Turkey, We Need You: Obama's Ankara Speech

Related Post: Video of President Obama's Town Hall Meeting in Turkey
Related Post: Video of President Obama's Speech in Ankara

So, after his high-profile participation in the G-20 and NATO summits, after the set-piece excitement of his speech to French and German, President Obama spoke in Turkey yesterday. And, while most of the US media missed the story, his address was just as significant as his statements on the global economy and intervention in Pakistan-Afghanistan.

TURKEY, THE US NEEDS YOU

Both the New York Times and Washington Post are still so caught up with the broad notion of Obama's "engagement" with the Islamic world that they missed the depth in Obama's approach to the Turkish Government and people. This was a talk which recognised that Ankara has a central place in both short-term and longer-term American initiatives and, doing so, set aside other general issues that could trouble the US-Turkish relationship.

From his opening sentences, Obama elevated Turkey's importance:

I have been to the G-20 Summit in London, the NATO Summit in Strasbourg and Kehl, and the European Union Summit in Prague. Some people have asked me if I chose to continue my travels to Ankara and Istanbul to send a message. My answer is simple: Evet. Turkey is a critical ally.

Of course, Obama is going to offer very nice words to flatter his audience, but that inclusion of "critical" goes beyond the requirements of rhetoric.

Turkish readers can help interpret the symbolic significance of Obama's lengthy reference to Kemal Ataturk, but I was struck by his concluding phrase: "His greatest legacy is Turkey’s strong and secular democracy." The President has swept aside the chatter, which has been prevalent in the US and Europe, about the threat of "Islamism" in Turkey's political system. (And I suspect he had also swept more immediate doubts about the legitimacy of "democracy" in the rulling AKP's recent electoral success, which has been challenged by opposition parties.)

Why the extended references to "Turkey’s democracy [as] your own achievement [which] was not forced upon you by any outside power, nor did it come without struggle and sacrifice"? In part, it is to do with the Obama "engagement" with Islamic countries --- Turkey is going to be elevated as the model for others to emulate.

The initial plans of the Obama Administration were for the President to make his appeal to the Islamic world in Cairo, given Egypt's more immediate place in Middle Eastern issues and the "Arab" dimension. Those had to be set aside, however, because of the complications of the Gaza crisis and of some far-from-trivial questions about the recent Egyptian record of democracy. So step up, Ankara: "Because of the strength of our alliance and the endurance of our friendship, both America and Turkey are stronger, and the world is more secure."

This general exaltation, however, has immediate purposes, as Obama's next sentences made clear:

Our two democracies are confronted by an unprecedented set of challenges. An economic crisis that recognizes no borders. Extremism that leads to the killing of innocent men, women and children. Strains on our energy supply and a changing climate. The proliferation of the world’s deadliest weapons, and the persistence of tragic conflict.

LET'S GET SPECIFIC: WELCOME TO EUROPE

Turkey is in the right place at the right time. In the midst of economic crisis, Washington sees the country as one with great potential for growth. That is a growth that could other US allies out of the recessionary doldrums.

And that in turn eliminates any doubts about the US position on Turkey in European Union, as Obama set out in several paragraphs:

Let me be clear: the United States strongly supports Turkey’s bid to become a member of the European Union. We speak not as members of the EU, but as close friends of Turkey and Europe.

No messing about here. Obama swept aside "human rights" objections to Turkey's EU membership, citing changes in its legal system and penal codes and its granting of minority rights to Kurds.

LET'S GET SPECIFIC: THE MIDDLE EAST

More good news for Turkey. It finds itself as a "lynchpin", just as in the 1950s, for American ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

One key issue, of course, is that of Israeli relations with Arab States. Here Obama did hide the full US agenda. He referred at length to Turkey's role in an Israeli-Palestinian settlement but omitted a more immediate item: an Israeli agreement with Syria.

There was a political sensitivity at work here. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's anger with Tel Aviv over the Gaza War was because it interrupted, indeed threatened to demolish, Ankara's brokering of direct Israeli-Syrian talks. Obama, both for the sake of his hosts and sensitivities in Israel, thus did not say "Syria", but the signal was clear. Washington is hoping for a resumption of the discussions and would be pleased for Turkey to take the diplomatic credit.

