Text: President Obama's Budget

President Obama's budget document, setting out US Federal Government spending of more than $3 trillion in the next fiscal year:

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The Latest on Israel-Gaza-Palestine (17 February)

Evening Update (8 p.m.): Another obstacle to the Egyptian-brokered talks, this time over Palestinian unity. Reuters claims the "efforts may be doomed by Western powers' reluctance to accept ministers from the Islamist party. Neither the Obama administration nor the European Union is ready to offer more than vague and conditional encouragement to a coalition intended to heal the schism in Palestinian politics."

The BBC are reporting that the UN has protested the removal of unexploded munitions from its warehouses in Gaza. The facilities were being guarded by Hamas personnel, and it is suspected that the organisation has revolved the ordnance.

The UN was waiting for Israel to allow technical support into Gaza to defuse the ordnance (see 6 a.m.)

3:30 p.m. How little political movement has there been today? More than nine hours ago, we wrote, "The question is whether Tel Aviv will accept the [prisoner swap] arrangement, and we won't have any indication of that until Wednesday's Security Cabinet meeting."

This from Agence France Presse:

"We want first to resolve the Shalit issue and then will look into the reopening of crossings and the rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip," [Israeli Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert said. His demand was swiftly rejected by Hamas's exiled leader Khaled Meshaal, who again accused Israel of backtracking on the terms of a proposed long-term truce by linking the lifting of the blockade to the soldier's release.

6:50 a.m. An interesting political development, however, which may have long-term significance in Israeli politics and Israel-Palestine relations. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, still trying to form the next Israeli Government in which she would be Prime Minister, told US Jewish leaders in Jerusalem yesterday that Tel Aviv would have to "give up parts of the Land of Israel" in a settlement.

The comments are in sharp contrast to those of Livni's rival, Benjamin Netanyahu, who insists on "biblical borders" including parts of Gaza and the West Bank.

Livni put her support for the two-state solution in a wider regional perspective: ""If we don't continue with the plan, we will not be able to count on the support of the international community against Iran, Hezbollah, or Hamas."

Morning Update (6 a.m. GMT; 8 a.m. Israel/Palestine): A relatively quiet day yesterday and likely to be so again today. News services are reporting that Hamas is ready to consider prisoner swap, which in fact is not news --- the Gazan leadership have been discussing this for some days. The issue is whether a prisoner swap will be agreed in advance of any settlement of issues such as border crossings, setting up a two-stage process. Hamas wants to keep the strands separate: the release of kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit (pictured) must not be "part of a broader cease-fire agreement with Israel".

No, the question is whether Tel Aviv will accept the arrangement, and we won't have any indication of that until Wednesday's Security Cabinet meeting.

Meanwhile safety, let alone reconstruction, is being held up by continued restrictions on supplies and movement in Gaza:

A team trained to remove and destroy unexploded ordnance has been operating in the Gaza Strip for three weeks, but its work is being held up because Israel has not approved the entry of its equipment nor an area for storing and neutralizing ordnance. For now some of the latter, located by the Palestinian police, is being stored in locations that are dangerously close to population centers in Rafah, Khan Yunis and Gaza City.

One Gazan died and five were wounded yesterday when unexploded munitions were thrown onto a fire melting scrap metal.

Iran's Presidential Election: What Difference Does Khatami Make?

Our colleague Chris Emery offers this incisive assessment of former President Mohammed Khatami's declaration that he will stand in June's Presidential Election in Iran, taking us beyond the simplistic formula of Ahmadinejad v. Khatami:

Former two-term Iranian President Mohammed Khatami waited until almost the last possible minute before deciding to put his name on the ballot for the presidential elections in June. He only declared after a careful examination of the political environment and, more importantly, his electoral chances.



This scrutiny was not matched by the western media.

Their haste was perhaps predictable: Khatami is well-known and respected in the West. It was just too tempting to paint him as the reformist liberal who, in conjunction with the new saviour of American diplomacy, could genuinely transform US-Iranian relations. So it will now hold its collective breath that he will prevail against the hard-line incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

The context of renewed hopes for rapprochement is, I suspect, of much less significance to the Iranian public’s perception of Khatami’s decision to run. And it is unlikely, though still unclear, that Khatami's decision was relatded President Ahmadinejad’s reciprocation of Barack Obama's offer for dialogue with America.

