein Salami warns, "Iran is standing on 50% of world's energy resources. If it decides to do so, Europe will spend the winter in the cold."

1205 GMT: Maintaining His Silence. The Supreme Leader used a meeting with Tehran's ambassador to take a nationally-televised swipe at the International Atomic Energy Agency, "Measures and reports of the agency show its lack of independence.... Unilateral acts erode trust in this institution and the United Nations and it is very bad for the reputation of these international assemblies."

No news there, as it is a restatement of Iran's public line on the IAEA, a day before the Agency's four-day discussion of a draft report on Tehran's nuclear programme. What is more intriguing is the Supreme Leader's lack of reference to Ali Larijani's manoeuvres in Japan for "third-party enrichment" (see 0935 GMT).

1155 GMT: MediaWatch. Leading US newspapers have noted and evaluated the Mousavi interview. Borzou Daragahi of the Los Angeles Times leads with Mousavi's accusation of the regime's "wasteful exercise" of 22 Bahman (11 February) but then puts his key point, "Mousavi offered few specifics on what the so-called green movement should do next."

In The Washington Post, Thomas Erdbrink  takes a similar line with Mousavi's denuncation of the Government as a "gang with no respect for Iran's interests" and the note that "he did not, however, propose new strategies". Nazila Fathi has a shorter piece in The New York Times, following the Associated Press, with the criticism of the Iranian leadership as a dictatorial "cult" but with no comment on Mousavi's goals.

0955 GMT: On the US-Israel Front. Laura Rozen has an intriguing reading of Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak's appearance at the Washington Institute of Near Policy, after his meetings with senior Obama Administration officials:
It became quite clear that [Barak] did not want to answer [a] question about the state of U.S.-Israel relations on Iran....It was his impression that Washington believes that, while it’s highly undesirable, at the end of the day the U.S. could live with a nuclear Iran; [however] for Israel, Barak said, it would be a “tipping point” in the strategic equation in the region.

0945 GMT: Today's Propaganda Special. Iranian state media pronounces, "Rigi planned to meet Holbrooke in Kyrgyzstan", which paints the picture of the Jundullah leader sitting down with President Obama's special envoy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke.

The source? "Famous Washington, D.C. based investigative journalist and reporter Wayne Madsen". Funny, but I don't actually see that on the website of "famous reporter" Madsen.

Safer, I think, for Iran's loudspeakers to rely on "Iranian forces bust terrorist cell in Azarbaijan".

Meanwhile, Jundullah has chosen a new leader to succeed Rigi.

0940 GMT: Speaking of Larijani. Ali Larijani has avoided the nuclear issue on his return to Iran from Japan, issuing instead an un-controversial condemnation of US policy in Afghanistan and an announcement that Japanese officials are willing to cooperate with Iran on the reconstruction of the Afghan infrastructure.

0935 GMT: The Larijani Debate. Elsewhere, there is a spirited discussion going on, as Ali Larijani returns to Iran from a five-day trip, over the significance of his manoeuvres in Japan, especially on the nuclear programme.

I stand by the reading that Larijani's sudden embrace of "3rd-party enrichment" (no doubt backed by the Supreme Leader) is a political move meant not only to keep open links with the international community but to out-manoeuvre and even push aside President Ahmadinejad. Mr Verde is more cautious:
I think Larijani’s talk of enrichment by Japan is an attempt by the Islamic Republic to break or slow down the anti-Iran posturing. Larijani may be chipping away at Ahmadinejad, but it is all with Supreme Leader's permission.

The post-elections protest shocked the regime and Khamenei. And the Larijani/[Ahmad] Tavakoli spat with Ahmadinejad is possibly an attempt to show that the Republic is not just one voice (that of the Supreme Leader) but it actually tolerates dissent.

A well-placed EA contact, however, is dismissive that there is any significance, writing of "incremental
developments that oftentimes go nowhere".

0930 GMT: We have published a Sunday special: there is a summary of the official statement of the Assembly of Experts, and a detailed analysis by Mr Verde: "The institutions of the Islamic Republic are unable to pull it out of the current crisis. All that have any power (at least on paper) are under the direct, and at times illegal, control of Khamenei."

0745 GMT: It will be a slightly later start this morning, as we wrap up our coverage of the Chile earthquake and tsunami watch and also pick up on the important statements out of Iran.

We have posted the English translation of Mir Hossein Mousavi's Saturday interview with Kalemeh. Initial reading is both of a Mousavi trying to maintain the momentum of opposition but also carefully defining how far the challenge goes --- is it enough to call for the "spread of awareness", "free rallies", and "adherence to the Constitution" if the regime stands firm against even those measured demands? We'll think about that today, looking forward to an analysis on Monday.

Later today, however, we may have an equally important reading. The official statement of the Assembly of Experts, which did not appear for several days after last week's meeting, is now posted. Beyond its loyalty to the Supreme Leader, the references to the opposition are not clear. Was this really the declaration that "sedition" would be put down and opposition would longer be acceptable in the Iranian system?
Saturday
Feb272010

Middle East Inside Line: Israel Presses US on Syria, Dubai Killing, Palestine's "Quiet Revolution"

Israel Pressures US on Syria: After this week's meetings in Damascus between Syrian President Bashar Assad, Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak has been pressing U.S. officials not to send Robert Ford, the recently nominated ambassador to Damascus.

Dubai Accuses Israel on Assassination: Dubai Police Chief Dahi Khalfan Tamim says he  has DNA evidence from one of the assassins and fingerprints from the crime scene. He urged Meir Dagan, the director of Israel's Mossad spy agency, to "be a man" and admit that Israel stands behind last month's killing of Hamas chief Mahmoud al-Mabhouh.

