Video/Transcript: "Will Israel Attack Iran?"

Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Obama Backs Himself into a Corner
The Latest from Iran (30 September): Confusion

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On Monday, Michael Rubin, resident scholar with the American Enterprise Institute, and Bob Baer, a former CIA officer and intelligence columnist for Time magazine, were the guests on MSNBC's Hardball. Both guests were pessimistic on the success of diplomatic engagement with Tehran, and both agreed that Israel would sooner or later attack Iran. They asserted that, while Israel can carry out the operation on its own, the US should discourage this since Washington cannot afford chaos in the region.
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TCic7ZL2efA[/youtube]
Unsurprisingly, Rubin and Baer portrayed Iran as a country ruled by "irrational" people who can even "commit suicide" by blocking the energy corridor through the Straits of Hormuz after an Israeli operation, just to ensure "the destruction of the Zionist regime". Iran's only motive for  obtaining a nuclear weapon is to attack rather than deter or balance Israel.

Transcript:

CHRIS MATTHEWS: Michael Rubin, is it plausible that within the next year or so, Israel will strike at those nuclear facilities in Iran?

MICHAEL RUBIN, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE: Absolutely plausible. It is. They view Iran and the Iranian nuclear threat as an existential threat, meaning they don‘t feel that if diplomacy fails, that they can live with a nuclear Iran. Their assessment is different than ours on this.

MATTHEWS: The odds are?

RUBIN: The odds are greater than 50/50.

MATTHEWS: OK, let me go to Bob Baer. Is it plausible—same question to you—that Israel will strike at Iran?

BOB BAER, FORMER CIA OFFICER: I think it‘s 50/50 or better. I agree with Michael. They look at the—the complete picture on this. They look at Lebanon. They look at the fact that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard corps has the missiles. And they have to do something now. I don‘t think sanctions are going to work.

MATTHEWS: Do they—bigger question to you because it‘s about the United States. Does the United States have to give them its compliance, its help, its OK, or can Israel strike on its own? Do we have to be party to this, or won‘t they do it?

RUBIN: Israel can strike on its own, but they can‘t finish the job on their own. It would take over a thousand sorties to do it right. The worst possible scenario for us would be that Israel starts something, and then the region becomes so messy that we feel that we have to finish it.

MATTHEWS: So you think we should help them.

RUBIN: I think that the idea is, if you‘re—if the worst-case scenario is military action, then we‘ve really got to ratchet up the other forms of coercion right now. And we certainly have to be prepared. We‘ve got to have sanctions alongside...

MATTHEWS: OK...

(CROSSTALK)

MATTHEWS: I‘m just trying to get to a question. Does Israel need our help to do the job?

RUBIN: No.

MATTHEWS: OK. Let me go to Bob Baer. Do they need our OK to give them, for example, to push Iraq to give them airspace and that sort of thing, to get to the target in Iran?

BAER: If you‘re sitting on the ground in Iraq and you‘re an American air controller and you see Israeli airplanes coming your way, how many minutes is the White House going to say yes or no? And the chances of saying no are zero. I don‘t think they need our help, but we will be drawn into a war, as a consequence.

MATTHEWS: So you both say that, technically, they could carry out the mission.

BAER: They could certainly start the mission.

MATTHEWS: OK, let‘s go to the question, Should we help them? If they decide—if Bibi Netanyahu makes the decision as prime minister of Israel, facing what you—what you believe he sees as an existential threat to the future of Israel and he decides to make the attack, should we help him?

RUBIN: The calculation has got to be on our interests. If the region is going to get messy, we‘ve got to do what we need to do to protect the United States‘ interests once Iran retaliates and should Iran retaliate.

MATTHEWS: If you were asked right now by the president, Should we help them, would you say yes or no?

RUBIN: I don‘t think now is yet the time.

MATTHEWS: OK. You wouldn‘t say yes now.

RUBIN: No.

MATTHEWS: OK. What do you think, Bob? should we say yes to the Israeli attack and say we‘ll help them?

BAER: We‘d say absolutely not.

MATTHEWS: Because I understand it‘s much more difficult for them to do it by themselves. But your thought is not to help them.

BAER: Not—we can‘t help them. We don‘t have enough troops. We‘d need a million troops in the Gulf. We would have to do something about the oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, to protect them.

MATTHEWS: OK.

