Iran Special Analysis: The Politics of the Tehran Trial

The Latest from Iran (2 August): Assessing the Trial

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Saturday, for the first day in recent weeks, it was the regime on the offensive. Ayatollah Jannati's tough address at Friday prayers in Tehran was followed by the showpiece of the trial of almost 100 defendants, including a former Vice President and Deputy Ministers, key members of reformist political parties, and journalists.

As legal process, the courtroom scene was, to be frank, ludicrous. There were no defense lawyers, and the only official press in the courtroom were those from media favourable to the State.

The indictment and presentation of charges offered no evidence of substantive criminal acts apart from the relatively minor acts of throwing stones at security forces. More sinister allegations of bombing relied upon the past, rather the current, records of defendants (and did not include any of the most prominent detainees). And the "foreign plot" scenario was almost laughable. It turned US-based academics into directors of an Iranian insurgency. (Abbas Milani has no love for the regime, but he is a solid historian and political analyst, and Gene Sharp works with theory, rather than application, of non-violent regime change. Mark Palmer may be an irritating polemicist, but he is not a CIA mastermind.)

The central act of the prosecution's play was the testimony of former Vice President Mohammad Ali Abtahi. While dramatic in its content, it offered no detail of a treasonous plot. Instead, this was blatant political manoeuvre, designed to stigmatise Mohammad Khatami, Mehdi Karroubi, Mir Hossein Mousavai (although he was portrayed as naïve campaigner rather than malevolent schemer), and, above all, Hashemi Rafsanjani.

Only Abtahi knows whether his testimony was genuine or coerced. His family and attorney declared that he had been tortured and drugged. Pictures from the courtroom showed a man who looked haggard and unhealthy, losing a lot of weight in his detention. His "confession" had apparently been circulated in advance to news services that would give it the correct interpretation.

Opposition politicians denounced both the trial and Abtahi's suspect testimony. Mousavi's camp declared, via Ghalam News, "The people's movement is peaceful in nature and relies on the demand of the public to achieve their rights which have been trampled upon during the last elections." They specifically ruled out the allegation of conspiracy with foreign agents, responding not only to the trial but some unhelpful calls from outside Iran for regime change: "Despite claims of the dissidents, this just and spiritual movement has no connections with the foreigners and is completely domestic, and our nation is mindful of staying away from foreigners."

Rafsanjani was briefer in his response, calling the testimony "an obvious lie". Significantly, however, his advisors issued the statement through the offices of the Expediency Council, which Rafsanjani heads. The message to the regime? If you want a fight, we have our own bases of support within the system.

What matters in the short-term is not the cold dissection of yesterday's events but the emotive reaction. Will the regime succeed, days before the anointing of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President, in mobilising public opinion against the opposition or at least ensuring acceptance of its authority? Or is this another instance of going too far in trying to crush protest as illegitimate?

The challenge for the regime is that it cannot sustain the high-profile denunciation on a daily basis. It has played its strongest card with Abtahi. Meanwhile, the opposition is countering. A show of dissent was scheduled for this morning outside the offices of the head of Iran's judiciary, and there is talk of protests not only for Wednesday, when Ahmadinejad is inaugurated, but also Monday, when he is approved by the Supreme Leader, and Friday, a day of celebration for Imam Mahdi's birthday.

It is one thing to crush a reformist faction like the Islamic Iran Participation Front, whose leading members are on trial. It is another to take on both the Green movement and Rafsanjani by linking them so blatantly (and, I think, crudely).

The regime may "win" but, to do so, it is gambling. And far from cleaning up the resistance with an easy bet, it is having to raise the stakes.

1440 GMT: Ali-Akbar Javanfekr, President Ahmadinejad's press secretary, has resigned from his post. Javanfekr stated that " there is a need for fresh blood to take over the responsibility,  and one must make way for these individuals".

http://parlemannews.com/?n=2376

The Islamic Participation Front, one of the reformist parties has responded to the trials via its news site Norouz:

"The show goes on: Wholesale killings and suppressions, wholesale arrests and wholesale trial and sentencing. The trial of the political activists arrested after the presidential elestions has started. As it could have been expected and just as political activists and parties had warned the trial was held eschewing all legal presuppositions favoring the defendants. The Islamic Participation Front states that the sole reporting news agency in the court was the pro-government and mendacious Fars news agency. Considering the track record of this agency in propagating falsehoods, it is obvious that none of the statements of this agency possess any credibility.