Obama, however, was looking beyond Israel and the Arab world with his reference to Turkey's regional importance. For Washington, Ankara now has a part to play in keeping Iran "sensible". The President was a bit ham-fisted with his emphasis on the nuclear issue, rather than the political significance of Iranian policy in the region, but Turkish leaders undoubtedly picked up on the wider message. Ankara can be a major player, as Obama pursues "engagement", working with Syria to ease Tehran into an acceptable place in discussions on the Middle East.

PROBLEMS? WHAT PROBLEMS?

Obama didn't shy away from headline issues that could have jeopardised this vision of US-Turkish co-operation. He did refer to Armenia and Cyprus, looking in each case to "reckoning with the past" and "just and lasting settlements".

That finessing of sensitive issues led Obama to Iraq, where he made clear that Washington would recognise Turkey's position over the threat from the Kurdish separatists of the PKK:

Make no mistake, though: Iraq, Turkey, and the United States face a common threat from terrorism. That includes the al Qaeda terrorists who have sought to drive Iraqis apart and to destroy their country. And that includes the PKK.

Ahh, the Obama magic. By re-framing Turkey's relationship with the Bushian legacy of Iraq in this way, the President could once again elevate Ankara's political importance in America's new fights:

We share the common goal of denying al Qaeda a safe-haven in Pakistan or Afghanistan.

Yes, Turkey, Uncle Sam and President Barack need you.

Pakistan: Who’s Calling Who A Failed State?

"Collateral Damage"

A disturbing picture is emerging of one of the countries at the center of the Global War on Terror, a terrifying confluence of events which constitutes a “perfect storm” of instability. This country, which President Bush formerly praised as a “leader” in the fight against militant Islamism in Central Asia, now appears to be increasingly ungovernable, what we in the West commonly refer to as a “Failed State.”

A porous border facilitates the funneling of arms and resources to a booming narco-insurgency next-door, an insurgency which takes the lives of innocent civilians, militants, soldiers and police on a daily basis. In the halls of power and government, corrupt western-educated oligarchs continue to, in the midst of catastrophic economic collapse, wildly pillage the state treasuries while their rural fundamentalist constituencies, and the militant industries they patronize, fuel money and weapons to the neighboring insurgency, often with the explicit help of state intelligence services. And yet even though the citizens have recently achieved some modest democratic gains, the central government seems oblivious to their cries for justice against members of the criminal ex-regime. Meanwhile, a brutal domestic terrorist outbreak, flush with recently unemployed recruits, continues without mercy, killing over 50 civilians and security services in a series of suicide attacks over the last month.

This is not Pakistan.

It’s the United States.

The narco-insurgency? It’s not the Taliban in Afghanistan, it’s the drug cartels in Mexico. And those corrupt western-educated oligarchs aren’t the bumbling US allies in Islamabad, it’s the elites calling the shots in Washington, DC. I’ll let you do the rest of the math on your own, but the last figure commands special attention. The Associated Press reports, “A string of shootings in the US in the last month alone has claimed the lives of 53 people” starting with a gunman in Samson, Alabama who killed 11 people including himself and ending in Graham, Washington with a man who massacred his 5 children before finally killing himself.

So is this to say that America is really some kind of “Failed State?” Absolutely not. Rather this semantic bait and switch is intended to serve as a catalyst for western experts, analysts, and academics, those typically thought of as foreign policy elites, to rethink their perceptions of Pakistan and the role it is playing in the War on Terror. In particular, this is an antidote to the endemic tendency to paint Pakistan as weak, corrupt, and ungovernable, also known as a failed state. Far from being a dangerous, failed state, Pakistan is actually a thriving democracy with more in common with its allies in the West than either party would be comfortable admitting to presently.