Israel Video & Transcript: Barak in Washington — Speeches and Meetings
Middle East Inside Line: Hamas Division, Ahmadinejad with Syria & Hezbollah, Mitchell to Resign?


UN Repeats Call for Call War Inquiries: On Friday, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a new resolution, by 98-7 (including the US and Israel) with 31 abstentions and 50 absent, calling on both Israel and the Palestinian Authority to investigate the 2008/9 Gaza War with inquiries that are "independent, credible and in conformity with international standards".


PA Rules Out Violence over Israel's West Bank Sites: The Palestinian Authority's Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, referring to Israel's plan to include West Bank religious locations in a new list of national heritage sites, said Friday that Palestinians will protest peacefully:
We will not be dragged into violence by the terrorism of the settlers, and the terrorism of the settlement project.

Our people understand all the dimensions of this political decision but they are determined to respond by building a positive reality on the ground.

This is what we call a quiet revolution.
Thursday
Feb252010

Israel-Palestine: Life in Gaza "Like Walking on Broken Glass"

Sara Roy writes for The Nation:

"Do you know what it's like living in Gaza?" a friend of mine asked. "It is like walking on broken glass tearing at your feet."

On January 21, fifty-four House Democrats signed a letter to President Obama asking him to dramatically ease, if not end, the siege of Gaza. They wrote:

Israel Interview: Netanyahu on Israeli Culture and Security (22 February)



The people of Gaza have suffered enormously since the blockade imposed by Israel and Egypt following Hamas's coup, and particularly following Operation Cast Lead.... The unabated suffering of Gazan civilians highlights the urgency of reaching a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and we ask you to press for immediate relief for the citizens of Gaza as an urgent component of your broader Middle East peace efforts.... Despite ad hoc easing of the blockade, there has been no significant improvement in the quantity and scope of goods allowed into Gaza.... The crisis has devastated livelihoods, entrenched a poverty rate of over 70%, increased dependence on erratic international aid, allowed the deterioration of public infrastructure, and led to the marked decline of the accessibility of essential services.



This letter is remarkable not only because it directly challenges the policy of the Israel lobby--a challenge no doubt borne of the extreme crisis confronting Palestinians, in which the United States has played an extremely damaging role--but also because it links Israeli security to Palestinian well-being. The letter concludes, "The people of Gaza, along with all the peoples of the region, must see that the United States is dedicated to addressing the legitimate security needs of the State of Israel and to ensuring that the legitimate needs of the Palestinian population are met."

I was last in Gaza in August, my first trip since Israel's war on the territory one year ago. I was overwhelmed by what I saw in a place I have known intimately for nearly a quarter of a century: a land ripped apart and scarred, the lives of its people blighted. Gaza is decaying under the weight of continued devastation, unable to function normally. The resulting void is filled with vacancy and despair that subdues even those acts of resilience and optimism that still find some expression. What struck me most was the innocence of these people, over half of them children, and the indecency and criminality of their continued punishment.

The decline and disablement of Gaza's economy and society have been deliberate, the result of state policy--consciously planned, implemented and enforced. Although Israel bears the greatest responsibility, the United States and the European Union, among others, are also culpable, as is the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank. All are complicit in the ruination of this gentle place. And just as Gaza's demise has been consciously orchestrated, so have the obstacles preventing its recovery.

Gaza has a long history of subjection that assumed new dimensions after Hamas's January 2006 electoral victory. Immediately after those elections, Israel and certain donor countries suspended contacts with the PA, which was soon followed by the suspension of direct aid and the subsequent imposition of an international financial boycott of the PA. By this time Israel had already been withholding monthly tax revenues and custom duties collected on behalf of the Authority, had effectively ended Gazan employment inside Israel and had drastically reduced Gaza's external trade.

With escalating Palestinian-Israeli violence, which led to the killing of two Israeli soldiers and the kidnapping of Cpl. Gilad Shalit in June 2006, Israel sealed Gaza's borders, allowing for the entry of humanitarian goods only, which marked the beginning of the siege, now in its fourth year. Shalit's abduction precipitated a massive Israeli military assault against Gaza at the end of June, known as Operation Summer Rains, which initially targeted Gaza's infrastructure and later focused on destabilizing the Hamas-led government through intensified strikes on PA ministries and further reductions in fuel, electricity, water delivery and sewage treatment. This near daily ground operation did not end until October 2006.

In June 2007, after Hamas's seizure of power in the Strip (which followed months of internecine violence and an attempted coup by Fatah against Hamas) and the dissolution of the national unity government, the PA effectively split in two: a de facto Hamas-led government--rejected by Israel and the West--was formed in Gaza, and the officially recognized government headed by President Mahmoud Abbas was established in the West Bank. The boycott was lifted against the West Bank PA but was intensified against Gaza.

Adding to Gaza's misery was the decision by the Israeli security cabinet on September 19, 2007, to declare the Strip an "enemy entity" controlled by a "terrorist organization". After this decision Israel imposed further sanctions that include an almost complete ban on trade and no freedom of movement for the majority of Gazans, including the labor force. In the fall of 2008 a ban on fuel imports into Gaza was imposed. These policies have contributed to transforming Gazans from a people with political and national rights into a humanitarian problem--paupers and charity cases who are now the responsibility of the international community.

Not only have key international donors, most critically the United States and European Union, participated in the sanctions regime against Gaza, they have privileged the West Bank in their programmatic work. Donor strategies now support and strengthen the fragmentation and isolation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip--an Israeli policy goal of the Oslo process--and divide Palestinians into two distinct entities, offering largesse to one side while criminalizing and depriving the other. This behavior among key donor countries reflects a critical shift in their approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from one that opposes Israeli occupation to one that, in effect, recognizes it. This can be seen in their largely unchallenged acceptance of Israel's settlement policy and the deepening separation of the West Bank and Gaza and isolation of the latter. This shift in donor thinking can also be seen in their unwillingness to confront Israel's de facto annexation of Palestinian lands and Israel's reshaping of the conflict to center on Gaza alone, which is now identified solely with Hamas and therefore as alien.

