Pakistan: Government Approves Sharia Law in Northwest Province

The political situation in Pakistan has twisted once again.

On Monday, President Asif Ali Zardari (pictured) signed the measure allowing Islamic law in the Swat Valley in northwest Pakistan. The accord had been provisionally reached in January as part of a peace deal between the Government and local groups, but Zardari --- after criticism from inside and outside Pakistan --- had refused final authorisation.

Last week, the influential cleric Sufi Mohammad announced he was pulling out of the peace deal, raising the possibility of a breakdown in the cease-fire. Mohammad's son-in-law, Maulana Fazlullah, is a leading insurgent commander in the Swat Valley.

The resolution of Zardari's unexpected signature brings more questions. Did he effectively bow to the pressure from Mohammad? Is Pakistan's military on-board with this political arrangement?

And did Washington know that this was coming? Only last week, US envoy Richard Holbrooke visited Zardari, leading to the standard re-statements of fighting militants and terrorists.

This political strategy accepting local autonomy is one way of carrying out that fight. Somehow, I think it's not the American way.

Scott Lucas in The Guardian: Petraeus v. Obama

Our coverage of the battle within the Obama Administration over Iraq and Afghanistan strategy reached The Guardian last night with Scott Lucas' analysis of the President's plans and General David Petraeus's manoeuvres:

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HOW MANY TROOPS IS ENOUGH?
General David Petraeus is subtly challenging President Obama's views on the number of US troops needed in Afghanistan

In the weeks after Barack Obama's inauguration, there was a running battle within his administration over the president's foreign policy. General David Petraeus, the former commander of US forces in Iraq, now the head of the military's Central Command, was pressing – often publicly – for a slower drawdown of troops in Iraq and a larger surge of US soldiers in Afghanistan.

With the compromise over an Iraq timetable and Obama's recent announcement of the Pakistan-Afghanistan strategy consensus seemed to have emerged. In fact, Petraeus had won quiet victories. A loose definition of "non-combat forces" meant tens of thousands of American troops could remain in Iraq after September 2010. While headlines said Obama had approved an extra 17,000 troops in Afghanistan, the boost was actually 30,000, the amount that military commanders had been seeking. No wonder Petraeus appeared alongside Obama envoy Richard Holbrooke on political talkshows to promote the plan.

Everything all right then?

No.

Last week, Petraeus was back on the attack. He told congressmen on Capitol Hill that "American commanders have requested the deployment of an additional 10,000 US troops to Afghanistan next year, [although] the request awaits a final decision by President Obama this fall."

The general couldn't have been clearer: if you want his solution in Afghanistan, then the president's recent announcement was only an interim step. As Ann Scott Tyson put it in the Washington Post: "The ratio of coalition and Afghan security forces to the population is projected through 2011 to be significantly lower than the 20 troops per 1,000 people prescribed by the army counterinsurgency manual [Petraeus] helped write."

How brazen, even defiant, is this? Consider that, only three days earlier, the president had tried to hold the line against precisely this "bit more, bit more, OK, a bit more" demand. He said he had "resourced properly" the Pakistan-Afghanistan strategy and had pre-emptively warned his generals: "What I will not do is to simply assume that more troops always result in an improved situation … There may be a point of diminishing returns."

In the congressional hearings, Michele Flournoy, the undersecretary of defence, insisted that the US plan was to concentrate forces in "the insurgency belt in the south and east", rather than throughout Afghanistan, as Petraeus preferred, and tried to signal that there would be upward shifts in deployments: "Troops would arrive, as planned, in 2010."

Still, even as Obama was travelling to Europe to get Nato's support for his approach, Petraeus was subtly challenging his president. Both are invoking an al-Qaieda threat against the US and the world as the call for action. Both are setting the disruption of the Pakistani safe havens as an immediate US objective.

The president sees "a comprehensive strategy that doesn't just rely on bullets or bombs, but also relies on agricultural specialists, on doctors, on engineers", an inter-agency approach with increased economic aid, including a trebling to $1.5bn per year for Pakistan, and a boost in civilian workers.

For Petraeus "comprehensive", even if it must have non-military as well as military dimensions, means an effort led by the Pentagon in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Military commanders have steadily taken over non-military programmes, including information operations and economic development, from other agencies. (In last week's hearings, the general announced a Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capability Fund of $3bn, taking responsibility for security assistance from the US state department.)