Whilst the prospect of a more moderate leadership in Washington and Tehran is gratifying, the characterisation of Khatami as "the Iranian Obama" or, even more erroneously, that Obama’s election provoked Khatami’s decision to run is patently false. Khatami’s decision to run rests on internal Iranian politics, the complex dynamics of which are hard to penetrate.

For example, it had been widely reported that Khatami would not run if former Prime Minister Mir-Hussein Mousavi chose to. Prior to his announcement, Khatami met with Mir Hossein Mousavi at the office of reformist politician and cleric Abdollah Nouri in northeast Tehran. So all Iranian eyes will now watch if Mousavi, another popular reformist, is now the one to withdraw.

Another egregious error, as typified by the BBC article that announced Khamtami’s decision, is the assumption that Iranians now face a choice between one hard-line conservative candidate (Ahmadinejad) and one liberal reformist (Khatami). Quite apart from failing to qualify terms such as "reformist", "liberal", and "conservative2, which have very different and dual meanings in Iran than in the West, it is rash to immediately reduce the election to a two horse race. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the popular Tehran mayor and veteran, remains firmly in the race and the chances of Mehdi Karoubi, who heads the reformist E'temad Melli Party, or former Prime Minister Mousavi cannot simply be discounted.

It is perhaps tempting, given the generally constructive rhetoric emerging from Washington, to link Khatami’s entry to the tentative prospect of normalised relations between Iran and the US. This is also an error. Firstly, Khatami's electoral prospects are not going to stand or fall on current developments in US-Iranian relations. Secondly, both sides will probably refrain from meaningfully pushing rapprochement until the election in Iran is finished. Thirdly, Khatami does not have a radically different attitude to Ahmadinejad on the main American concerns of Iran’s nuclear programme and its support for Hamas and Hezbollah. Fourthly, the final decision on rapprochement will not be made, in Tehran, by the president’s office- whoever is occupying it.

In any case, the election in June will not be fought over rapprochement with the US. Instead, if the contest comes down to a battle between Khatami and Ahmadinejad, it will be over presidential legacies and broken promises. Ahmadinejad’s failure to deliver on his promise to improve economic and employment conditions, at a time of increased oil revenue, has led to widespread disillusionment. Khatami has claimed a better economic record as president, yet he failed to deliver the reforms and greater openness his supporters sought.

Many questions, however, remain. Will Khatami’s entry damage the reformists’ prospects, uniting the conservatives against him, as Khatami must have feared? What will be the response of the influential former President Hashemi Rafsanjani who, according to different sources, is either refusing to support Khatami or trying to persuade Karoubi to step aside in favour of him?

Update on Obama v. The Military: Where Next in Afghanistan?

Is President Obama preparing to stall out the military's request for 25,000 more US troops to Afghanistan?

The Times of London, in an article that is not replicated elsewhere, thinks so. It asserts, on the basis of an unnamed source:

The Pentagon was set to announce the deployment of 17,000 extra soldiers and marines last week but Robert Gates, the defence secretary, postponed the decision after questions from Obama.

The president was concerned by a lack of strategy at his first meeting with Gates and the US joint chiefs of staff last month in “the tank”, the secure conference room in the Pentagon. He asked: “What’s the endgame?” and did not receive a convincing answer.

On its own, that's not strong evidence that Obama is going to block the military's insistence on a "surge" to be announced before the NATO summit on 5 April. However, the excellent Juan Cole stacks up the reasons why Obama might want to pull the plug on Genius/General David Petraeus's plan.

As we've noted for weeks, the US is in a real logistical bind. With the closure of its main supply route from Pakistan, it has to find an alternative for all those extra forces. Russia, however, is playing a double game: while it says publicly it will allow the US to move supplies across its territory, it has encouraged Kyrgyzstan to close the US Manas airbase that is needed for the effort. Meanwhile Uzbekistan, which did host US bases after 9/11 but then evicted American forces in 2005, is only prepared to allow non-military supplies across its supplies.