Nourouz states that a credible source located in the court has stated that none of the statements of Fars are true and the court is effectively a kangaroo court.

The Latest from Iran (1 August): The Regime Gets Tough

NEW Iran: Interpreting Ayatollah Jannati’s Challenge at Friday Prayers
The Latest from Iran (31 July): And Now….?

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1340 GMT: The "reformist" Parliamentary group Imam Khomeini Line has denounced today's events as a "so-called trial".

1330 GMT: Fars News Agency has published the "confession" of former Vice President Abtahi; this differs somewhat from the version reported out of the trial (see 1210 GMT). This may be because Fars had an advance "script" of Abtahi's testimony.

1210 GMT: Blaming Hashemi. And now to the political point of today's proceedings. Take note of how the "confession" of former Vice President Mohammad Ali Abtahi, as described by Fars News, is set out to tie former President Rafsanjani into the "plot" of the opposition:

After the election [Mohammad] Khatami and Rafsanjani had sworn to have each other's back, and I don't understand the point of it, knowing the diference [in votes between Ahmadienjad and Mousavi] was 11 million....Hashemi wanted to take revange on Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader....

Mousavi probably did not know the country, but Khatami, with all due respect... knew all the issues. He was aware of the capability and power of the leader, but he joined Mousavi and this was a betrayal,...I see myself as a reformist but stated that Khatami did not have the right to force [this] on Mousavi. I did not agree with Ahmadinejad's presidency but believe in people's votes, and congratulated as people's choice as  the president.

It was wrong of me to take part in the rallies, but [Mehdi] Karroubi told me that we cannot call the people onto the streets with such a meagre number of votes, so we had better go to the streets ourselves to demonstrate our protest.

But, if Rafsanjani is the chief villain, Iran can thank its ultimate hero:

If the Supreme Leader would have backed up even a bit, today Iran's distress would have gone as far as that in Afghanistan and Pakistan; therefore people should thank the supreme leader for his moves. I am telling all friends and all that hear our voices to know the election matter was a lie to make an excuse for riots so Iran would have changed to another Iraq and Afghanistan so [the opposition] could hurt the regime and take over.

1140 GMT: How Serious is that "Foreign Plot"? Well, Mark Palmer is far from a covert practitioner of regime change: he is the author of Breaking the Axis of Evil, which "has the gumption to argue what diplomats and political leaders dare not speak: that global peace with not be achieved until democracies replace the world's remaining dictatorships". A former State Department official, he advocated the invasion of Iraq well before March 2003, and he is now with the American Enterprise Institute.

Abbas Milani is also not very secretive: he is one of the most prominent US-based analysts of Iran. He is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, another "conservative" think tank (one of its most notable associates is former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice). While critical of the Iranian system, Milani has not advocated "regime change".

And Gene Sharp, singled out in the prosecution's indictment (see 0938 GMT), is an academic who has written for decades "on the strategic uses of nonviolent struggle in face of dictatorship, war, genocide, and oppression". A long-time fellow at Harvard University, the "instructions" cited in the indictment are not direct orders to the defendants (unless the prosecution has some dramatic evidence that Sharp has ever met any of them) but a reference to the general theories and analysis in his books.

Put bluntly, if this is a "foreign plot", as the Iranian prosecutors allege, it's a very poorly-designed one indeed, given that it took me five minutes to assemble the above information.

1105 GMT: Finding the Foreign Agents. This from the prosecution's opening statement:

Some people like "Mark Palmer", President of "Konos Institute" have carried out much research on Iran and formed classed two or three years ago, to which they invited reformists like Emad Baqi to train them in "soft overthrow" of the Government.