Hence, within the annexation (West Bank)/alien (Gaza Strip) paradigm, any resistance by Palestinians, be they in the West Bank or Gaza, to Israel's repressive occupation, including attempts at meaningful economic empowerment, are now considered by Israel and certain donors to be illegitimate and unlawful. This is the context in which the sanctions regime against Gaza has been justified, a regime that has not mitigated since the end of the war. Normal trade (upon which Gaza's tiny economy is desperately dependent) continues to be prohibited; traditional imports and exports have almost disappeared from Gaza. In fact, with certain limited exceptions, no construction materials or raw materials have been allowed to enter the Strip since June 14, 2007. Indeed, according to Amnesty International, only forty-one truckloads of construction materials were allowed to enter Gaza between the end of the Israeli offensive in mid-January 2009 and December 2009, although Gaza's industrial sector presently requires 55,000 truckloads of raw materials for needed reconstruction. Furthermore, in the year since they were banned, imports of diesel and petrol from Israel into Gaza for private or commercial use were allowed in small amounts only four times (although the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, UNRWA, periodically receives diesel and petrol supplies). By this past August, 90 percent of Gaza's total population was subject to scheduled electricity cuts of four to eight hours per day, while the remaining 10 percent had no access to any electricity, a reality that has remained largely unchanged.

Gaza's protracted blockade has resulted in the near total collapse of the private sector. At least 95 percent of Gaza's industrial establishments (3,750 enterprises) were either forced to close or were destroyed over the past four years, resulting in a loss of between 100,000 and 120,000 jobs. The remaining 5 percent operate at 20-50 percent of their capacity. The vast restrictions on trade have also contributed to the continued erosion of Gaza's agricultural sector, which was exacerbated by the destruction of 5,000 acres of agricultural land and 305 agricultural wells during the war. These losses also include the destruction of 140,965 olive trees, 136,217 citrus trees, 22,745 fruit trees, 10,365 date trees and 8,822 other trees.

Lands previously irrigated are now dry, while effluent from sewage seeps into the groundwater and the sea, making much of the land unusable. Many attempts by Gazan farmers to replant over the past year have failed because of the depletion and contamination of the water and the high level of nitrates in the soil. Gaza's agricultural sector has been further undermined by the buffer zone imposed by Israel on Gaza's northern and eastern perimeters (and by Egypt on Gaza's southern border), which contains some of the Strip's most fertile land. The zone is officially 300 meters wide and 55 kilometers long, but according to the UN, farmers entering within 1,000 meters of the border have sometimes been fired upon by the IDF. Approximately 30-40 percent of Gaza's total agricultural land is contained in the buffer zone. This has effectively forced the collapse of Gaza's agricultural sector.

These profound distortions in Gaza's economy and society will--even under the best of conditions--take decades to reverse. The economy is now largely dependent on public-sector employment, relief aid and smuggling, illustrating the growing informalization of the economy. Even before the war, the World Bank had already observed a redistribution of wealth from the formal private sector toward black market operators.

There are many illustrations, but one that is particularly startling concerns changes in the banking sector. A few days after Gaza was declared an enemy entity, Israel's banks announced their intention to end all direct transactions with Gaza-based banks and deal only with their parent institutions in Ramallah, in the West Bank. Accordingly, the Ramallah-based banks became responsible for currency transfers to their branches in the Gaza Strip. However, Israeli regulations prohibit the transfer of large amounts of currency without the approval of the Defense Ministry and other Israeli security forces. Consequently, over the past two years Gaza's banking sector has had serious problems in meeting the cash demands of its customers. This in turn has given rise to an informal banking sector, which is now controlled largely by people affiliated with the Hamas-led government, making Hamas Gaza's key financial middleman. Consequently, moneychangers, who can easily generate capital, are now arguably stronger than the formal banking system in Gaza, which cannot.

Another example of Gaza's growing economic informality is the tunnel economy, which emerged long ago in response to the siege, providing a vital lifeline for an imprisoned population. According to local economists, around two-thirds of economic activity in Gaza is presently devoted just to smuggling goods into (but not out of) Gaza. Even this lifeline may soon be diminished, as Egypt, apparently assisted by US government engineers, has begun building an impenetrable underground steel wall along its border with Gaza in an attempt to reduce smuggling and control the movement of people. At its completion the wall will be six to seven miles long and fifty-five feet deep.

The tunnels, which Israel tolerates in order to keep the siege intact, have also become an important source of income for the Hamas government and its affiliated enterprises, effectively weakening traditional and formal businesses and the rehabilitation of a viable business sector. In this way, the siege on Gaza has led to the slow but steady replacement of the formal business sector by a new, largely black-market sector that rejects registration, regulation or transparency and, tragically, has a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.

At least two new economic classes have emerged in Gaza, a phenomenon with precedents in the Oslo period: one has grown extremely wealthy from the black-market tunnel economy; the other consists of certain public-sector employees who are paid not to work (for the Hamas government) by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. Hence, not only have many Gazan workers been forced to stop producing by external pressures, there is now a category of people who are being rewarded for their lack of productivity--a stark illustration of Gaza's increasingly distorted reality. This in turn has led to economic disparities between the haves and have-nots that are enormous and visible, as seen in the almost perverse consumerism in restaurants and shops that are the domain of the wealthy.