Conclusion? The US is going to have pay a very high price --- economic and political --- to get full support for an alternative supply route. That is --- and here's a crazy thought --- unless it's prepared to supply Afghanistan from the west via Iran.

But, as good as Cole's analysis is, I think it misses the wider political point. It's pretty clear that Washington would prefer to see the back of President Hamid Karzai, its choice to lead Afghanistan in 2001 but a leader who --- depending on your point of view --- is too tolerant of corruption or too critical of the US approach to be a solid ally in this new surge.

However, unless the US is prepared to abandon the semblance of national government, it needs someone to play the political partner in Kabul. And Karzai, who is getting bolder even as his position is more and more tenuous, has made the process more difficult by suspending elections for the foreseeable future.

That means that, short of a coup, the Obama Administration is encumbered by a national leader who is now an opponent of its plans. And that means that, even if the US can find short-term military success against the insurgents, it has no political "endgame" in sight.

I'm wary of the V-word as an analogy but, for students of history, it might not be a bad idea to revisit Ngo Dinh Diem and Saigon 1963. Let's hope that Barack Obama chooses to take a glance, and draw any suitable lessons, this week.

Decoding the Political Challenges of the Iraqi Elections

Four days after the provincial elections in Iraq, the political complexities are beginning to emerge. While many are still caught up in the two-dimensional narrative of "victory for the secularists, defeat for Iran", this  is at best a diversion which does not appreciate the complexities of politics and society after Saddam.

Consider and contrast, for example, the fatuous cheerleading of the Kagan spin machine (Kimberly and Frederick in the Wall Street Journal) with Juan Cole's simple, effective correction: "Iran did not Lose the Provincial Elections". And, for the less onerous but still simplistic readings of "Big Win for Prime Minister al-Maliki", Cole has a more detailed breakdown today (which we reprint below) and an incisive conclusion:

Although Nuri al-Maliki's Da'wa Party got over a third of the votes in Baghdad and Basra, they clearly did not achieve a commanding position, and its share in the more rural Shiite provinces was signifcantly less..

The big story here is that the Shiite religious parties (and yes, the Da'wa or Islamic Mission Party is among them) again swept the Shiite south. However, those Shiite parties that won out this time want a strong central government, not a Shiite mini-state.



The irony, which is deliberately missed by those who want to twist the election into a simple "victory for America, defeat for Al Qa'eda, defeat for America's enemies" narrative, is that less than a year ago, the US was working against a strong Baghdad and in favour of stronger local Sunni movements. Then, however, al-Maliki asserted himself in the battles for Sadr City and Basra and Washington swung behind him as the most effective Iraqi leader.

But, of course, those local Sunni movements that had been courted by the US in the "surge" are still around --- indeed, up to 48 hours ago they were threatening a mini-war with Baghdad --- and so are the other parties in al-Maliki's coalition. As we said last summer and will say again, Iraqi politics is now beyond Washington, and the US military is marginal, not central, to the complex processes that will play out beyond any simple invocation of "democracy".

Religious Parties Sweep Shiite South; Sunni Arabs fragmented, mainly Secular
JUAN COLE

The Iraqi provincial election results are out. They confirm what I said last Monday, that the parties who want a strong, united Iraq have come to the fore in these elections. Although Nuri al-Maliki's Da'wa Party got over a third of the votes in Baghdad and Basra, they clearly did not achieve a commanding position, and its share in the more rural Shiite provinces was signifcantly less..

The big story here is that the Shiite religious parties (and yes, the Da'wa or Islamic Mission Party is among them) again swept the Shiite south. However, those Shiite parties that won out this time want a strong central government, not a Shiite mini-state.

There is nothing here to give comfort to those Americans who fear Iranian influence in Iraq. The Islamic Mission Party or Da'wa is just as committed to warm relations with Tehran as is the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. The Da'wa leaders were in exile in Tehran for years just like ISCI. Da'wa is more "lay" and less clerical than ISCI, but being "lay" means non-clerical, not secular. Da'wa wants an Islamic State.