There is a institute in US which is called "Hoover", and one of its member is Abbas Milani. His value to CIA is more than Reza Pahlavi [the son of the Shah] because of his good relationship with reformists and some members of the Kargozaran Party especially Mohammad Atrianfar. The institute has a project called "Democracy in Iran", and also Milani covers all of Akbar Ganji's financial costs overseas.

1100 GMT: This trial is clearly an effort to break the "reformist" Islamic Iran Participation Front, with several of its high-ranking officials amongs the defendants. In addition to those listed in earlier entries, Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, the Vice President of the IIPF, is on trial.

1040 GMT: Sea of Green Radio is dedicating itself to establishing and publicising the death toll in post-election conflict: "Any failure to hold Iranian authorities to account has one key consequence: it extends to repressive forces in Iran a licence to continue to kill without fear that the full scale of these murders will be exposed." Today it interviews the author of Iran Revolution, a blog pursuing an up-to-date confirmation of casualties.

1010 GMT: Other defendants include Mohsen Mirdamadi, General Secretary of  the Islamic Iran Participation Front, Mohsen Aminzadeh, a founding member of the Islamic Participation Front and former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs under President Khatami, and journalist Mohammad Atrianfar.

1000 GMT: Summary of prosecutor's introduction of defendants:

"What we have seen is a part of an unsuccessful velvet coup d'etat. Many arrestees have been previously arrested for being with Monafeghin [anti-Iranian terrorists]", including involvements in bombings. Others have travelled to Iraq to meet American troops and have sent American authorities videos of their plans for bombings. "Emad Behavar [leader of the youth wing of the Freedom Party] was an activist in Mousavi's campaigns, which was making film and distributing them to others in Iran....They betrayed their country by sending footage out to foreign media to change the image of Iran." One defendant is accused of destroying banks and other public property.

0938 GMT: From Revolutionary Road, who is live-blogging from the first trials of the detainees, the text of the indictment:

Every fair man can easily see the big achievement of this great epic [election] in the political, cultural, social, and economic fields at national and international levels.

Firstly, this election converted into real democratic pride and performance, with a message to people around the world, that the Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the most secure and stable countries in the world for investment and progress in economic projects.

Secondly, in the field of international relations, this great national election contributed to the achievement of the full realization of peoples' rights. Therefore, there in no place for false claimants of freedom, democracy. and human rights [to challenge this]. From now on, Iranian diplomats and statesmen can do their roles better than ever in the world.

Thirdly, the profound effect of this election was that, more than ever, the national public realized that the pattern of religious democracy is efficient.

Fourth, since the support of the people is one of the most important components in national security to the holy Islamic Republic, the 85 percent turnout iof people in this election stabilised the national security and will help Iran in its domestic and foreign problems.

But as the supreme leader Ali Khamenei had warned people about enemies and their malicious intrigues, the losers and hopeless enemies immediately started to turn this victory into bitterness for the Iranian nation. According to available documents and evidence and the reasonable confessions of the accused, this was a pre-designed and scheduled velvet coup. More than 100 of 198 instructions of "Gene Sharp" for velvet coup have been carried out.

0925 GMT: The Battle Amongst the Clerics. Picking up on some news from yesterday: the Association of Teachers and Researchers of Qom, a "reformist" group, issued a statement asking protesters to continue. The Association asserted, "Grand Ayatollahs are worried and disappointed by the recent developments ,and what the
Friday prayer leader [Ayatollah Jannati] says in the Friday sermon does not reflect thoughts and beliefs of the Grand Ayatollahs and the professors and teachers in the seminaries and the Hawzahs [schools of clerical learning and interpretation]."

0845 GMT: Fars News Agency has posted a series of pictures from the trials. There is no update on the proceedings.

0600 GMT: Iranian state media are reporting that the first trials of demonstrators in the post-election conflicts have begun. It is unclear how many are being tried, but the estimates of 30 to 100 are greater than the original figure of 20 put out this week. The charges of rioting and vandalism seem relatively minor; the catch-all and more ominous allegation are "acting against national security" and "having ties with counter-revolutionary groups".