Even more importantly, Obama has left open the possibility that if the military approach runs into trouble, then it will be reconsidered: "[This is] not going to be an open-ended commitment of infinite resources." He even broke the taboo of the v-word last Sunday: "I'm enough of a student of history to know that the United States, in Vietnam and other countries, other epochs of history have overextended to the point where they were severely weakened."

In contrast, the prospect of an increase of violence only reinforces Petraeus's rationale to put more soldiers into the conflict. The general's acolytes in counterinsurgency are already writing of up to 100,000 US troops in Afghanistan. An expansion of aerial and covert operations in northwest Pakistan is underway.

Obama's announced strategy may be muddled. It lacks any approach to, and even understanding of, the politics in Islamabad and Kabul, and its default position of airstrikes in northwest Pakistan is likely to bolster rather than vanquish the safe havens for the Afghan insurgency. Petraeus's campaign, however, only escalates the dangers.

In mid-February, the president called the US commander in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, and asked how the general planned to use an extra 30,000 troops. According to a White House official, Obama "got no coherent answer to the question".

What we are witnessing goes beyond the egos and aspirations of two intelligent, confident American leaders. And it is beyond the dreaded v-word of the 1960s or the contrasting myth of Petraeus' successful Iraq surge.

This is the tension of what the historian Marilyn Young labels the "limited unlimited war". Even as President Obama sets aside the phrase "global war on terror", he frames this particular intervention in the terms of the ongoing battle against Osama bin Laden and his extremist allies. Doing so, he leaves himself open to the vision of Petraeus, for whom the counterinsurgency operation never quite reaches an end.

Pakistan: Leading Cleric Pulls Out of Peace Deal

Prominent cleric Sufi Mohammad (pictured) has announced that he is withdrawing from a peace deal, arranged in late February, between local groups and the Government in the Swat Valley in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan.

Mohammad brokered the deal between Islamabad and his son-in-law, Maulana Fazlullah, the commander of Taliban forces in the Valley. The agreement received much attention, because it allowed sharia law, and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari pulled back from signing it.

Mohammad blamed Zardari for the breakdown of the deal and warned that the Pakistani Government will be responsible for any bloodshed. The province's political leadership is sending a delegation to hear Mohammad's complaints.

If the deal does break down, it poses another challenge to the American strategy against the "safe havens" in northwest Pakistan. A rival "Taliban" group under Baitullah Mehsud has stepped up its attacks against Pakistani targets, and Fazlullah has warned that his supporters will challenge any US or Pakistani military operations.

The Engagement is Official: US, Iran in Nuclear Talks

Related Post: A Beginners' Guide to Engagement with Iran

The  initial news last night was that Undersecretary of State William Burns was in London in  "5+1" talks with Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China on Iran's nuclear programme. Then came the revelation. Iran will soon be there as well: Washington is dropping its policy of no direct discussions with Tehran. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made the brief announcement, "There's nothing more important than trying to convince Iran to cease its efforts to obtain a nuclear weapon." You can choose the political spin on this from different newspapers. For both The New York Times and The Washington Post, "U.S. to Join Iran Talks Over Nuclear Program". For The Daily Telegraph, desperate to prove Tehran is giving way, "Iran Offered New Nuclear Talks". So let's leave it to a State Department official to make the concise summary, "It was kind of silly that we had to walk out of the room" whenever Iranians were nearby.

While Iranian media have highlighted the US change in position, there has been no official Iranian reaction to the news. However, the 5+1 meeting and Clinton's statement follow contact between US and the Iran at The Hague conference on Afghanistan. Ensuing signals indicated that Iran was happy to take up engagement: last week President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Tehran will shake an "honest hand".

This American decision confirms a significant break from the Bush Administration's attempt to isolate Iran. First, Bush officials broke off direct contact with Tehran in May 2003, rejecting an Iranian letter which offered detailed talks. A double game followed: Washington would push for more economic sanctions against Iran while European countries persisted in negotations. When those negotiations were close to a breakthrough, the US Government would pull back from any agreement, and the finger-wagging --- from both the US and Iran --- would resume.

Perhaps more importantly, the offer of direct talks may put Obama's military commanders in their place. Last week both Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General David Petraeus, the head of US Central Command, pointedly warned that Israel would be attacking an operating Iranian nuclear facility. Vice President Joe Biden finally stepped in publicly, telling CNN that Israel "would be ill-advised" to carry out an airstrike.

