Michael Cohen on The Trouble with Counter-Insurgency

"Now I could offer you plenty of reasons why I think a counter-insurgency doctrine is a bad idea; it doesn't fit with the comparative advantage of the US military; its not applicable to the threats America will face in the future; its an example of fighting the last war and as Andrew Bacevich brilliantly and pithily puts it, 'If counterinsurgency is useful chiefly for digging ourselves out of holes we shouldn't be in, then why not simply avoid the holes? Why play al-Qaeda's game? Why persist in waging the Long War when that war makes no sense?'"

Michael Cohen had an excellent guest piece in the Washington Note yesterday which considers the political impossibility of the US entering into another COIN conflict. Read it below.

As I've written before, I'm not much of a fan of counter-insurgency doctrine and two events over the past several days lend compelling evidence as to why. Quite simply, it's the politics, stupid.

First comes word from Baghdad of an outbreak of fighting between US-supported Sunni "Awakening" fighters and the Iraqi government. According to Brian Katulis, "This weekend's incident was the first crack in a shaky foundation constructed by the 2007 surge of U.S. troops--a foundation that largely glossed over long-standing political rivalries." This is not meant to criticize the "surge" but simply it is a recognition that for a counter-insurgency effort to succeed it requires not only a significant number of troops, it needs a long-standing time commitment to ensure that this type of violence doesn't turn into a larger conflict. And it also relies on genuine political reconciliation, which can of course take generations.

Next we have President Obama's recent announcement of his Administration's new policy for Afghanistan, which Fred Kaplan calls "CT-plus." The focus on counter-terrorism versus the broad counter-insurgency strategy advocated by the so-called COIN-dinastas is as Kaplan argues a reflection that following the latter course "could require too many troops, too much money, and way too much time--more of all three than the United States and NATO could muster--and that the insurgents might still win anyway. Better to focus U.S. efforts more narrowly on simply fighting the insurgents themselves, especially in the border areas with Pakistan."

Now I could offer you plenty of reasons why I think a counter-insurgency doctrine is a bad idea; it doesn't fit with the comparative advantage of the US military; its not applicable to the threats America will face in the future; its an example of fighting the last war and as Andrew Bacevich brilliantly and pithily puts it, "If counterinsurgency is useful chiefly for digging ourselves out of holes we shouldn't be in, then why not simply avoid the holes? Why play al-Qaeda's game? Why persist in waging the Long War when that war makes no sense?"

But let me offer another reason why counter-insurgency is the wrong approach; and its one borne out by the experience in Iraq and now Afghanistan - there is simply no domestic political support for the sort of long-standing political, military and financial commitments that are required for counter-insurgency to succeed. There wasn't that type of commitment in 2003 (and I'll get to that issue in a second) but after 7 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is absolutely no desire among policymakers to go down this road today.

One of the architects of the military's COIN strategy in Iraq, David Kilcullen, argues that counter-insurgency in Afghanistan means a five to ten year commitment aimed at "building a resilient Afghan state and civil society" and extending "an effective, legitimate government presence into Afghanistan's 40,020 villages." That is the sort of commitment that very few US politicians are going to be willing to countenance. So not only are the COIN-dinastas preparing for war that we are unlikely to face, but they are preparing for one that the country is unlikely to be willing to fight.

It's worth remembering that the adoption of COIN strategy in Iraq was not a willful choice by US policymakers; it was a move of desperation by an Administration and a military caught flat-footed by a vibrant insurgency in Iraq. Indeed, it is worth also remembering that the Bush Administration assiduously avoided any discussion of a long commitment to Iraq and aggressively pushed back on anyone who asserted that more not less troops would be needed to pacify the country. The reason was clear: the American people and Congress would never have gone along with such a commitment.

Counter-insurgency only made sense as a strategy once, to paraphrase Bacevich, we had dug a very big hole in Iraq. And as we are seeing in Iraq right now, the surge has been only temporarily effective. We are still in that hole and even with the outbreak in violence one is hard pressed to find any US political leaders calling for more troops to be sent to Iraq. What happens in Iraq, going forward, will be determined by Iraqis, which by the way is the other flaw in COIN strategy - it presupposes a sovereign government is willing to go along with the long-term stationing of US troops in their country. Even if US troops wanted to stay in Iraq, the Iraqi government is not going to go along . . no matter what Tom Ricks says. (This is not to mention the fact that it's hard to see why it is in the national interest for the US to get in the middle of a civil war between rival Iraqi militias).

