Update: Analysing the Iranian (Non-)Threat

Well, it didn't take long.

This morning we highlighted the US "Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment", which explicitly said that, as of mid-2007, Iran had not resumed its programme for nuclear weapons.

We added, however, that the report left open the door to those who don't like this assessment of non-threat, offering the admission:

We do not have sufficient intelligence reporting to judge confidently whether Tehran is willing to maintain indefinitely the halt of its previously enumerated nuclear weapons-related activities while it weighs its options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt it to restart those activities.

And we noted that Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair, who presented the report to a US Senate committee, "was so cautious that..he has made a rod for the back that he was trying to cover,quite keen to cover his back and that of his agency". Step up, stridently pro-Israel Commentary magazine:

Blair acknowledged [Iran's nuclear programme] was a difficult question to deal with in a public setting. “I can say at this point that Iran is clearly developing all the components of a deliverable nuclear weapons program — fissionable material, nuclear weaponizing capability and the means to deliver it,” he said.

Let's revisit the relevant passage of the Threat Assessment report:

We judge in fall 2003 Tehran halted its nuclear weapons design and weaponization activities and that the halt lasted at least several years. We assess Tehran had not restarted these activities as of at least mid-2007. Although we do not know whether Iran currently intends to develop nuclear weapons, we assess Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop them.

That's not exactly the same as "clearly developing...nuclear weaponizing capability". Or to be blunt, the Director of National Intelligence, in front of a Congressional committee was undercutting the analysis of his intelligence services.

And it gets worse. Yesterday morning, Greg Miller of the Los Angeles Times put out a sensational article, "U.S. Now Sees Iran as Pursuing Nuclear Bomb".

It's a poor piece of journalism, with almost no sources and absolutely no evidence to back up the claim, "The Obama administration has made it clear that it believes there is no question that Tehran is seeking the bomb." There's a Presidential quote pulled far out of context, and another snap sentence before a Congressional committee, this one from CIA Director, Leon Panetta: ""From all the information I've seen, I think there is no question that they are seeking that capability."

It's enough, however, for Miller to write, "The language reflects the extent to which senior U.S. officials now discount a National Intelligence Estimate issued in November 2007," when in fact the Threat Assessment repeats and supports the conclusions of that Estimate unequivocally. And you can guess which of the two pieces --- Miller's slipshod report or the primary document based on the detailed analysis of the intelligence services --- is racing around the talkboards on the Internet and the journals like Commentary.

So it may come to pass --- amidst hesitant Obama officials, activists wanting to take out an "enemy", and a mainstream media without the time or judgement to consider details rather than assumptions --- that grey becomes black and Iran once more becomes Threat Number One to the United States. If so, then this month's opening for US-Iran engagement will be jeopardised, not by a Bomb but by unsupported bluster.

US Director of National Intelligence: No Evidence that Iran Has Restarted Nuclear Weapons Program

It may not have the sexiest of titles but, for those digging for the detail in US foreign policy, the "Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment" is a must-read. Presented by the US Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, to the US Senate yesterday, it offers the latest American evaluation of challenges from Al Qa'eda to the Middle East to Afghanistan to Latin America.

Here's one far-from-incidental passage: the US does not believe Iran is an imminent nuclear threat. Indeed, American intelligence has no evidence that Iran has resumed the weaponisation programme that it suspended in 2003:

We judge in fall 2003 Tehran halted its nuclear weapons design and weaponization activities and that the halt lasted at least several years. We assess Tehran had not restarted these activities as of at least mid-2007.

In effect, Blair was re-stating the US intelligence community's issued a National Intelligence Estimate of December 2007. This reversed previous American analysis: far from pushing for a nuclear weapon, Iran had halted its efforts four years earlier.

This didn't mean, of course, that Iran had stopped the pursuit of enriched uranium, since that was necessary for any nuclear energy programme. Nor had Iran suspended development of ballistic missiles. However, it was no longer seeking to put nuclear warheads on those missiles.

The December 2007 NIE has been repeatedly attacked by politicians and commentators, in part because it undermines Israel's projection of an Iran prepared for an offensive strike, in part because it removes one of the props for "regime change" in Tehran. Conversely, its conclusions are useful backing for a policy of "engagement", since there is time to deal politically with Iran before it resumes weapons development, let alone joins the A-Bomb Club.

It should be noted, however, that Blair also threw a bone to those who have criticised US intelligence for being too soft on Iran: "Although we do not know whether Iran currently intends to develop nuclear weapons, we assess Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop them." Indeed, he was so cautious that I suspect he has made a rod for the back that he was trying to cover, namely that US intelligence simply doesn't know what is going on:

We do not have sufficient intelligence reporting to judge confidently whether Tehran is willing to maintain indefinitely the halt of its previously enumerated nuclear weapons-related activities while it weighs its options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt it to restart those activities.