BAER: Right now, we can‘t. Can we afford oil at $400 a barrel? Can we afford the mischief-making they would do in Iraq? And the answer is no.

MATTHEWS: OK, let‘s get to that point now. You both agree that Israel might do it. You both agree that it‘s more difficult for them to do it without us, but they could do it, right?

RUBIN: Yes.

MATTHEWS: And third question is, both of you think right now, the answer is we shouldn‘t encourage them to do it.

BAER: We should not.

MATTHEWS: OK, now the fourth question. If they attack the Israeli (SIC) nuclear facilities, as Netanyahu threatens to do, by the way, sometime next year at this point, because he‘s only giving our government up to the end of this year, what would be the consequences in order of importance, the consequences of an attack, because I‘m going to get the consequences of not attacking later. What are the consequences of an attack by Israel on the Iranian facilities?

RUBIN: The most important consequence of an attack would be that it would delay Iran‘s nuclear program, and it could delay it enough. That‘s what Israel‘s calculation is.

MATTHEWS: “Enough” meaning?

RUBIN: Enough to outlast the Iranian regime.

MATTHEWS: So the first instance, it would have a good effect.

RUBIN: The first instance, it would have a good effect.

MATTHEWS: What are the bad effects?

RUBIN: The bad effect is nothing like a military strike would rally the Iranian people around the flag more. The best thing that ever happened to...

MATTHEWS: I just talked to an Iranian emigre today, lives in this country. He‘s an American now. He believes it would give a 20-year life span to that faction running the country, the Ahmadinejad crowd.

RUBIN: I think that‘s possible, yes.

MATTHEWS: If Israel attacks.

RUBIN: People rally around the flag.

MATTHEWS: OK, so the first thing is good. It gets rid of—it puts them off maybe for a long time. Number two, they rally behind Ahmadinejad. The first two worst—or scenarios that you see, Bob, if they attack the facilities?

BAER: I think, again, it‘s the Gulf. It‘s the security of our oil.

I harp on this, but that‘s what the Iranians have said they‘re going to do. If they‘re attacked, no matter how minor the attack is, they‘re going to respond against oil. There‘s nothing we can do about it, and that‘s what worries me. In Iraq, as well.

MATTHEWS: The Straits of Hormuz. They shut off all oil shipments through the Straits, right?

BAER: They hit—they hit up (ph) cake (ph). It takes six million barrels off instantaneously, and we can‘t defend it. You know, secondly...

MATTHEWS: But doesn‘t that—doesn‘t that—doesn‘t that—that stranglehold, that chokehold, have a life span of itself? Can they keep doing that without committing suicide economically?

BAER: They‘re prepared...

MATTHEWS: I mean, how long can they...

BAER: ... to commit suicide.

MATTHEWS: ... raise the price that high?

RUBIN: They are.

BAER: They can. And they‘re ready to.

RUBIN: I absolutely agree. Iran‘s not a democracy. It doesn‘t matter what the ordinary people think, in the government‘s calculation. They will look at it—this—the leadership of Iran is the leadership that grew up in the Iran/Iraq war. They look at this and say, The vegetables are expensive? Well, when I was your age, I was fighting mustard gas on the front with Iraq.

MATTHEWS: OK, the way—the look of you right now—and I know you‘re emotional—passionate on this, not emotional. Is it possible, Michael, that the attack by Israel, which Bibi Netanyahu has threatened to carry out if we don‘t do something in stopping this weapons program by Iran, could be the beginning of a horrendous amount of action in the world, not just the end, but the beginning of spiking prices for oil, of Hezbollah attacks all over the place, not just Israel? What do you see happening?

RUBIN: Absolutely. And you‘ve got to balance that with, if Iran does go nuclear, you‘re going to have an end of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and a cascade of proliferation throughout the world. That‘s the choice.

MATTHEWS: OK. Let me ask you the final question tonight, and then I want to get to some of these quotes by people here. Bob Baer, what happens if we let Israel—we discourage Israel successfully and even (INAUDIBLE) maybe Netanyahu with a right-wing faction running the country there, with Lieberman, he decides not to move because we say, We don‘t want you to move?

If he doesn‘t move, what happens to the world if Israel is faced with a neighbor that hates it, wants to destroy it? Does that basically kill the notion of Israel as a safe haven for world Jewry in the long run? In other words, young people in their young 20s, young engineers, biotechnicians and all, would no longer want to live in that country because it‘s under a nuclear threat? Don‘t you—do you think that‘s a real prospect?