With that in mind, it should hardly be surprising that the Obama Administration rejected the COIN approach. And while there are elements of counter-insurgency strategy in the President's Afghanistan plan this is primarily a counter-terrorism effort. Let's put it this way, if Afghan security services are up to speed in two years and Al Qaeda and the Taliban have been sufficiently degraded the United States will not be sticking around to make sure Afghanistan's democracy is vibrant and robust. We're just going to go home. If you don't believe me; ask the Iraqis.

The choice made by President Obama represents the fundamental flaw being made by COIN-advocates. It's a fundamental flaw made also by supporters of bank nationalization; or those who would push for a single-payer health bill - a failure to reflect domestic political constraints. If the Obama Administration can't convince the American people to go along with a broad counter-insurgency strategy (and won't even try) in a country where we already have troops and where the 9/11 attacks were hatched what makes people think that this or any other Administration will be able to convince Americans that they should go along with a COIN-strategy in a country we haven't even invaded and occupied yet? And a military strategy that has no relation to domestic politics isn't going to be of much use.

Now I realize my example is sort of a straw man, but then not really.

The fact is, COIN-strategy is presupposed on the notion that the US will be getting into intractable conflicts that will necessitate the same sort of tactics used in Iraq over the past 5 years. As an observer of the American political scene, something tells me that simply ain't going to happen.

What has happened in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past week is only further evidence that COIN is simply not a realistic or easily applicable military doctrine.

-- Michael Cohen

Engagement Dance: The US-Iran Meeting on Afghanistan

Perhaps the most naive summary of the exchange between American and Iranian officials at The Hague conference on Afghanistan came in the opening sentence of The New York Times account: "It was brief, it was unscheduled and it was not substantive."

Anyone with a shred of diplomatic experience or perception would recognise that the "encounter" between Richard Holbrooke, the US envoy on Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Mehdi Akhondzadeh (pictured) was far from accidential. The choreography behind the meeting would have done Twyla Tharp proud.

Because the Iranians had held back from sending their Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had to maintain, "I myself did not have any direct contact with the Iranian delegation.” Because of domestic politics in both countries and because neither side wants to be see as approaching the other cap-in-hand, the Iranians officially denied these were "talks" and Clinton insisted, "“It was cordial, unplanned and they agreed to stay in touch." And to cover the Obama Administration's claim that any engagement will cover concerns over human rights, Clinton added that a letter setting out US concerns over Iran's detention of Roxana Saberi and student Esha Momeni and the fate of the missing Robert Levinson.

To get behind the dance, you only have to note the public Iranian position: "Iran pledges Afghan help in new gesture to U.S." Akhondzadeh told the conference that Tehran was ready to help fight Afghanistan's opium trade and to assist in reconstruction.

That is an opening position for "engagement" which is Spockian logical. The flow of drugs across the border has caused major social problems in Iran, and reconstruction of areas in western Afghanistan offers the prospect of financial benefit and enhanced Afghan-Iranian trade.

At the same time, Iran's position set outs to the US that it wants to move on specific issues rather than discuss the general American position, especially on the military side. Leave aside the obvious that the domestic audience in Tehran would be resistant to any Iranian support of the expansion of the American force. The experience of the US occupation in Iraq is enough to ensure both that Iran will want no association with a military intervention which can turn sour and that it will take advantage of any political vacuum/turmoil that results.

No, Mr New York Times. This was carefully scripted and it was very substantive. The silver lining of the past and possibly future debacle in Afghanistan is likely to be a US-Iranian rapprochement. If that is to occur, however, it will face a specific and limited Tehran agenda vs. the general ambitions of Washington in its "re-development" of Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Israeli Strike on Sudan: Hamas Wins, Darfur Loses

Related Post: ICC Seeks Arrest of Bashir, Sudan Expels Aid Agencies

Sometime in January, several Israeli F-15s and F-16s entered Sudanese airspace and attacked a convoy of 17 trucks, supposedly filled with weapons bound for Hamas in Gaza. The attack killed 39 people, all Eritrean, Sudanese, and Ethiopian nationals, as well as injuring an unknown number of bystanders. The official reasoning was that this was a deterrent to Iran's smuggling of weapons to Hamas, as well as a display of Israel's capability to strike, as Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said, “everywhere there is terror".