The Obama Administration has also made this move despite (possibly because of) reports that President Ahmadinejad will today announce that the nuclear plant at Bushehr is now active. And it has done so despite yesterday's news that Iranian-American journalist Roxana Saberi, detained in Iran since January, has been charged with espionage.

This is the clearest signal that Obama, in contrast to his predecessor, has decided that it is better to live with an Iran with a nuclear programme rather than to pursue confrontation. Doing so, Washington hopes to reap the benefit of Iranian assistance --- or non-interference --- with American initiatives from Afghanistan to the Middle East.

Mr Obama's War: Pakistan Pushes Back at US Envoy Holbrooke

Lost amidst the attention to President Obama's trip in Europe, another US tourist, a Mr Richard Holbrooke, wound up in Islamabad yesterday.

US envoy Holbrooke and Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, didn't even catch the attention of The Washington Post. Which might be a good thing, because Pakistani officials did not follow the Obama script for a united War against Al Qa'eda/Taliban terror:

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi told the press after the meeting with Holbrooke, “We did talk about drones, and let me be very frank: there is a gap between us.” He continued, with diplomacy barely concealing Pakistan's decision to push back at the Americans:

The terms of engagement are very clear. We will engage with mutual trust and mutual respect, and that is the bottom line. We can only work together if we respect each other and trust each other. There is no other way and nothing else will work.

Holbrooke and Mullen got an even sharper rebuke from the head of Pakistan’s intelligence service (ISI), Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, who refused to meet separately with the Americans. Pasha did attend a discussion between Holbrooke, Mullen, and the head of the Pakistan military, General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani.

Of course, you can try out the ritual line that Pakistani officials are putting out a tough line for the sake of domestic opinion while privately being nice to their visitors. Yesterday's sparring, however, pointed to a real division between Islamabad and Washington.

The Obama Administration has been telling the Zardari Government not only that it has to accept the American military strategy but that it has to clean out those elements supporting the Pakistani Taliban and other insurgents. That warning has been specially directed at the ISI. On Tuesday, US officials piled on more pressure, letting The New York Times know that Washington was considering an expansion of drone attacks across northwest Pakistan.

It is unsurprising that the ISI's General Pasha would show personal resistance with his snub of Holbrooke and Mullen. More intriguing is the Foreign Ministry's forthright challenge to the drone strategy. And even more interesting, if curious, is the behaviour of President Asif Ali Zardari.

Zardari is persisting with his unsubtle public-relations mission to prove the wisdom of Zardari. He was the subject of a lengthy Sunday profile in The New York Times by James Traub which, unfortunately for the President, didn't provide the boost he wanted:

The Pakistani people have grown weary of his artful dodging. Zardari’s poll numbers are dreadful. More important, he has given little sustained attention to the country’s overwhelming problems — including, of course, the Islamist extremism that, for the Obama administration, has made Pakistan quite possibly the most important, and worrisome, country in the world. Zardari has bought himself more time, but for Pakistan itself, the clock is ticking louder and louder.

Today's more successful effort by Zardari is in The Independent of London, which gives him the space in a question-and-answer session to put his claim for political legitimacy:

Our military and intelligence agencies are behaving responsibly and respecting the sovereignty and legitimacy of the elected government.  That is an enormous and positive change that bodes well for the future. We have been elected for five years and there is no point in giving a final verdict on our performance within a few months or even a year of our taking office.

On the issue of the US military strategy, Zardari is playing a double game. After his meeting with Holbrooke, his office issued the statement, "Pakistan is fighting a battle for its own survival....The president said the government would not succumb to any pressure by militants." In the interview with The Independent, however, the President also tried to put limits on the drone attacks:

We would much prefer that the US share its intelligence and give us the weapons, drones and missiles that will allow us to take care of this problem on our own. President Obama has denied any such intentions to extend the use of drone attacks to Balochistan. These drone attacks are counter productive.

As the tourist Mr. Richard Holbrooke takes his Rough Guide to India today, he may be reflecting on his rather unwelcome stay in Pakistan. Forget for the moment the issue of an American "exit strategy" from its military efforts. Washington doesn't even have a clear "entry strategy" on how it is going to shape the Islamabad Government to its plans.