BAER: I think it‘s—Israel is under existential threat. I think if that Iran continues to grow, is a superpower or is a hegemon in the Gulf, that it ultimately it will affect Israel‘s survivability. There‘s no question about it. The Israelis have a point.

MATTHEWS: Michael? And that point is strong enough that it means their life. Do you buy that argument, that their life‘s at stake? And not over the year or two, but eventually, you cannot have an Israeli Jewish state, if you will, succeed if it‘s under the nuclear threat of a country that hates it.

RUBIN: There is a psychological threat, and with Iran‘s nuclear program...

MATTHEWS: By the way, it‘s a real psychological threat.

RUBIN: Yes.

MATTHEWS: It‘s not in the head.

RUBIN: But just as important is the uncertainty over who would control a nuclear bomb should Iran achieve that capability. Ordinary...

MATTHEWS: Who‘s got the button?

RUBIN: Who has the button, and under what circumstances would it be used? And that‘s what...

MATTHEWS: Who do you think is in charge in Iran right now? I want to get back to you. Who is making the decision to fire off these rockets? Who‘s making the decision to proceed in a way that looks like they‘re going towards weaponization? Who‘s calling that shot? Is it Khamenei, the boss, the supreme leader? Is it Ahmadinejad? Is a faction in the back room of old men, religious people? Who‘s making the call, Bob Baer, to go to war with us, basically, on this?

BAER: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. And the new defense minister‘s from the IRGC. And don‘t forget that he blew up the Israeli embassy in Argentina. These guys have blood on their hands, and we really can‘t predict what they‘re going to do.

MATTHEWS: Michael?

RUBIN: Absolutely correct. The supreme leader still has ultimate control with the Revolutionary Guard. But the problem is, no one really knows about the factions inside the Revolutionary Guard Corps. It‘s still relatively a black box. Politics—we talk about reformers, we talk about hard liners, but the real decision making is inside that Islamic Revolutionary Guard.

MATTHEWS: OK. A fellow I know out in Hollywood, a guy who‘s pretty smart otherwise, said to me that the only smart Israeli action is to not just to go in and blow up the facilities, but to take out the leadership. Is that a feasible Israeli Entebbe-style possibility? Bob Baer, you first. Could they go in and take out the leadership faction, kill them? Could they do that?

BAER: No, the country...

MATTHEWS: Decapitate this government?

BAER: The country‘s too big. Israel‘s air force is too small. It‘s too big. You can‘t do it. It‘s 71 million people. We‘re talking about—the result would be a conventional war. It would look like World War III.

RUBIN: I would agree with that. You go after the leadership if it can prevent a war. In this case, it can‘t...

MATTHEWS: But you see it written along those lines in terms of knocking out, like, say, one person, killing one person, like, a really bad guy out there. But is it feasible for Israel to do an Entebbe-style assault, where they go in and find six or seven guys in this faction behind Ahmadinejad and kill them?

RUBIN: What‘s much more feasible...

MATTHEWS: Because they‘ve done stuff like this on the West Bank.

RUBIN: Yes. What‘s much more feasible, if Iran has buried nuclear facilities under mountains, they don‘t have to destroy the facilities, they just need to destroy the entrances to them.

MATTHEWS: And how long do they keep those sealed by blowing them up?

RUBIN: They set the program back a year or two and hope that the international community actually—actually becomes active.

MATTHEWS: Yes, the trouble is, the international community, from an Israeli point of view, goes the other way.

RUBIN: Yes.

MATTHEWS: What‘s your thought, Bob...

(CROSSTALK)

BAER: ... the intelligence isn‘t good enough.

MATTHEWS: Yes. Yes. What I‘ve heard as a scenario is they blow up, in the short run. They do the best they can and say, More coming if you keep going. Have you heard that argument?

RUBIN: I have heard that argument. And what‘s interesting, it‘s the same argument that was made when the Israelis went over after the Iraqi reactor in 1981. Critics said...

MATTHEWS: OK. How much longer do we both have—you both have, not me. I‘m watching you guys. You‘re the experts. How longer (ph), Michael, and how longer, Bob, do we have to keep Netanyahu from acting?

RUBIN: I‘d say it‘s in weeks—months, if not weeks.