Gaza's economy is largely devoid of productive activity in favor of a desperate kind of consumption among the poor and the rich, but it is the former who are unable to meet their needs. Billions in international aid pledges have yet to materialize, so the overwhelming majority of Gazans remain impoverished. The combination of a withering private sector and stagnating economy has led to high unemployment, which ranges from 31.6 percent in Gaza City to 44.1 percent in Khan Younis. According to the Palestinian Chamber of Commerce, the de facto unemployment rate is closer to 65 percent. At least 75 percent of Gaza's 1.5 million people now require humanitarian aid to meet their basic food needs, compared with around 30 percent ten years ago. The UN further reports that the number of Gazans living in abject poverty--meaning those who are totally unable to feed their families--has tripled to 300,000, or approximately 20 percent of the population.

Access to adequate amounts of food continues to be a critical problem, and appears to have grown more acute after the cessation of hostilities a year ago. Internal data from September 2009 through the beginning of January 2010, for example, reveal that Israel allows Gazans no more (and at times less) than 25 percent of needed food supplies, with levels having fallen as low as 16 percent. During the last two weeks of January, these levels declined even more. Between January 16 and January 29 an average of 24.5 trucks of food and supplies per day entered Gaza, or 171.5 trucks per week. Given that Gaza requires 400 trucks of food alone daily to sustain the population, Israel allowed in no more than 6 percent of needed food supplies during this two-week period. Because Gaza needs approximately 240,000 truckloads of food and supplies per year to "meet the needs of the population and the reconstruction effort," according to the Palestinian Federation of Industries, current levels are, in a word, obscene. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization and World Food Program, "The evidence shows that the population is being sustained at the most basic or minimum humanitarian standard." This has likely contributed to the prevalence of stunting (low height for age), an indicator of chronic malnutrition, which has been pronounced among Gaza's children younger than 5, increasing from 8.2 percent in 1996 to 13.2 percent in 2006.

Gaza's agony does not end there. According to Amnesty International, 90-95 percent of the water supplied by Gaza's aquifer is "unfit for drinking." The majority of Gaza's groundwater supplies are contaminated with nitrates well above the acceptable WHO standard--in some areas six times that standard--or too salinated to use. Gaza no longer has any source of regular clean water. According to one donor account, "Nowhere else in the world has such a large number of people been exposed to such high levels of nitrates for such a long period of time. There is no precedent, and no studies to help us understand what happens to people over the course of years of nitrate poisoning," which is especially threatening to children. According to Desmond Travers, a co-author of the Goldstone Report, "If these issues are not addressed, Gaza may not even be habitable by World Health Organization norms."

It is possible that high nitrate levels have contributed to some shocking changes in the infant mortality rate (IMR) among Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. IMR, widely used as an indicator of population health, has stalled among Palestinians since the 1990s and now shows signs of increasing. This is because the leading causes of infant mortality have changed from infectious and diarrheal diseases to prematurity, low birth weight and congenital malformations. These trends are alarming (and rare in the region), because infant mortality rates have been declining in almost all developing countries, including Iraq.

The people of Gaza know they have been abandoned. Some told me the only time they felt hope was when they were being bombed, because at least then the world was paying attention. Gaza is now a place where poverty masquerades as livelihood and charity as business. Yet, despite attempts by Israel and the West to caricature Gaza as a terrorist haven, Gazans still resist. Perhaps what they resist most is surrender: not to Israel, not to Hamas, but to hate. So many people still speak of peace, of wanting to resolve the conflict and live a normal life. Yet, in Gaza today, this is not a reason for optimism but despair.
Saturday
Feb202010

Photos of the Decade: 2000


Palestinians attempt to escape tear gas fired by Israeli soldiers,
Gaza, 20 October 2000 (Reihard Krause/Reuters)

Tuesday
Feb162010

Middle East Transcript: Hillary Clinton at Qatar Town Hall Meeting (15 February)

ABDERRAHIM FOUKARA, AL JAZEERA: Madam Secretary, if the criteria for judging U.S.-Muslim relations is the issue of Palestine, as millions of Arabs and Muslims seem to feel, they would say that those relations, taking that criterion into consideration, are not in very good shape right now. What say you to that?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, first, I am delighted to be part of this exciting interview and town hall at Al Jazeera. And thank you for participating.

The Latest from Iran (16 February): Un-Diplomatic Declarations

The first thing I would say is that, obviously, our relations with people around the world is much broader than any one issue, even an issue as important as the future of the Palestinian people and the conflict between the Palestinians and Israel. I think it is a mistake to only look at the United States and our role in working with other countries through any single prism. But I accept the fact that this is a critical issue. It’s a critical issue to us.



One of the very first decisions that President Obama made was that the United States would not be on the sidelines, that we would actively participate in trying to bring the parties into negotiations that would lead to a final resolution, and that it would result in a state for the people of Palestine, that they would have a chance to have their own future, fulfill their own dreams and aspirations, and that it would provide security for the people of Israel, that they too would be able to live side-by-side, in a two-state solution.

We have worked over this past year with both parties, as well as other interested countries, to try to bring that about. And I am hopeful that this year we will see the commencement of serious negotiations that will cover every issue that is outstanding. Obviously, those are the ones that have to be decided between the parties; no one can dictate to either the Israelis or the Palestinians what the outcome should be. They must make those decisions themselves. But the United States is very focused on being a facilitator and a help in every way possible to achieve that outcome. And we are working hard on it, we are working hard on it every day. And we hope that we will see the kind of break-through this year that everyone is anticipating.