Fars News says that the trials began in "chaos and turbulence" at 9:10 a.m. local time (0440 GMT). There are "nearly 100" defendants, including former Deputy Speaker of the Parliament Behzad Nabavi, former Vice President Mohammad Ali Abtahi, and former Deputy Ministry of Economy Mohsen Safai-Farahani.

Kurdish officials in Iraq said last night that three American tourists have been detained by Iranian security forces after they strayed across the border during a mountain hike.

Iran: Ayatollah Jannati's Challenge at Friday Prayers (Rafsanjani, We're Watching You)

The Latest from Iran (1 August): The Regime Gets Tough

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Less than 24 hours after the "40th Day" memorial demonstrations, the regime offered its response through Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati's address at Friday prayers in Tehran. The message was far from subtle, but for some it may be surprising.

Right now, those supporting the Government do not see the protestors as the main threat. The challenge does not come from the leaders of that movement, such as Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karoubi, or Mohammad Khatami. It is not even in the statements of senior clerics from Qom.

The man they fear is former President Hashemi Rafsanjani.

On reflection, this may always have been the case. A week after the election, in his address at Friday prayers, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, gave nothing to the Green opposition. However, he devoted much attention to Rafsanjani, offering conciliatory words over the verbal fighting before the election (especially over "corruption") but concluding that he preferred the political views of President Ahmadinejad.

The difference yesterday was that Jannati did not extend any hand of compromise to Rafsanjani. Instead, he cast him as the shadow behind the post-election conflict, "an unrest four years in the making". That reference to the 2005 election, in which Ahmadinejad defeated Rafsanjani in the second round, could not have been clearer. (Even Press TV English is openly framing this as a showdown allegation against the former President.) Jannati charged, "After defeat was inflicted on a certain figure four years ago, those who could not stand a young man in power colluded against him. Since then, they have planned to avenge (their loss)."

The "young man" reference deserves special attention. As sharper analysts of Iran have noted, there is a wider battle here between politicians and clerics who emerged in the early years of the Revolution, including Rafsanjani and Mousavi, and a "new guard" including Ahmadinejad. In 2005 the Supreme Leader, despite having gained his position in 1989 in large part because of Rafsanjani's manoeuvring, backed the "young man" in what was widely seen as a political upset.

The shifting alliances --- Rafsanjani now finds himself on the same side as Ayatollah Montazeri, the clerical leader ousted in favour of Khamenei in 1989 --- do not replace the challenge on the streets. Jannati noted this yesterday when he warned opposition leaders, ""You were behind these unrests. You are responsible for the bloodshed… Now you go to their graves and offer prayers? Sooner or later, you will be punished for your unlawful acts."

However, since Rafsanjani chose to make his challenge public when he led prayers on 17 July, it is his specific threat that has galvanised supporters of the current regime. It is no coincidence that Jannati, the Secretary of the Guardian Council, is also one of the key figures behind the letter --- signed by 16 of the 86 members of the Assembly of Experts --- that tried to remove Rafsanjani as chairman of that body. And a contributing factor to his address was the reaction from other members of the Assembly, who sharply rebuked him and others for claiming a widespread mandate for the letter --- Jannati directly responded by claiming that while many members scattered around the country could not sign, they of course were fully supportive of the contents.

So the regime turns its eyes upon and points its fingers at Rafsanjani, waiting for his response. That still leaves intriguing questions, four days before the Presidential inauguration: if Rafsanjani is willing to compromise by promising no long-term challenge to the Supreme Leader and the system, will Jannati and his colleagues, including Khamenei, sacrifice Ahmadinejad? And, as the first trials of detainees begin today, with hundreds (how many hundreds?) languishing in prison, will the regime risk saying, "We were wrong", by giving in to the primary demand --- a demand not only of the Green opposition but of Rafsanjani and other political and clerical figures within the system --- to release and apologise to those who were taken off the streets and from their homes?

