The US and Pakistan: Bye Bye President Zardari, But Hello to Whom?

Just over 48 hours after the culmination of the Long March, with the Government's restoration of Pakistani Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, and the story has dropped out of American newspapers. But, of course, this weekend's events were only the beginning of a new, important stage in Pakistani and regional politics.

For many, it is the beginning of hope. Perhaps, after the expression of popular protest, the legal system can be resurrected and placed above personal and party manipulation. Perhaps there can be a scrutiny which would produce a meaningful democracy rather than today's well-connected politician who ascends to the highest office through connections rather than ability and integrity.

In no way do I want to demean that hope, but it moves alongside, and arguably trails behind, more immediate negotiations and manoeuvres after the drama of the last week.

First and foremost, Asif Ali Zardari is effectively Dead President Walking. If this was a showdown for those marching for Chaudhry's restoration, the future of political parties such as the Pakistani Muslim League (N), or a general wish for an ethical politics, it was also Zardari's showdown against his rivals. Trying to maintain a careful balance between the isolation of Nawaz Sharif and the appearance of a Government upholding judicial and political authority, he was putting his case not only in Pakistan but in the US through outlets like The Wall Street Journal.

The problem for the Obama Administration is that Zardari put his battle against Sharif, and indeed Chaudhry, above the battle against insurgency in northwestern Pakistan. An article in The Washington Post, fed by Administration sources, put the case cogently yesterday:

Administration officials are putting the finishing touches on a plan to greatly increase economic and development assistance to Pakistan, and to expand a military partnership considered crucial to striking a mortal blow against al-Qaeda's leadership and breaking the Pakistani-based extremist networks that sustain the war in Afghanistan....But the weakness of Pakistan's elected government -- backed into a corner by weekend demonstrations that left its political opposition strengthened -- has called into question one of the basic pillars of that plan.

The President had thus become secondary to the military commander, General Ashfaq Parvez Kiani, as he met American counterparts and political leaders in Islamabad, Washington, and Kabul.

At the same time, the US had to move carefully. After all, Washington had been instrumental in supporting Zardari's rise to the Presidency when Benazir Bhutto was assassinated and when General Pervez Musharraf became a liability for American plans. Even if the Pakistani military had become the key link for US officials, the appearance of democracy had to be maintained.

The Long March, with all its good intentions, provided a mini-solution for the Obama Administration. Only 24 hours into the march, the US jumped in through talks with Nawaz Sharif and a blunt call to Zardari --- Washington did not want the President to force a showdown with Sharif. By Saturday, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was telling both politicians, "If Pakistan is in such a state of internal political turmoil that U.S. aid can't be used effectively, that's going to limit what can be done and also how successful we are in Afghanistan."

Perhaps more importantly, the Americans appear to have been in close touch with the Pakistani military and security services during the crisis. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, spoke with General Kiani on Friday. The New York Times summarised, "One encouraging sign for Washington was the role played in the crisis by the army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who let Mr. Zardari know that he could not rely on soldiers to confront the protesters who were threatening to descend on Islamabad."

We may never know exactly who, if anyone, gave orders to the security forces who let the convoy of Nawaz Sharif slip easily through the cordon of his house arrest, providing support to the growing demonstrations and forcing Zardari's hand. We may never know exactly what was said between the President, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gillani, and General Kiani at the Sunday morning meeting that conceded the restoration of Chaudhry.

Even murkier, however, is the next step in the relationship between Zardari, his political rivals, his military, and the American sponsors. Even if there is no way back for the President, there is no easy solution to fit Washington's plans. The accession of Nawaz Sharif to power is still an uncomfortable prospect for the US, which has long considered him too close to "conservative" (read that in a political and religious sense) forces in Pakistan and the region. Indeed, Saudi Arabia's backing of Sharif poses the prospect of a battle between Washington and Riyadh for influence over the next steps in both Islamabad and Kabul.

As US envoy Richard Holbrooke bluntly said Monday, the immediate resolution of the Long March "bodes better than the alternative outcome" of disorder and collapse of the Government but "the underlying problem still exists". Having failed to get "stability" with Musharraf, having failed with Zardari, it is not hope that moves Washington but this question:

Who or what can come next?