MR. FOUKARA: Madam Secretary, a lot of people look at the issue of settlement into the West Bank, and they wonder if the United States gives priority to the concerns of the few thousand settlers over its interests and its relations with over a billion Muslims. How do you account for that?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, the fact is that we do not, that our position is that settlement activity is illegitimate, and that the final resolution of borders has to be worked out that will give both sides, the Israelis and the Palestinians, the secure borders that they deserve to have. And both sides recognize that development and swaps will be necessary in order to achieve the outline of the Palestinian state. But, of course, it will be based, as I have said many times, on the 1967 lines, with the agreed swaps, and taking into account subsequent developments. Those are the very clear parameters that the United States believes that the parties should negotiate over.

So that is, then, our condition. It remains our condition. And we think the best way to resolve the ongoing concerns that are reflected in the question and the feelings that so many people have is to get the parties into a negotiation facilitated by the United States, and to assist them in whatever way we can to reaching a resolution on borders, on refugees, on security, on Jerusalem that will, once and for all, end the conflict.

MR. FOUKARA: Madam Secretary, I have a few more questions, so I will be talking to you again, one-on-one, in a little while. But for now I would like to take a few questions from the audience, if that is okay with you.

QUESTION: Hello, Madam Secretary. My name is Kasi Irae. I am from Iran. But I was born and raised in Dubai. My question is about the war in Iraq. So, ever since -- throughout high school and subsequently in my university years, I have been watching the Iraq war. People are dying, you know, bombs are going off, and there are several (inaudible). And something I just -- I wonder if America were -- if Iraq didn’t have any oil. And my question is, would America be in Iraq if Iraq didn’t have any oil?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I think that what is happening in Iraq is very important on a number of fronts. And we are going to be leaving Iraq, and when we leave Iraq, as has been agreed to with our military -- and we are on schedule to do that -- we will, hopefully, have a relationship with Iraq as we would have with any other country. We hope to have a strong civilian partnership.

And I think that the short answer to your question is we will be in Iraq as we would be in any country, whether or not they have natural resources. And the Iraqis themselves are making the decision about the future of their oil industry. You may have followed the recent bidding that has been done, giving contracts to countries from all over the world, companies from China to Europe to the United States to the Middle East.

That’s the way it should be. The people of Iraq, through their democratically elected government -- something they did not have in the past -- should be making those decisions for themselves. That is really what the United States hopes will be the future of Iraq, that it will remain democratic, a strong democracy, a pluralistic society, where every part of the country gets to participate, that there isn’t any tilting of power for or against any group within Iraq, and that, as part of their democratic future, the Iraqi people will have the benefit of their oil revenues. Not one group, not any individual, but the Iraqi people.

And it is my hope that that becomes the reality for the Iraqis, that they benefit from their own natural resources, that they invest in education cities, that they build great health care facilities and housing for people. That is what we hope for them, and that is the direction that the Iraqi Government seems to be headed, themselves.

So, the United States is very pleased at the progress that Iraq is making. And the oil industry is broadly dispersed among many different companies and countries, at the decision of the Iraqis themselves. That is the way it should be, in our view.

MR. FOUKARA: Can I take the next question in Arabic, and preferably from a female voice, if that’s okay?

QUESTION: Hello, Madam Secretary. (Inaudible.) I was wondering in regards to your (inaudible) in Doha, the campaign is pretty much emphasizing to cut off support for Iran’s nuclear program, since you have evidence that they are, indeed, building nuclear weapons. How do you plan to implement that, especially in the Middle East?  (Inaudible) the vast majority of the companies (inaudible) Iranian, and you have much (inaudible) Iranian. How do you (inaudible) that issue?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you. I think it’s important to remember that when President Obama went into office a little over a year ago, he made it very clear that we wanted -- the United States wanted -- a different relationship with Iran. We have not had a very good relationship for over 30 years. And President Obama decided that it was time to try to change that. And I agreed, that we wanted to reach out to the Iranian leadership and look for ways that we could begin to cooperate and have something of a more normal government-to-government, people-to-people relationship. And President Obama has reached out, and has publicly and privately made it clear that we are extending a hand. But it is a two-way street to have any kind of engagement.

We also believe that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons was very destabilizing for the entire region. People of Iranian descent may live in Qatar, but I think part of the reason why we’re so focused on the nuclear threat from Iran is that it would be very destabilizing to all the countries in this region. And we believe that it is in violation of Iran’s obligation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and violation of a number of United Nations resolutions for Iran to pursue nuclear weapons.

We have made it clear -- and it’s on the front page of the paper in Doha, what I said yesterday -- that Iran, as any country, has a right to peaceful, civil nuclear power. We drew that distinction. Unfortunately, there has not been the kind of response that we had hoped for from the Iranian leadership.

And, therefore, we have pursued a dual track approach. The engagement offered is still there. But it is important for us to work with like-minded countries here in the Gulf, in the broader region, and around the world who share our concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. And the world community has made those concerns very clear. We have worked with Russia and Germany and France, the United Kingdom, and China to continually, over the course of this past year, make clear that we did not believe that Iran should pursue nuclear weapons.

So, where are we today? Well, on the nuclear front we see Iran being exposed for having a secret facility at Qom. We see Iran refusing an offer from Russia, the United States, and France to help it get the enriched uranium it needed to run something called the Tehran Research Reactor, which makes medical isotopes, something that we are willing to support Iran to do, for medical purposes. We see the president of Iran ordering the nuclear program to do its own enriching, and to begin to move toward the level of enrichment that certainly is troubling to us, because of what it well could be, with respect to nuclear weapons. We hear a lot of very negative language coming out of Iran.

And we are deeply concerned about the way Iran is treating its own people, and the way that it has executed demonstrators, imprisoned hundreds and hundreds of people whose only offense was peacefully protesting the outcome of the elections. Sitting here in this extraordinary campus, where you are encouraged to think and speak freely, it is hard to imagine what it must be like now to a young person in Iran, who wishes to have the same opportunities.