I don’t expect this change of perspective to be simple. Western elites have a long history of despising democratic governments while at the same time enabling the militant and authoritarian undercurrents of society within the countries they govern. The names are well known: Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, Panama, Iraq.  All of these places at one point in time had democratic governments, albeit messy and tumultuous ones. Western expertscharacterized them as weak, corrupt, and ungovernable, however, and used this rhetoric as a jumping off point for violent intervention. The reward was a foreign policy timeline punctuated with the blowback of war, mass killings, and terrorism.

Pakistan, one of the largest Muslim democracies on the planet, doesn’t have to be next.

Take for example the recent public demonstrations in Pakistan over the disqualification of the Sharif brothers from politics. Nawaz Sharif, placed under house arrest by the government, defied his detention and marched with thousands of people in the streets, eventually forcing President Zardari to reinstate the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. That Supreme Court then agreed to hear an appeal of the political disqualifications. In the west, this was seen as a horrifying example of Pakistan’s  weakness, corruption, and inability to be governed. Thomas Friedman seemed on the verge of soiling himself when he breathlessly exclaimed on the CBS political talk show, Face the Nation, “they’re rioting in Pakistan!”

The western narrative is that Nawaz Sharif, agent of Saudi Arabia and staunch ally of the Islamic political parties, led an angry mob in the streets to de-stabilize the weak US-backed President and threaten the US campaign against al-Qa'eda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A more reasonable view would be that Nawaz Sharif, a typically-corrupt religious politician, the Pakistani parallel of Newt Gingrich or Tom DeLay, led a grassroots public protest against the lame duck, unpopular (think low approval ratings) President, forcing him to restore the power of the judiciary as a check and balance against legislative power, not to mention the Pakistani military. What elites in the west saw as an angry mob destabilizing a weak, corrupt government was actually a shining moment for democracy, more akin to a Pakistani version of Marbury v Madison than anything else.

"Rioting Mobs"

When mass public demonstrations are called “destabilizing” and  “riots,” the west undermines the confidence and ability of the population to determine its own government, which in Pakistan hampers their ability to strengthen the judicial system to the point where it can hold the civilian and military leadership accountable, and in effect discredits the entire democratic political philosophy. The result is that terrorist elements are legitimized and authoritarian elements in the government are forced to crack down on the population.

That Pakistan's government is becoming more responsive to the demands of its citizens should not be called weakness, but rather it's an amazingly positive sign that the concept of law and order is alive and well in Pakistani society. Indeed it is this concept that fuels a great majority of Pakistani protests against the ongoing US drone attacks inside Pakistani territory. While classified in the west as strikes against “high value” terrorist targets, they are nevertheless strikes against Pakistani citizens who have their constitutional rights violated every time the US extra-judiciously executes them for crimes they’ve never been accused of, tried, and convicted for in Pakistani courts.

And even this war crime doesn’t factor in the extreme human cost, those innocent civilians who are slaughtered as “collateral damage.” That the Pakistani government approves of these extra-judicial killings, in fact providing the US full basing rights to conduct its military campaign, doesn’t make it any less illegal. Certainly in the light of elected representatives allowing such cruel and unusual capital punishments, Pakistan’s democratic battle for the credibility of its legal system takes on a whole new urgency.

Of course the analysts, experts and academics who conduct the foreign policy assessments in the west aren’t directly responsible for these crimes, but they did ask for them. Indeed, President Obama’s “AfPak” strategy is nothing so much as a regurgitation of foreign policy conventional wisdom from the last few years.

"Corrupt civilian government"

The vast majority of this strategy was laid out during Vice President Joe Biden's Democratic primary run in a speech on November 15, 2007 at Saint Anselm College. In addition to calling for a “surge” of the troops and advisors, the plan called for tripling US aid to Pakistan to $1.5 billion, for the US to condition its military aid to Pakistan on benchmarks measuring success or failure in quelling the insurgency (as opposed to spending it all in an arm's race with India) and for broader diplomatic engagement with regional players such as Iran, Azerbaijan, and India.

These ideas didn’t come to Biden in a stroke of genius, they came from a politician’s typical pedestrian reading of contemporary foreign policy publications. One part of the plan in particular, calling for an influx of 4,000 advisory troops, seems to be lifted directly from a June 2007 paper John Nagl wrote for the Center for a New American Security, an elite foreign policy think tank, titled Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for an Army Advisor Corps.