These election results raise severe questions about the viability of the Biden plan, which foresaw three decentralized super-provinces overseen by a weak central government. Most of the victors in this election are strong believers in a centralized civil bureaucracy.

On the whole, I think these results are encouraging for Obama. The Sunni Arab ex-Baathist secular elites have reentered polities in the Sunni Arab areas. These election results put paid to the fantasies of Dick Cheney and John McCain that Sunni Arab Iraqis are pro-"al-Qaeda." Most of them would not even vote for a religious party, much less for a radical fundamentalist terrorist group. Cheney said that if the US left, al-Qaeda would take over Sunni Arab Iraq. That is highly unlikely given these election results.

Iraq voted as several distinct demographic zones.

In the two provinces with very large Shiite cities, the Islamic Mission Party (Da'wa) of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki took over a third of the vote. Another 15-20% of the vote went to Shiite fundamentalist parties such as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq or the Sadrists. Contrary to what a lot of observers are saying, the Da'wa Party is not secular and it is not anti-Iran. It is Iraq's oldest Shiite fundamentalist party, founded in the late 1950s, and it explicitly works for an Islamic republic. Its leaders consult with and tend to defer to Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. Since these parties will have to make post-election coalitions to rule, given that none gained a majority, the resulting provincial governments will resemble those formed by the United Iraqi Alliance, which grouped as allies these same Shiite religious parties. The major difference in this election in the big urban areas is that in Baghdad, the Shiite middle class gave the Iraqi List of Iyad Allawi nearly 10% of the vote, and the Sunni fundamentalists got a similar percentage. Of course, some Sunnis may have voted for Allawi's Iraqi List. But the election returns suggest that Sunnis are no no more than ten to fifteen percent of the Baghdad population, and that Iraq's capital is now a largely Shiite city. In Basra province, the Sunni proportion seems even smaller, tiny, even. This is odd because Zubayr near Baghdad is a largely Sunni city of 300,000. The Basra middle classes, once fairly secular, returned the big religious parties overwhelmingly.

The second zone is the medium and smaller Shiite cities of the south. There, Da'wa did not do nearly as well, receiving between ten and twenty-three percent of the vote. The other 90 to 77 percent of the seats went to other fundamentalist Shiite parties in the main. The Sadrists showed substantial strength in some provinces, garnering 14% and 15% of the vote. Although the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq suffered a massive reversal, insofar as it had dominated the provinces of the south from 2005, it still often ranged from 8% to 15% of the seats in these provincial councils. Other small Shiite parties, including former PM Ibrahim Jaafari's National Reform Trend and the Islamic Virtue Party, both small Shiite fundamentalist parties, often got between three and eight percent of the vote.

The final zone is the four Sunni Arab provinces, which did not vote similarly to one another.

The ethnically mixed Diyala Province in the east split its vote, with about a quarter going to secular parties with a Baathist background; about a fifth going to the Sunni fundamentalist bloc; a fourth going to the Kurdistan alliance, and about 15 percent going to Shiite fundamentalist parties.

In al-Anbar, the secular and tribal parties won big, with the religious parties marginalized (15% of the vote).

In Ninevah, a big, secular, centralizing party, al-Hadba', got nearly 50% of the seats, sweeping away the Kurdish representatives that were once prominent on this provincial council.

Salahuddin returned so many small parties that seeing a trend thare is beyond me. The over all picture of the Sunni ARabis is that contrary to the last administration in Washington, the Sunni Arabs of Iraq are mostly secular nationalists and are uninterested for the most part in fundamentalists or "al-Qaeda."

Al-Hayat reports in Arabic that the Iraqi High Electoral Commission announced 90 percent of the results in the provincial elections held Jan. 31. More results are given in Arabic in this al-Hayat article. The New York Times has a fairly complete list of results in English.