However, this attack may have had catastrophic consequences, not only for Israel's battle against Hamas, but for the US War on Terror, and on a much greater scale, those suffering from the horrible human rights crisis in Darfur. To understand how, we must examine in detail the events leading up to the Israeli attack, the attack itself, and the fallout from the government in Khartoum.

In mid January, the US Ambassador to Liberia, Linda Thomas Greenfield traveled to Khartoum for discussions with Sudan's Foreign Minister Deng Alor. Mrs. Greenfield was there to discuss US-Sudan relations, specifically in the wake of the New Year's assassination of John Granville, a US diplomat working with USAID, as well as disagreements with Sudan over the construction of a new US embassy in Khartoum.

But that may not be all she was there to discuss. According to a report in Al-Sharq al-Awsat, “a senior American official transferred a message to a Sudanese government official and asked him to make sure that the message makes its way to Sudan's leaders in Khartoum so that immediate steps can be taken to put a stop to [Hamas weapon smuggling via Sudan]”. Since Mrs. Greenfield is the only “senior American official” that we know of in Sudan at the time, we can be reasonably sure the message was passed through her or through someone in her entourage.

(If you're feeling really cavalier about circumstantial evidence, it should also be mentioned that Mrs. Greenfield has previously worked for the US in Pakistan and was also a major cheerleader for the creation of AFRICOM, the US military command focusing on Africa.)

How did the US know about weapon smuggling through Sudan? According to Time magazine, “In early January, at the height of Israel's assault on Gaza, Israel's foreign intelligence agency Mossad was told by an informant that Iran was planning a major delivery of 120 tons of arms and explosives to Gaza, including anti-tank rockets and Fajir rockets with a 25 mile range and a 45 kg warhead." The New York Times also cited two anonymous American intelligence sources who reported that an operative from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps had also recently traveled to Sudan, possibly in connection to the shipment.

This information likely passed from Mossad to the Americans, and from there to the leadership in Khartoum. However, the warnings apparently stalled when they passed to Sudanese intelligence officials, who decided to “investigate” the matter further. That's when the Israeli air strike occurred. In fact, the air strike happened so quickly after the American warning that the Sudanese originally accused the Americans of carrying out the strike. With Mrs. Greenfield's meeting on January 13, that means the air strikes likely occurred sometime between January 14 and January 20, when the Israeli campaign against Hamas officially ended.

So the US and Israel are sharing intelligence on Iran, which is news to no one, and the US tried to warn Sudan about Hamas weapons smuggling, which is also unremarkable given the long history of US-Sudan intelligence sharing in the Global War on Terror.

The Israeli jets supposedly flew south down the Egyptian coast of the Red Sea. However, to leave Israel's airspace and fly the coast, the Israeli fighters would have to pass through the high-power beams of French-built Saudi radars at the air force base in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia. The Saudi radars are capable of spotting US stealth bombers at a range of 10 miles, which says a lot for its capability at seeing non-stealth Israeli F-15s and F-16s a few hundred miles away.

The Israelis would also have to worry about any one of the Saudi fleet of five E-3 Sentry AWACS, two of which are regularly kept in the air to monitor precious oil installations along the Saudi coast. With a war raging in Gaza and Israeli planes swarming the skies, it is highly unlikely the Saudis chose that time to ground their AWACS for maintenance.

We could ignore these radars if the Israelis had flown fast and low to the ground to avoid detection, but they didn't. When the jets reached the Red Sea, they actually stopped for a mid-air refueling. Israeli fuel tankers are customized Boeing 707s, gigantic planes that are not known for flying either fast or low. At some point during the operation, there were three to six Israeli fighter aircraft hovering over the Red Sea at 35,000 feet attached to a massive, slow-flying tetliner for 30 minutes to an hour.

(This is assuming the Israelis used their indigenous refueling capabilities, as opposed to American tankers, which were reportedly used in the August 2007 strike against Syrian rocket production facilities. The US has denied any American aircraft were involved in this current incident.)

At the point of refueling over the Red Sea, the Israeli jets would have been in the air for roughly two to four hours, which is two to four hours longer than it would have taken the Saudis to scramble jets and intercept. But the Saudis aren't the only ones around with radar. Further south, just past the American military bases in Djibouti and Ethiopia, the Red Sea feeds into the Gulf of Aden.