President Obama first called for the extra-judicial killings of Pakistani citizens in a speech on August 1, 2007 at The Woodrow Wilson Center. Citing the danger posed by al-Qa’eda safe havens in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, Obama said, “If we have actionable intelligence about high-value terrorist targets and [the Pakistani government] won’t act, we will.”

Again this was a standard action called for in foreign policy publications. President Bush was consistently attacked in the press for appeasing the Musharraf regime, who was seen as too hesitant to strike terrorists inside Pakistani territory. Naturally, the response from elites was to urge the use of military violence. As far back as 2003 analysts for Jane’s Defense Weekly and Newsmax were lamenting the inability of the US to strike al-Qa’eda targets in Pakistan.

Clearly the narratives of Pakistan created by foreign policy elites have real world consequences, and thus there is a responsibility to ensure that any analysis offered into the debate should be reasonable and accurate, and not grounded in western fallacies of weak, corrupt, and ungovernable failed states. When experts called for strikes against al-Qa’eda in Pakistan, they weren’t offering realistic counterterrorism solutions, they were calling for the equivalent of Canada dropping 500lb bombs on criminals in Detroit, Michigan. They were advocating illegal vigilante justice.

"Collateral Damage"

Now the foreign policy debate has turned to even greater existential questions about the fate of Pakistan. Experts casually run the cost-benefit analysis of wider military action against Pakistani criminals, while at the same time using frequent instances of mass killings and terrorism as impetus to question the very governability of Pakistani citizens. However, these questions could be answered, presumably without such depraved and violent solutions, by simply accepting the perspective that Pakistan and the West are far more similar than they are different. Quite simply, follow the golden rule, and treat others the way you would expect to be treated.

Remember the suicide attacks in the United States, those that have killed 53 Americans in a single month? The reactions from citizens have been confused, hurt, and frightened. There is a general difficulty comprehending the purpose of so much tragedy and bloodshed. In response to one of the attacks in Binghamton, New York, a local resident told WIVB-TV, “This is crazy - 13, 14 people dead. I never dreamed I'd wake up to see this, to hear this, you know?"

Similarly, in response to a recent string of violent attacks, Adil Najam wrote in the Pakistaniat, “For the life of me I cannot understand how the US thinks it will root out terror by lobbing bombs at Pakistani women and children. Nor how these militants think they are helping Islam or fighting America by killing Muslims and Pakistanis, bombing girls schools, or terrorizing civilian populations…All we know for sure is that innocent Pakistanis are dying. For what? For whom? Why?”

Pakistan is not a failed state, it is a vibrant democracy, and it is not weak and ungovernable, it is a fellow law abiding member of the international community. Until pundits, analysts, and academics in the foreign policy establishment, and those in the halls of power who feed off their conventional wisdom, can break with their western superstitions about the weakness, corruption, and chaos of developing democratic countries, they will be incapable of providing any answer to these questions. If the foreign policy elites wish to engage in Pakistani politics and tackle issues of counterterrorism, they should do so in a manner that acknowledges the democratic and legal values of the Pakistani citizens.

When we call a country a failed state, it leads to extra-judicial killings and exorbitant numbers of civilian casualties. This illegal violence undermines the democratic institutions, strengthens the militant and authoritarian factions within society, and like so many times in the history of western civilization, leads to the blowback of violent, extremist terrorism. Quite frankly, the next time a Pakistani gazes upon the scenes of carnage from a US drone strike and asks “why,” we’d better have a damn good reason.

US Army Intelligence: We're Losing In Afghanistan (and Al Qa'eda is Not Reason Number One)

Amidst all the flurry of Presidential announcements and Congressional hearings on Pakistan-Afghanistan, this is the most important document to sneak onto the Internet this week.

Wikileaks has posted a report of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, circulated on 1 March 2009. TRADOC is based in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where General David Petraeus developed his counter-insurgency approach before returning to Iraq in 2007 and then becoming head of US Central Command.