Iraq: US Colonel's Leaked Memo "We Now Smell Bad to the Iraqi Nose"

Iraq continues to be a violent and unstable country. Yesterday, bombs exploded near five Shi'a mosques in Baghdad, killing 29 people. British forces have finally been forced to complete their withdrawal, with the Iraqi Parliament refusing to extend an agreement for their stay, leaving the US as a "Coalition of One". Political tension over the future of Kirkuk, the key city in the middle of Iraq's oil-producing region, is escalating.

Paradoxically, however, six years after the "liberation" of Iraq, the campaign by some in the US military to turn instability into a rationale for a continued US presence persists. So this leaked memorandum for a high-ranking US officer in Baghdad, published in The New York Times, has caused a stir within Iraq, even if it has not been picked up by many in the "mainstream" media. The official response from the US military is that "the author is conveying that the problem is too hard, and therefore we should quit"; Juan Cole offers his own analysis of the issues for the American occupation:

From: Col. Timothy R. Reese, Chief, Baghdad Operations Command Advisory Team, MND-B, Baghdad, Iraq

As the old saying goes, “guests, like fish, begin to smell after three days.” Since the signing of the 2009 Security Agreement, we are guests in Iraq, and after six years in Iraq, we now smell bad to the Iraqi nose.

Today the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are good enough to keep the Government of Iraq (GOI) from being overthrown by the actions of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the Baathists, and the Shia violent extremists that might have toppled it a year or two ago. Iraq may well collapse into chaos of other causes, but we have made the ISF strong enough for the internal security mission. Perhaps it is one of those infamous paradoxes of counterinsurgency that while the ISF is not good in any objective sense, it is good enough for Iraq in 2009.

Despite this foreboding disclaimer about an unstable future for Iraq, the United States has achieved our objectives in Iraq. Prime Minister (PM) Maliki hailed June 30th as a “great victory,” implying the victory was over the US. Leaving aside his childish chest pounding, he was more right than he knew. We too ought to
declare victory and bring our combat forces home. Due to our tendency to look after the tactical details and miss the proverbial forest for the trees, this critically important strategic realization is in danger ofbeing missed.

Equally important to realize is that we aren’t making the GOI and the ISF better in any significant ways with our current approach. Remaining in Iraq through the end of December 2011 will yield little in the way of improving the abilities of the ISF or the functioning of the GOI. Furthermore, in light of the GOI’s current interpretation of the limitations imposed by the 30 June milestones of the 2008 Security Agreement, the security of US forces are at risk. Iraq is not a country with a history of treating even its welcomed guests well. This is not to say we can be defeated, only that the danger of a violent incident that
will rupture the current partnership has greatly increased since 30 June. Such a rupture would force an unplanned early departure that would harm our long term interests in Iraq and potentially unraveling the great good that has been done since 2003. The use of the military instrument of national power in its current form has accomplished all that can be expected. In the next section I will present and admittedly one sided view of the evidence in support of this view. This information is drawn solely from the MND-B area of operations in Baghdad Province. My reading of reports from the other provinces suggests the same situation exists there.

The general lack of progress in essential services and good governance isnow so broad that it ought to be clear that we no longer are moving the Iraqis “forward.” Below is an outline of the information on which I base this assessment:

1. The ineffectiveness and corruption of GOI Ministries is the stuff of legend.
2. The anti-corruption drive is little more than a campaign tool for Maliki
3. The GOI is failing to take rational steps to improve its electrical infrastructure and to improve their oil exploration, production and exports.
4. There is no progress towards resolving the Kirkuk situation.
5. Sunni Reconciliation is at best at a standstill and probably going backwards.
6. Sons of Iraq (SOI) or Sahwa transition to ISF and GOI civil service is not happening, and SOI monthly paydays continue to fall further behind.
7. The Kurdish situation continues to fester.
8. Political violence and intimidation is rampant in the civilian community as well as military and legal institutions.
9. The Vice President [Joe Biden] received a rather cool reception this past weekend and was publicly told that the internal affairs of Iraq are none of the US’s business.