As of January 2009, some 15 countries were participating in CTF-151, a multinational effort at combating piracy operations around Somalia, Yemen, and the Gulf of Aden. Almost the entire Horn of Africa was being covered with sophisticated naval radars from countries like South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, Turkey, and Germany. It would not be unimaginable for some of these countries, China or Russia for instance, to wander off course and turn their radars on more valuable American and Israeli equipment operating further north. Multiple unknown aircraft idling over the Red Sea would almost certainly draw attention, even from allies of the US and Israel.

So now we have a rather large group of countries who might have seen the Israeli planes on their way to sneak attack Sudan. Saudi Arabia, certainly Egypt, several layers of American commands in Egypt, Djibouti, and Ethiopia, not to mention any countries from CTF-151 who may have been looking north at the time. All of this occurred before the jets even dropped one bomb.

The incident is extremely humiliating for Sudan. However, being a cooperative player in the Global War on Terror, Sudan chose not to retaliate against Israel or the international community who enabled the attack. That is, they did not retaliate until the international community, seemingly with strong US backing, issued an arrest warrant for the President of Sudan via the International Criminal Court. Sudan responded by expelling 10 NGO aid agencies from the relief effort in Sudan's troubled Darfur region.

Is this a conflation of two completely unrelated issues, the ICC warrant and the Israeli air strike? Not at all. In fact, the ICC warrant was almost a coincidence. To understand the connection, we have to go back to the original US-Israeli warning that Hamas was smuggling weapons.

While Israel may have had an informant with information on Iranian weapons shipments, it is unlikely this person would have any specific information on the shipment, such as when it would arrive in Sudan and what route it would take up the coast. Without this information like this, Israel would be unable to intercept the shipment, at least until it was deep into Egypt, and it would be extremely difficult for the Israelis to justify an attack on Egyptian soil. Therefore, we can be reasonably certain that Israel and the Americans have intelligence assets on the ground inside Sudan.

With assets on the ground, information on the time and placement of the weapons shipments would be much easier to discern, especially since Israel seemed to have specific details on the nature of the Iranian weapons (amount, weight, etc). A quick SMS or e-mail from an agent observer to the local Mossad/CIA station chief would be all the notice needed for Israel to launch its air strike.

So how do you position western intelligence assets in a country split between an Arab and African population? Simple, you hide them in relief agencies. And if you want information on smuggling activities, you hide them in relief agencies near the ports.

When Sudan expelled the 10 NGO's, it did not cite the ICC as its reason but rather that these NGO's were in effect breaking Sudanese law by being infiltrated by “western governments and diplomats.” Furthermore, Sudan specifically selected aid agencies working not inside Darfur, but rather those working with refugees from Darfur displaced along the eastern coast of Sudan, particularly those based around Port Sudan.

And there's the connection: Where was the air strike? Port Sudan. Where were the western intelligence assets? Port Sudan. From where were the NGO's expelled? Port Sudan.

The consequences of this are dire. First of all, the suffering of the Sudanese people displaced from Darfur, some 3 million people along the coast, is needlessly and gruesomely exacerbated by the lack of aid coming from the expelled NGOs. Beyond the 39+ deaths from the air strike, there's no telling how many refugee deaths will be caused by the lack adequate care and relief. Second, the US and Israel have lost the ability to infiltrate eastern Sudan through the camouflage of hundreds of faceless western relief workers. Now what was once a rather clever spy operation monitoring Hamas and Iranian smuggling activities has been completely blacked out.

Remember those Saudi radars and the odd visual of aircraft copulating over the Red Sea? This may help explain why  leaders of the Arab world, not normally in a rush to be pictured with war criminals, greeted Sudan's president as a hero at this week's Arab League Summit. Better to shower Sudan with praise and support than risk spiteful damaging revelations from Sudan of Arab complicity in an Israeli attack against another Arab nation. Injustice breeds injustice, and while the Arab world wasn't especially supportive of the ICC to begin with, there is now zero chance its jurisdiction will ever be honored in Sudan, much less the wider Middle East.

There are very good reasons why clandestine, unilateral military attacks are illegal under international law, and with one single air strike, Israel has illustrated those reasons perfectly. Your enemies gain sympathy, your allies stop helping you, and in the case of Darfur, genocide is enabled.