The document is burdened by acronyms, not to mention confusion over the numerous insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but a careful reader can pick out the high (or low) points:

"Permanent Taliban presence [heavy Taliban/insurgent activity now amounts to 72% of the total landmass", as of November 2008. The figure in 2007 was 54%.
http://sydwalker.info/blog/2009/04/04/afghanistan-leaks-and-lies/
"4 main highways into Kabul compromised by Taliban; Taliban infiltrate Kabul at will."

"IEDs [improvised explosive devices attacks rose late summer 2008 and continued to rise in 2009....Winter violence are at highest levels since 2001 invasion."

The number of US troops Killed in Action rose 50 percent in 2008.

All of this is depressing but unsurprising. Even more revealing are some other numbers and statements that will not be mentioned by any Obama Administration official:

Number of Al Qa'eda in Pakistan-Afghanistan: 2,000. On its own, that figure is frustrating --- how many members does it take to constitute a "global terrorist organisation" --- but it takes on some significance when compared to Taliban in Afghanistan (30,000), the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan led by Baitullah Mehsud (15,000); the [Jalaluddin] "Haqqani Network" (unknown, "numbers are included in Taliban of Pakistan‟s total strength"); and "Warlord Militias" (tens of thousands).

The most significant role of Al Qa'eda, according to the document, is to provide "funding, foreign fighters and other assistance" to an "enemy [which] is primarily Pashtun in nature and Sunni Muslim (Wahhabi and Deobandi)". However, the insurgency is also funded by drug economy and Gulf Arab money.

"This enemy is trained and assisted by ISID or ISID affiliated elements". The acronym hides the impact of the statement: "ISID" is Pakistan's intelligence services, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate.

Syd Walker blogs that the report is "more like a teenage scrapbook than an official ‘Intelligence’ document....It might work as a motivational Powerpoint Presentation for rookies." He's got a point, given the analysts' attempt to get over complexity with an "Insurgent Syndicate" linking, rather than differentiating, between Al Qa'eda and local movements (not to mention inaccurate conflations of those local movements, such as the asserted alliance between the "Haqqani Network" and Baitullah Mehsud).

Still, the devil of significance is in the detail lurking in the pages. And it's that detail, beyond the spectral 2000 Al Qa'eda, that show the shallowness of an Obama rhetoric of "an al Qaeda network that killed thousands on American soil" and is "still plotting today".

US Rethinks Af-Pak Strategy As Strikes Widen

Andrew Exum (also known as Abu Muqawama) offered a good analysis earlier this week in The New Republic of what was right and what was wrong with Obama's counter-terrorism strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Thomas Hegghammer at Jihadica followed up with a couple more useful observations. But events have once more overtaken strategy in the region. On Wednesday a US drone struck in the Orakzai Tribal Area, an area which had not previously been targetted- some fear that this widening of strikes will serve only to push those that the US is targetting into more populated areas deeper inside Pakistan.

Today, meanwhile, is the NATO summit in Strasbourg and Baden-Baden, where it looks likely that America's European allies will resist calls to back any Afghan 'surge'. The UK has denied reports that it will send another 2000 troops to Afghanistan, with a senior official explaining that, "What the UK brings to the table is the civil side, the development side, not the military side". Is the Obama Af-Pak strategy, just days old, already out of date?

Playing for Time: Clinton-Obama and the Hague Conference on Afghanistan

Related Post: Text of Clinton Remarks to Hague Conference on Afghanistan

Lots of sound and not much substance (yet). That's the quick summary of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's address to the international conference on Afghanistan at The Hague yesterday.

First and very much foremost, the American priority was tipped off in the final paragraphs of Clinton's statement:

Now the principal focus of our discussions today is on Afghanistan, but we cannot hope to succeed if those who seek to reestablish a haven for violence and extremism operate from sanctuaries just across the border. For this reason, our partnership with Pakistan is critical. Together, we all must give Pakistan the tools it needs to fight extremists within its borders.

As for the continuing vagueness of "What Is to Be Done?" on Afghanistan, CNN's headline grab is a tip-off: "Clinton Backs Talks With Moderate Taliban".