So, we are still hoping that Iran will decide to forgo any nuclear ambitions for nuclear weapons, and begin to respect its own people more on a daily basis, provide opportunities that the young students of Iran deserve to have for their future. But we cannot just keep hoping for that. We have to work to take action to try to convince the Iranian government not to pursue nuclear weapons.

And so, that is our policy. And that is what we are attempting to do. And we think it is very important for this region, but it is also important for the world.

MR. FOUKARA: Madam Secretary, as a follow-up to what you said about giving young people in Iran an opportunity, a lot of Arabs and Muslims look at Gaza. They look at the young people in Gaza, and they say, “Well, aren’t those also worthy of an opportunity? And is the U.S. working to (inaudible) on Gaza, so that they can enjoy that opportunity?”

SECRETARY CLINTON: And they are right. That is exactly how we view the situation in Gaza. We consider it a humanitarian crisis. It is something that I have worked on, ever since I became Secretary of State. The United States has contributed many, many hundreds of millions of dollars to try to assist the people of Gaza. We have worked to encourage the lifting of the boycotts, and tried to get more important materials into Gaza. And I deeply, deeply feel the terrible situation that all the people of Gaza are experiencing.

We have begun to deal with the immediate necessities of food and medical supplies. But we need housing for people to live in. We need hospitals rebuilt. We need schools tha t can function and provide an education. And we are continuing to push very hard for that to be realized. And we hope that once we get into the negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians, we will see more progress.

We would also love to see Hamas renounce violence, agree to recognize Israel, and be part of that future. Because, clearly, we want to see a secure and stable policy in place that would include Gaza. And that can only happen if Hamas decides that it wishes to be part of the solution, going forward.

So, this is a very, very serious humanitarian challenge that we feel very strongly about, and are working to try to address. That is part of the larger political challenge that we think can only be resolved through finally ending the conflict and creating a state for the Palestinian people to live in peace and security and pursue the kind of everyday activities, like educating their children, that should be the birthright of everyone.

MR. FOUKARA: Just for the sake of diversity, I am going to try to find and get a question in Arabic (inaudible), Madam Secretary.

QUESTION: (Speaks in Arabic.)

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I hope so. That is certainly our goal. And it is President Obama’s vision and hope that we would overcome stereotypes and misinformation, misconception. Because, clearly, the raw diversity of the Islamic world is something that Americans are learning more about, and recognizing to a greater degree.

But I think we have work to do. And so what we are trying to achieve is a broad program of outreach. And I have two young people here with me today, and I will ask them to stand up, so that you can see them. One of them is our new special envoy to the OIC, Rashad Hussein, who the President has just appointed. He is a trusted advisor to the President, works in the White House and in the State Department on behalf of this important position. The other is Farah Pandith, who is our special representative to the Muslim community, particularly young people. And Farah has been working non-stop, traveling the world, talking with and listening to young people in Muslim communities from Morocco to Malaysia. It has been a very concerted and broad outreach.

So, both of these young people are part of President Obama’s and my outreach, because we want to have the kind of conversation we are having today. We will not agree on everything. I don’t know any family that agrees on everything, let alone countries that have differences in experience and cultural views and the like. But we believe it is very important to have this kind of dialogue.

We are also investing hundreds of millions of dollars in more educational opportunities for Muslim students to come to the United States, because the young woman’s question raises one of the challenges. After 9/11, as some of you may know, America became very focused on protecting our citizens, and made it more difficult for people to come to study and work in the United States. We are trying to, you know, reverse that.

We are also sending out science and technology envoys. We have Nobel Prize winners and other very distinguished scientists who are traveling the world, coming to countries, talking about what we can do in partnerships on science and technology. Entrepreneurships is an important area of our emphasis. And at the end of April, April 26th to 27th, President Obama will host an entrepreneurship summit at the White House, where we are identifying and bringing young people from across the Muslim world to be part of that networking and opportunity experience.

So, we are working hard on this, and we would hope that many of the Muslim communities around the world will, you know, reciprocate by inviting American students, inviting American professors, inviting American business leaders, media personalities, because that is the kind of dialogue that we think will help to move us beyond this very narrow focus that we, unfortunately, see too much of in the past.

MR. FOUKARA: How do you feel about veering to this side a little bit now?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Indeed. Don’t want to leave anyone out.

QUESTION: Madam Secretary, why did the current U.S. Administration turn its back on UN and NATO central European allies’ calls, specifically, in the context of the missile shield program, and instead chose to accommodate Russia’s demands, which are more appropriate for the Cold War era?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Very good question, because I have the opportunity to explain our policy. And for those of you who may not have followed this issue, in the prior Administration of President Bush, a decision was made to deploy a so-called missile shield into Europe, particularly central and eastern Europe, as a defensive measure against potential missile attacks, particularly nuclear attacks.

When the Obama Administration came in, we conducted a very thorough review of the prior policy. And we concluded that it was not aimed at immediate threats, so much as longer-term threats, and that we could, with some changes in the architecture of the missile defense, be much more effective. And so we adopted a new approach. We did not eliminate missile defense, we changed how we were going to deploy it, and the various technologies that would be used for it. And you may have noticed in the last week there were announcements of placement in Poland and Romania.

Now, our belief is that there is a greater potential threat from Iran, with its missile -- with the development of its missile program, and with other potential rogue regimes or networks of terrorists who get a hold of missiles, than there are from a European-Russian conflict. We just do not see that as a problem, going forward. We may have political difficulties that we have to work out between the United States and Russia, or between Europe and Russia, but we don’t see that as a kind of long-term threat, the way we unfortunately see Iran with its missile development, and its (inaudible) nuclear weapons.