Below, I list the major results, though I'm leaving out the very small parties. I will use the names of the leading parties rather than the names of their coalitions, since they aren't really much of a coalition and typically there is a strong party core. So the Islamic Mission Party or Da'wa of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki ran with others as the Coalition for a Government of Laws. The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim (which is especially close to Iran) ran with some other closely allied small parties as the Martyr of the Prayer Niche Alliance. And the Sadrists, followers of Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr, ran as "The Free Independent Movement." But I'll just call them Sadrists. Likewise, among Sunnis the National Dialogue Front of Salih Mutalk (secular, Sunni, ex-Baathist) ran in a coalition called "the Iraqi National Plan." Iyad Allawi's Iraqi National List kept its name. Former Prime Minister Ibrahim Ja'fari ran a party called the National Reform Trend.

LARGE SHIITE PROVINCES:

Baghdad: Da'wa won 38%; the Sadrists won 9%; the (Sunni) Iraqi Accord Front won 9%; The Iraqi List won 8.6%; the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) won 5.4%; The National Reform Trend won 4.3%

Basra: Da'wa won 37%; ISCI won 11.6% the Gathering of Justice and Unity won 5.5%; the Sadrists won 5%; the Iraqi Accord Front won 3.8%; the Islamic Virtue Party won 3.2%; the Iraqi List won 3.2%; the (Shiite fundamentalist) National Reform Trend won 2.5%

SMALLER SHIITE PROVINCES

Dhi Qar: Da'wa won 23.1%; Sadrists won 14.1%; ISCI won 11.1%; National Reform Trend won 7.6%; Islamic Virtue Party won 6.1%

Qadisiya: Da'wa won 23.1 %; ISCI won 11.7%; the National Reform Trend won 8.2%; the Iraqi List won 8%; the Sadrists won 6.7%; Islamic Loyalty won 4.3%; the Islamic Virtue Party won 4.1%

Maysan: Da'wa won 17.7%; Sadrists won 15.2%; ISCI won 14.6%; National Reform Trend won 8.7%; Islamic Virtue Party won 3.2%

Najaf: Da'wa won 16.2%; ISCI won 14.8%; Sadrists won 12.2%; Loyalty to Najaf won 8.3%; the National Reform Trend won 7%

Wasit: Da'wa won 15.3%; ISCI won 10%; Sadrists won 6%; Iraqi List won 4.6%; Constitutional won 3.9%; National Reform Trend won 3.2%

Babil: Da'wa won 12.5%; ISCI won 8.2%; Sadrists won 6.2%; the National Reform Trend won 4.4%

Muthanna: Da'wa won 10.9%; ISCI won 9.3%; Republicans won 7.1%; National Reform Trend won 6.3%; Sadrists won 5.1%; the National List won 5%; the Gathering of Muthanna won 4.9%;
Academics won 4.4%; the Middle Euphrates won 3.9%; the Islamic Virtue Party won 3.7%; the Iraqi List won 3.5%

Karbala: Yusuf Majid al-Hububi won 13.3%; the Hope of Mesopotamia won 8.9%; Da'wa won 8.5%; the Sadrists won 6.8%; ISCI won 6.4%; Justice and Reform won 3.6%; the
National Reform Trend won 2.5%; the Islamic Virtue Party won 2.5%

SUNNI PROVINCES

Salahuddin: Iraqi Accord Front won 14.5%; the Iraqi List won 13.9%; the Iraqi National Plan won 8%; the Kurdistan Alliance won 4% (plus many, many small parties)

Diyala: Iraqi Accord Front won 21.1%; the Kurdistan Alliance won 17.2%; and the Iraqi National Plan won 15%; The Iraqi List won 9.5%; Da'wa won 6%; the Coalition of Diyala won 5.3%; the National Reform Trend won 4.3%; the Sadrists won 3.1%; the National Movement won 2.6%; the Islamic Virtue Party won 2.3%

Ninevah: al-Hadba' won 48.4%; the Kurdistan Alliance won 25.5%; the Iraqi Accord Front won 6%; the Iraqi Islamic Party won 6.7%; the Turkmen Front won 2.8%; the National Iraqi Plan won 2.6%; ISCI won 1.9%

al-Anbar: the Iraqi National Plan won 17.5% ; the Awakening of Iraq won 17.1%; Iraqi Accord Front won 15.9%; the National Movement for Reform and Development won 7.8%; the Iraqi List won 6.6% (plus small parties)