At a superficial glance, that seems dramatic. The US talking to the same people who sheltered Al Qa'eda, who held Afghanistan under a reign of terror until they were toppled at the end of 2001? Here is how Clinton framed the call:

We must...support efforts by the Government of Afghanistan to separate the extremists of al-Qaida and the Taliban from those who joined their ranks not out of conviction, but out of desperation. This is, in fact, the case for a majority of those fighting with the Taliban. They should be offered an honorable form of reconciliation and reintegration into a peaceful society if they are willing to abandon violence, break with al-Qaida, and support the constitution.

All well and good, but who gets approached? Vice President Joe Biden is spreading the good news that 75 percent of Taliban members, with no incentive other than "desperation", can be stripped away from the organisation, but it is unclear how the US or the Afghan Government gets to those members.

In practice, if General Petraeus's model for Iraq is used, the manoeuvres will be with local commanders and leaders who may be persuaded --- by kind words or by lots of money --- to join the right side. In the Petraeus model, however, those former Sunni enemies of the US were already in powers in villages and towns. Is Washington considering a similar offer of political influence to ex-Taliban?

And who is to make the approach? Clinton's statement indicates that this will be "the Government of Afghanistan", and she none-too-subtly opened her remarks with an acknowledgement of "President Karzai, who fills a critical leadership role in his nation, and whose government helped to shape the shared comprehensive and workable strategy that we are discussing today".

Yet only weeks ago, some US officials were putting about the story that Karzai was to be curbed or even removed from power, and Washington was desperate not to let the President call a quick election for April. So is Clinton now signalling --- from reconciliation or from a lack of other options --- that the US will now accept Karzai's lead or equal participation in the political strategy?

Beyond the politics, Clinton offered the reconstruction approach of "the raw material of progress – roads, public institutions, schools, hospitals, irrigation, and agriculture". Again, nothing unexpected in the rhetoric. And again no specifics: earlier this year, the US Government was thinking that European and NATO partners could take the burden of non-military projects but President Obama's declaration last Friday of an expanded US civilian corps indicated that Washington may take the lead.

Clinton's statement tilted towards the former option: "We hope that others gathered here will heed the United Nations’ and Afghan Government’s call for help throughout the country with job creation, technical expertise, vocational training, and investments in roads, electrical transmission lines, education, healthcare, and so much else." At the same time, in another indication that Washington --- for all the charges of corruption leveled at the Karzai Government --- is having to put up with Kabul, Clinton supported "the Government of Afghanistan’s National Development Strategy, the National Solidarity Program, and other initiatives".

There was, however, a possible sting in the tail in Clinton's statement. Having set out a political, security, and economic approach which seemed to be premised on co-operation with the current Afghan Government, she declared:

To earn the trust of the Afghan people, the Afghan Government must be legitimate and respected. This requires a successful election in August – one that is open, free, and fair. That can only happen with strong support from the international community. I am, therefore, pleased to announce today that to advance that goal, the United States is committing $40 million to help fund Afghanistan’s upcoming elections.

Clinton's reference to "open, free, and fair" is jarring, to say the least: were previous Afghan elections --- and thus the rule of Hamid Karzai --- illegitimate? Washington's private assessment has been that the President is likely to win re-election in the summer. So is the US bowing to his continued presence, attempting (rather crudely) to put on a bit of pressure, or still pursuing an alternative leadership?

I don't have an answer. Nor, in my reading, does Washington. The more that one parses the Obama speech of last Friday and the Clinton statement yesterday, the more that it appears that the major objective for the Administration was to have something, anything, before next week's NATO gathering. The US is now clearly on its own militarily, and President Obama, for all that charm, will struggle in getting an expanded non-military commitment from European partners outside Kabul.

This is a "hold the line" approach, trying to ensure that the Taliban does not expand its hold on territory, until the right partnership with the right Government in Kabul can be foreseen. More importantly, the line is to be held until the US can resolve its core problem, which lies not in Afghanistan but across the border in northwest Pakistan.

And those prospects are no closer or clearer from last week's events and announcements.