So, the missile shield, which would protect into the Caucasus and down to Turkey, would provide some additional guarantee against threatening behavior. And we also are talking at length with a lot of our friends in the Gulf, as to what more they need defensively, in the event that Iran pursues this nuclear ambition.

So, we still are very committed to missile defense, but we think we have a better plan that is more effective than the one we inherited.

QUESTION: May I follow up? During the Aegis program, the Navy-based program that is going to be implemented now, didn’t it fail most of its tests, the most recent one being (inaudible)?

SECRETARY CLINTON: But it succeeded in most of its tests. I mean, that’s why you test, you know. You test -- there were some radar problems with it, and it didn’t hit a target. But we have a lot of data that shows it being successful. So I think you can rest assured that we are going to have a very robust, respected missile defense system that is of the variety that we think will actually meet the threats that are on the horizon.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. FOUKARA: Just as a follow-up to what you said about Iran, Madam Secretary, you said in your speech before the U.S.-Islamic World Forum that more pressure should be applied to Iran. And there are a lot of people in the Middle East wondering if the United States is planning, at any one time, whether before the withdrawal from Iraq or after the withdrawal from Iraq, planning to launch a military attack of one kind or another against Iran.

SECRETARY CLINTON: No. We are planning to try to bring the world community together in applying pressure to Iran through sanctions adopted by the United Nations that will be particularly aimed at those enterprises controlled by the Revolutionary Guard which we believe is, in effect, supplanting the government of Iran. I mean, that is how we see it. We see that the Government of Iran, the supreme leader, the president, the parliament, is being supplanted, and that Iran is moving toward a military dictatorship. Now, that is our view.

And so, what we are trying to do is to send a message to Iran, a very clear message, that we still would be open to engagement, we still believe that there is a different path for Iran to take. But we want the world united in sending an unequivocal message to Iran that, “We will not stand idly by while you pursue a nuclear program that can be used to threaten your neighbor, and even beyond.” And we hope to try to influence the decision making within Iran. And that is our goal.

MR. FOUKARA: So, Madam Secretary, now you are saying there is no plan on the part of the United States to launch an attack? Not in the immediate future, not in the middle term, not in the long term?

SECRETARY CLINTON: We are interested in changing Iran’s behavior and -- now, we will always defend ourselves, and we will always defend our friends and allies. And we will certainly defend countries here in the Gulf who face the greatest immediate nearby threat from Iran. But we have pursued a dual track, not a triple track, but a dual-track approach of engagement and potential pressure, and that is what we’re focused on.

MR. FOUKARA: Madam Secretary, I would like to take a short break with your permission and with the permission of the audience, a very short one. When we come back, we will take more questions from the audience.

(Applause.)

MR. FOUKARA: (Speaks in Arabic.)

QUESTION: (Speaks in Arabic.)

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, our goal, eventually, is to have a Middle East free of nuclear weapons. In fact, the President has set a goal of eventually (inaudible) zero nuclear weapons in the world. I mean, that is our stated goal. We know that it will take time, and we are negotiating right now with the Russians to reduce our nuclear arsenal, because we are very committed to demonstrating our -- the importance that we place on this goal. So that is our goal.

Now, I have spent a lot of time talking with the leaders, and leading influential people from the Gulf and the broader Middle East. And they worry a lot about Iraq having nuclear weapons. And they tell me all the time that this is something that would cause them to have to react. And they don’t want to. That’s not something that they want to spend their money on, that they want to be involved in. But, on the other hand, they don’t want to live in a region where they feel threatened.

So, our goal is to try to convince countries not to pursue nuclear weapons. And Iran signed a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. And they really bound themselves not to do so, and now are, we believe, reconsidering if not violating that.

So it is an ongoing challenge that we think the world has to face up to. The Non-Proliferation Treaty conference will be held in May. President Obama is hosting, in April, a nuclear security summit. And maybe it’s because we have to worry about all kinds of scenarios all the time. We know that a lot of countries around the world share our concerns. And, therefore, we want to talk about how we prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, how we control nuclear material that could fall into the wrong hands. We have reason to believe that al-Qaeda would be very interested in getting its hands on nuclear material to make a nuclear bomb.

And this is not the Cold War. In the Cold War the feeling was that you could deter each other, that no rationale actor, no rationale state would use a nuclear weapon on another, because they would immediately be destroyed. So that has kept everything in balance. When you have people who are willing to kill themselves, and kill many others at the same time, that upsets the balance. So it’s not like it was 40 years ago. Now we are looking at threats that are much more difficult to evaluate and control, which is why we would like to move everyone towards a world in which we don’t have nuclear weapons. We know that will take time, but we are pursuing it, and we are committed to it.

MR. FOUKARA: (Inaudible) question is what if Qatar or another ally of the United States decides to go for nuclear capability? How would you handle that?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, we would do everything we could to discourage it, because even though we have great relations with our friends here in the Gulf, we don’t think it is smart for more countries to be developing nuclear weapons.

And, given the legitimate concerns and even fears that some countries might have that others would have it and they wouldn’t have it, we would work to provide more defensive capability. Going back to the young man’s question about missile defense, we would do more to try to persuade our friends that they would be protected, and that they wouldn’t have to do this on their own. So that would be our response.

MR. FOUKARA: Israel. Everybody in the region knows that the Israelis have nuclear weapons. What if another state, another ally of the United States, decides openly that they want to have nuclear capability for military purposes? How would you handle that?

SECRETARY CLINTON: I would give you the same answer. I mean, we have had these conversations, as you might guess, going back many years. A number of countries that thought about it -- and this is public information -- like a Brazil or South Africa, decided not to pursue it. I mean it is a very expensive undertaking. It requires enormous commitment of technical expertise and financial resources. And in this world, as it exists today, it is not at all certain that it makes you safer.