MATTHEWS: Bob, how long has the United States got leverage over Netanyahu, the head of Israel, not to attack Iran?

BAER: I think Netanyahu...

MATTHEWS: Have we got a year?

BAER: He‘s given three months. He‘s got to see something happening in three months or he‘s going to start his planning. They‘ve already started their planning.

MATTHEWS: I think we‘re all on the same page on this. It‘s pretty scary. Thank you Michael Rubin from AEI, and thank you, Bob Baer, who knows his stuff.

Iran's Nuclear Programme: Obama Backs Himself into a Corner

Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Scott Lucas in La Stampa (English Text)
The Latest from Iran (29 September): The Forthcoming Test?

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Last week's high tide of politics over the Iranian "secret nuclear plant" still has some unpleasant backwash today, 48 hours before the US and other "5+1" powers meet Iran in Geneva. Bret Stephens of The Wall Street Journal takes the prize for meaningless swagger with his declaration of a neo-conservative resurgence: "A view of the world that understands that American power still furnishes the margin between freedom and tyranny, and between prosperity and chaos, is starting to look better all the time. Even in France."

Meaningless because, unless Mr Stephens is ready to lead the bombers over Iran, there's precious little he can do to back up the bluster. Far more importantly, the Obama Administration may be finding that it has talked itself into a high-profile corner.

The clue is the latest White House spin to the front-line newspapers. Yesterday's New York Times gives the game away. On the surface, it proclaims, "U.S. Is Seeking a Range of Sanctions Against Iran", but the more you read, the narrower that range becomes. Officials admitted, "The United States was not likely to win support for an embargo on shipments of gasoline or other refined fuel to Iran. The European allies...view this as a 'blunt instrument' that could hurt ordinary Iranians, inflame public opinion and unite the country behind the government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad."

The initial flourish, offered after President Obama's statement last week, that even Moscow was in line with a tough approach has sagged limply: "Administration officials acknowledge it will be difficult to persuade Russia to agree to harsh, long-term sanctions against Iran, whatever the assurances that the Russian president, Dmitri A. Medvedev, gave last week to Mr. Obama. China, these officials say, is even less dependable, given its reliance on Iranian oil and its swelling trade ties with Iran."

So all that's really left in "the range" is the suggestion of barriers to investment in Iran's gas and petroleum industry and more restrictions on Iranian financial institutions, covered by the assurance, "The administration also is seeking to build a broader coalition of partners for sanctions so that it may still be able to act against Iran even if China and Russia were to veto harsher measures proposed in the United Nations Security Council."

And even then promise of multilateral action is further constricted today. The Wall Street Journal reports that the White House will still face numerous challenges matching its rhetoric on sanctions with real international action, said U.S. and European officials involved in the process. That makes "the U.S. Treasury -- and not the United Nations -- the main focus of the West's financial campaign against Iran for now...The Treasury has pursued dozens of unilateral sanctions against Iranian banks, government officials and defense companies in recent years in an attempt to pressure Tehran."

The US Treasury? As far as I can tell, the American effort has gone from a united international front against Iran's threat to a "coalition of one".

There's still some blowing of smokes in places like Tuesday's Washington Post with the declaration, "The Obama administration is laying plans to cut Iran's economic links to the rest of the world if talks this week over the country's nuclear ambitions founder." Once again, however, it only takes a few paragraphs to see through Sanctions' New Clothes: "The administration has limited options in unilaterally targeting Iran, largely because it wants to avoid measures so severe that they would undermine consensus among countries pressing the Iranian government."

When rhetoric finally arrives at the obstacle of action, steps mentioned include making it more difficult for foreign firms to get adequate insurance for investments in Iran. But, surprise, surprise, the US has been pursuing that effort for years, so there is nothing new in the measure. Nor is it clear how much more punishment can be meted out by the suggestion of tightening restrictions on Iranian financial institutions.

And none of this can obscure the inconvenience that, as noted in The New York Times, major investors like Russia and China are likely to keep investing and trading. Credit to Simon Tisdall of The Guardian for stating the blunt facts:

Iran provided 10% of China's crude oil needs last year; its market share is expected to grow. Chinese companies and middlemen are supplying one third of Iran's refined petroleum requirements as western companies back off. Earlier this year the China National Petroleum Corporation signed a $1.7bn investment deal with the National Iranian Oil Company. The overall Chinese energy stake in Iran is said to be worth $100bn.