The rate of improvement of the ISF is far slower than it should be given the amount of effort and resources being provided by the US. The US has made tremendous progress in building the ISF. Our initial efforts in 2003 to mid-2004 were only marginally successful. From 2004 to 2006 the US built the ISF into a fighting force. Since the start of the surge in 2007
we have again expanded and improved the ISF. They are now at the point where they have defeated the organized insurgency against the GOI and are marginally self-sustaining. This is a remarkable tale for which many can be justifiably proud. We have reached the point of diminishing returns, however, and need to find a new set of tools. The massive partnering efforts of US combat forces with ISF isn’t yielding benefits commensurate with the effort and is now generating its own opposition. Again, some touch points for this assessment are:

1. If there ever was a window where the seeds of a professional military culture could have been implanted, it is now long past. US combat forces will not be here long enough or with sufficient influence to change it.
2. The military culture of the Baathist-Soviet model under Saddam Hussein remains entrenched and will not change. The senior leadership of the ISF Leakkedis incapable of change in the current environment.

a) Corruption among officers is widespread
b) Neglect and mistreatment of enlisted men is the norm
c) The unwillingness to accept a role for the NCO corps continues
d) Cronyism and nepotism are rampant in the assignment and promotion system
e) Laziness is endemic
f) Extreme centralization of C2 is the norm
g) Lack of initiative is legion
h) Unwillingness to change, do anything new blocks progress
i) Near total ineffectiveness of the Iraq Army and National Police institutional organizations and systems prevents the ISF from becoming self-sustaining
j) For every positive story about a good ISF junior officer with initiative, or an ISF commander who conducts a rehearsal or an after action review or some individual MOS training event, there are ten examples of the most basic lack of military understanding despite the massive partnership efforts by our combat forces and advisory efforts by
MiTT and NPTT teams.

3. For all the fawning praise we bestow on the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) leadership for their effectiveness since the start of the surge, they are flawed in serious ways. Below are
some salient examples:

a) They are unable to plan ahead, unable to secure the PM’s approval for their actions
b) They are unable to stand up to Shiite political parties
c) They were and are unable to conduct an public relations effort in support of the SA [Security Agreement] and now they are afraid of the ignorant masses as a result
d) They unable to instill discipline among their officers and units for the most basic military standards
e) They are unable to stop the nepotism and cronyism
f) They are unable to take basic steps to manage the force development process
g) They are unable to stick to their deals with US leaders

It is clear that the 30 June milestone does not represent one small step in a long series of gradual steps on the path the US withdrawal, but as Maliki has termed it, a “great victory” over the Americans and fundamental change in our relationship. The recent impact of this mentality on military operations is evident:

1. Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) unilateral restrictions on US forces that violate the most basic aspects of the SA
[Security Agreement]
2. BOC unilateral restrictions that violate the most basic aspects of the SA
3. International Zone incidents in the last week where ISF forces have resorted to shows of force to get their way at Entry Control Points (ECP) including the forcible takeover of ECP 1 on 4 July
4. Sudden coolness to advisors and CDRs, lack of invitations to meetings
5. Widespread partnership problems reported in other areas such as ISF confronting US forces at TCPs in the city of Baghdad and other major cities in Iraq.
6. ISF units are far less likely to want to conduct combined combat operations with US forces, to go after targets the US considers high value, etc.
7. The Iraqi legal system in the Rusafa side of Baghdad has demonstrated a recent willingness to release individuals originally detained by the US for attacks on the US.

Yet despite all their grievous shortcomings noted above, ISF military capability is sufficient to handle the current level of threats from Sunni and Shiite violent groups. Our combat forces’ presence here on the streets and in the rural areas adds only marginally to their capability while exposing us to attacks to which we cannot effectively respond.

The GOI and the ISF will not be toppled by the violence as they might have been between 2006 and 2008. Though two weeks does not make a trend, the near cessation of attacks since 30 June speaks volumes about how easily Shiite violence can be controlled and speaks to the utter weakness of AQI [Al Qa'eda in Iraq]. The extent of AQ influence in Iraq is so limited as to be insignificant, only when they get lucky with a mass casualty attack are they relevant. Shiite groups are working with the PM and his political allies, or plotting to work against him in the upcoming elections. We are merely
convenient targets for delivering a message against Maliki by certain groups, and perhaps by Maliki when he wants us to be targeted. Extremist violence from all groups is directed towards affecting their political standing within the existing power structures of Iraq. There is no longer any coherent insurgency or serious threat to the stability of the GOI posed by violent groups.