So, I think a lot of countries who have done the balancing test have concluded not to pursue it. If a friend, an ally of ours, were to say, “Look, I worry about living in a neighborhood where a country that we are not friendly with has it and we don’t have it,” which is only a conversation that I think has been really active in the last year or two because of Iran, which is the focus of these conversations, again, we would say, you know, “We would hope that you would not do that,” and we would try to reassure our friends that we would provide the defense and provide them with the defensive capability that they need to protect themselves from whatever that threat might be. That, I think, is the best way for us to proceed, and for our allies and friends to proceed.

MR. FOUKARA: (Speaks in Arabic.)

QUESTION: (Speaks in Arabic.)

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, we have to look at how we can best work with or influence or coexist with Iran. And that is really at the heart of your question: What is the best way to get along with Iran?

I can only tell you what so many leaders tell me, which is that they worry about Iran’s intentions. They worry about whether Iran will be a good neighbor, and will live peacefully. They know that Iran has funded activities that are against a lot of countries and people in the region. They know that Iran directly funds terrorist activities. So I think people have reason to worry.

And the question is, what can Iran do in order to allay the worries and the fears of their neighbors? And that is what we are trying to encourage Iran to consider. And yet, I don’t see much progress there, to be honest. I just wish that we could tell you that there was more progress.

And I don’t know whether the reaction that the Iranian Government had to the election, and now the opposition trying to express itself -- which we fully support their right to do so -- has made the Iranian Government even, you know, more unwilling to open up and talk with their friends and their neighbors about how to prevent the concerns from escalating. I wish that Iran would take a different approach. The United States, under President Obama, would really welcome a positive, normal relationship with Iran. But you can’t do that unless there is something coming back to you. And there hasn’t been. So, I wish that we could be having a town hall in Tehran. I wish that we could be having this conversation with members of the opposition and members of the government, and students from all points of view. But we are not.

So, our challenge is, how do we try to influence Iran to be a good neighbor and to treat its own people fairly and decently? And anyone who has answers to those questions, I really would love to hear them.

MR. FOUKARA: Madam Secretary, we want to get off the subject of Iran, and use your time with us to talk to you about other topics. I have one question for you before I go back to the audience.

Madam Secretary, you are obviously a Secretary of the United States of America. Part of your job is to look after the interests of the state that is your country. But you are also a human being. We all, as human beings, feel the need to see justice, whether in the Israeli-Palestinian issue or any other issue. How do you find that balance, between being the Secretary of State and just Hillary Clinton?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I find the balance because I think that my country and the people of the United States want very much to see other people around the world have the same rights and opportunities that we have. And it is heartbreaking when you see people mistreated or abused or deprived of those rights, or suffering from natural disasters or war or oppression or other terrible events.

We can’t be everywhere at all times, despite the size and the reach of the United States. But the United States has been extremely generous and concerned about meeting the needs of people. And I personally believe strongly that that is part of our obligation on this earth, to reach out and provide help and support to those in need. So, I think that the balancing act is not that hard. The prioritizing is hard, because there is so much need, and there are so many people who are suffering.

I took a very long trip to Africa last summer, and had a wonderful visit in many different places. But you go to a place like Eastern Congo, where more people have died in the conflict in Eastern Congo than any conflict since World War II -- more than 5.5 million people -- yet we rarely talk about it. We rarely see it on television. Women are raped and mutilated. People are driven from their homes. It is a horrible humanitarian disaster. And we are struggling to try to figure out a way to end the fighting, and to give people a chance to go back to their small homes and grow their food and raise their children, which is just the kind of common, everyday living that everyone should be entitled to.

So, when you look around the world, there are so many challenges that -- the balance is not the hard part. It’s trying to figure out what we can constructively do, how the United States can best intervene, how we can bring people together, how we can work with others to end suffering in Darfur, or to try to provide a better life for girls to go to school in Afghanistan. It is a very long list. But I think you have to keep your heart open, and you have to keep your mind alert to try to find opportunities to help wherever you can.

MR. FOUKARA: (Speaks in Arabic.)

QUESTION: (Speaks in Arabic.)

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I think that women everywhere should be able to pursue an education, and to have the opportunity to make important choices for themselves. But not every woman everywhere wants the same things in life. And we have to be respectful of our differences. But I do believe that there are certain basic rights that every woman and girl should have, and then for women to choose how to pursue your life, how to live with your family, and all of these choices that are so important to us.

I have been very blessed over many years to have a number of close friends and associates of women who have been from Gulf countries or other places in the world, who are Muslim, who have a great pride in their heritage, but who also are very independent and very strong-minded, and who make their own way in life.

And I think that the education that you are receiving here is absolutely critical, because you will then have more opportunities. And it’s not so much about what one wears as what is in one’s mind and one’s heart, and the kind of person one becomes. And I think that should be the emphasis as to how we look at girls and women’s lives around the world.

And, you know, I have spent a lot of time working in Afghanistan. When President Karzai became president, there were a little less than a million children in school, and they were all boys. Now there are closer to 7 million children, and 40 percent of them are girls. And many families, even though they are conservative, want their daughters, just as their sons, to be educated.

And so, that’s what we should be striving for. And that’s why what Education City represents -- and I am sure you are aware of this -- is so important, not only in Qatar, not only in this region, but far beyond. And the fact that young women and young men go to school together, study together, learn together, sends a strong message to the entire world.

So, that is my hope, that each young woman has a chance to fulfill her God-given potential, just as I hope the same for each young man.

MR. FOUKARA: Madam Secretary, I just want to say thank you. I hope we will have another opportunity to do something like this down the road. And I want to thank the Qatar Foundation, and everybody who has taken part in this program. Thank you.

(Applause.)