Speaking before crucial nuclear talks in Geneva, Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu urged the US, Britain and other UN security council members to eschew confrontation. "We believe that all sides should take more steps to ease tensions and resolve problems, not the opposite," she said. Beijing's meaning was plain. Even if it supported sanctions in principle (which it does not), it was not disposed to support measures that would harm its national economic self-interest.

It appears that the US plan was to show up at the Geneva talks with a loaded gun. An article in Sunday's Washington Times revealed:

President Obama's decision to confront Iran with evidence of a secret nuclear production site Friday was the culmination of a deliberate strategy over the past nine months to gain maximum impact from the disclosure by building up to it with other steps on the world stage.

A high-ranking administration official [said] that while the White House knew about Iran's construction of a second uranium enrichment plant before Mr. Obama took office in January, it waited to drop the bombshell until U.S. officials had conducted extensive diplomatic advance work.

Even when Iran disrupted the plan by telling the International Atomic Energy Agency of its second enrichment plant, the Administration kept a grip on the holster; indeed, by the time Obama made his statement, he was waving a pair of six-shooters.

Only one thing. If you're going to bring a gun to the table, you best make sure you've got enough bullets. And the Administration is beginning to discover, very late in the day, that it may not have even one in the chamber.

No amount of bluster, not even of Stephens-esque proportion, does not remove that difficulty. Indeed, it only bears out the ill-judged strategy of speaking loudly and carrying a very small stick.

The Latest from Iran (29 September): The Forthcoming Test?

NEW Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Obama Backs Himself into a Corner
UPDATED Iran: So What’s This “National Unity Plan”?
NEW Latest Iran Video: More University Demonstrations (29 September)
UPDATED Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Scott Lucas in La Stampa (English Text)
NEW Text: Mousavi Statement to His Followers (28 September)
NEW What is Iran’s Military Capacity?
The Latest from Iran (28 September): Signals of Power
Latest Iran Video: The Universities Protest (28 September)

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2100 GMT: We have posted an emergency update of our story on the National Unity Plan. To be blunt, this has turned into a giant mystery which we can lay out but not solve this evening, and there are likely to be further developments (even though it is early morning in Tehran) for our first update on Wednesday.

1700 GMT: We've split off our snap analysis updates on the National Unity Plan into a separate entry.

1545 GMT: A steady stream of reports indicate there are smaller but still significant gatherings of demonstrators in Tehran today. This is in addition to the sizable protest at Sharif University.

1455 GMT: Fars News have just published a copy of the National Unity Plan. We'll be back within the hour with an analysis.

1430 GMT: Back from a teaching break to find tension growing over the privatisation of Iran's state telecommunications company, with 51 percent going to a consortium linked to the Revolutionary Guard. It is reported that the Telecommunications Trade Council will review the deal, with the possibility of cancelling it because of concerns over a "monopoly".

1100 GMT: I sense a debate emerging, given our readers' comments, over the latest move of Mehdi Karroubi with his letter to Hashemi Rafsanjani. Tehran Bureau takes the line that this is a Karroubi criticism, rather than a plan worked out with the former President:

1) Karroubi criticises Rafsanjani for his failure to launch an investigation into the election during his chairmanship of the Assembly of Experts session;

2) Karroubi criticises Rafsanjani for being absent during the final meeting, with its declaration praising the Supreme Leader and framing the events after the election as riots and a conspiracy;

3) Karroubi criticizes Rafsanjani for not asking the Assembly to investigate how the military is taking control of the economy, as in the recent purchase of a 51% share in Iran's state telecommunications firm;

4) Karroubi criticizes Rafsanjani for not calling on the Assembly to review Iran's foreign policy.

0930 GMT: We've just posted video from today's demonstration at Sharif University. It is reported that Minister of Science Kamran Daneshjoo was prevented from reaching the Central Library.

0905 GMT: Tabnak reports that Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani has distanced himself from his brother Mohammad Javad Larijani, a high-level official in the Judiciary, after the latter's criticism of Ayatollah Khomeini's grandson Hassan, Mir Hossein Mousavi, and Mohammad Khatami.

0900 GMT: It Wasn't Just Tehran. An account has been posted of University demonstrations on Monday in Shiraz.

0835 GMT: President candidate Mohsen Rezaei has made a significant intervention with a call for a "national election commission independent of the three branches of Government".