Our combat operations are currently the victim of circular logic. We conduct operations to kill or capture violent extremists of all types to protect the Iraqi people and support the GOI. The violent extremists attack us because we are still here conducting military operations. Furthermore, their attacks on us are no longer an organized campaign to defeat our will to stay; the attacks which kill and maim US combat troops are signals or messages sent by various groups as part of the political struggle for power in Iraq. The exception to this is AQI which continues is globalist terror campaign. Our operations are in support of an Iraqi government that no longer relishes our help while at the same time our operations generate the extremist opposition to us as various groups jockey for power in post-occupation Iraq.

The GOI and ISF will continue to squeeze the US for all the “goodies” that we can provide between now and December 2011, while eliminating our role in providing security and resisting our efforts to change the institutional problems prevent the ISF from getting better. They will tolerate us as long as they can suckle at Uncle Sam’s bounteous mammary glands. Meanwhile the level of resistance to US freedom of movement and operations will grow. The potential for Iraqi on US violence is high now and will grow by the day. Resentment on both sides will build and reinforce itself until a violent incident break outs into the open. If that were to happen the violence will remain tactically isolated, but it will wreck our strategic relationships and force our withdrawal under very unfavorable circumstances.

For a long time the preferred US approach has been to “work it at the lowest level of partnership” as a means to stay out of the political fray and with the hope that good work at the tactical level will compensate for and slowly improve the strategic picture. From platoon to brigade, US Soldiers and Marines continue to work incredibly hard and in almost all cases they achieve positive results. This approach has achieved impressive results in the past, but today it is failing. The strategic dysfunctions of the GOI and ISF have now reached down to the tactical level degrading good work there and sundering hitherto strong partnerships. As one astute political observer has stated “We have lost all strategic influence with the GoI and trying to influence events and people from the tactical/operational level is courting disaster, wasting lives, and merely
postponing the inevitable.”

The reality of Iraq in July 2009 has rendered the assumptions underlying the 2008 Security Agreement (SA) overcome by events – mostly good events actually. The SA outlines a series of gradual steps towards military withdrawal, analogous to a father teaching his kid to ride a bike without training wheels. If the GOI at the time the SA was signed thought it needed a long, gradual period of weaning. But the GOI now has left the nest (while continuing to breast feed as noted above). The strategic and tactical realities have changed far quicker than the provisions and timeline of the SA can accommodate. We now have an Iraqi government that has gained its balance and thinks it knows how to ride the bike in the race. And in fact they probably do know how to ride, at least well enough for the road they are on against their current competitors. Our hand on the back of the seat is holding them back and causing resentment. We need to let go before we both tumble to the ground.

Therefore, we should declare our intentions to withdraw all US military forces from Iraq by August 2010. This would not be a strategic paradigm shift, but an acceleration of existing US plans by some 15 months. We should end our combat operations now, save those for our own force protection, narrowly defined, as we withdraw. We should revise the force flow into Iraq accordingly. The emphasis should shift towards advising only and advising the ISF to prepare for our withdrawal. Advisors should probably be limited to Iraqi division level a higher. Our train and equip functions should begin the transition to Foreign Military Sales and related training programs. During the withdrawal period the USG and GOI should develop a new strategic framework agreement that would include some lasting military presence at 1-3 large training bases, airbases, or key
headquarters locations. But it should not include the presence of any combat forces save those for force protection needs or the occasional exercise. These changes would not only align our actions with the reality of Iraq in 2009, it will remove the causes of increasing friction and reduce the cost of OIF in blood and treasure. Finally, it will set the conditions for a new relationship between the US and Iraq without the complications of the residual effects of the US invasion and occupation.