Rezaei's proposal, building upon earlier criticism of the Guardian Council for its handling of the Presidential vote, presents a political challenge to President Ahmadinejad moving beyond a simple "reform" of the system. His interview with Ayande News is the closest he has come to alleging electoral fraud, and he is critical of a number of individuals.

0740 GMT: We've posted the English translation of Mir Hossein Mousavi's Monday statement to his followers: "Qods Day showed that [our] network is like a toddler who is growing incredibly quickly."

0725 GMT: Parleman News has now posted a summary report of yesterday's student demonstrations.

0715 GMT: Fars News tries to pour cold water on the Rafsanjani plan for a political settlement, featuring the comments of a "hard-line" member of Parliament, Ranjbarzadeh, that the plan is unacceptable because it gives concessions to the losers of the election.

0625 GMT: Iran's Nuclear Offer. The head of Iran's nuclear programme, Ali Akhbar Salehi, has laid out Tehran's line in an interview with Press TV. Iran "will soon inform the International Atomic Energy Agency of a timetable for inspection". The plant will produce enriched uranium of up to 5 percent, consistent with a civilian nuclear energy programme, and it is being constructed within the framework of the IAEA regulations. Salehi emphasised, "It is against our tenets, it is against our religion to produce, use, hold or have nuclear weapons or arsenal. How can we more clearly state our position? Since 1974 we have been saying this."

It is 48 hours until Iran's meeting with the "5+1" powers in Geneva.

0555 GMT: Karroubi's second letter to Rafsanjani (0535 GMT) takes on a added sense of urgency because of the Government's decimation of  websites connected with Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi. The Etemade Melli/Saham News site, the Kalemeh site (which had replaced Mousavi's hacked Ghalam News site), and Tagheer are all down. Mowj-e-Sabz, however, is still up, featuring Mousavi's latest statement cautioning the movement against violence.

0535 GMT: A couple of interesting shifts within the Establishment. The long-anticipated change at the head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting has been made, with Ezatullah Zarghami replaced by Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli. What is more interesting is the framing of the move, with Zarghami blamed for "the poor performance of the IRIB" during and after the election. Meanwhile, Fazli is portrayed as an ally of the Larijani brothers and a critic of President Ahmadinejad.

Contrary to our update yesterday, university classes have not been suspended for seven days because of "swine flu" (or Monday's demonstrations). The headline in Mehr exaggerated the story, which was simply that provisions were in place to order a suspension if fears of flu arose. Still, the

But the most important development by far came from the opposition. While Mir Hossein Mousavi, considering his next move, tried to reassure his followers that Qods Days was a success, Mehdi Karroubi may have taken the bull by the horns (or, in this case, the shark by the gills). His second letter to Hashemi Rafsanjani was not quite, "Are you with us or against us?", but it has asked the former President to come forth on the plan circulated at the Assembly of Experts. Put bluntly, Karroubi wants to know if the rumoured "political resolution" will take heed of opposition demands or sell out the protestors.

Latest Iran Video: More University Demonstrations (29 September)

The Latest from Iran (29 September): The Forthcoming Test?

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Chants for Ayatollahs Montazeri and Sane'i

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WZkwM5SAmcE&feature=sub[/youtube]

Sharif University

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LFqTBKKcjsI&feature=player_embedded[/youtube]

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GeL900RN7Rg[/youtube]

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=24ATG5l4gmA&feature=player_embedded[/youtube]

UPDATED Iran's Nuclear Programme: Scott Lucas in La Stampa (English Text)

Non-Proliferation and “Iran’s Nukes”: Chris Emery on Al Jazeera English
The Latest from Iran (28 September): Signals of Power

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UPDATE 29 September: Many, many thanks to an EA reader who translated the interview.

I had a long chat with Francesca Paci of the Italian newspaper La Stampa on Sunday, starting from the news of Iran's missile tests to consider the "secret nuclear plants" and the politics leading up to Thursday's meeting in Geneva of the "5+1" powers and Iran. Paci's original article is on the La Stampa website.

So Now, Ahmadinejad is Back in the Saddle

Professor Lucas from University of Birmingham: Nuclear Programme Serves to Divert Attention from Domestic Problems in Iran

PACI: What are the aims of the launch of the Zelzal missiles by the Iranian Army on a war footing?

LUCAS: The true goal of these large-scale manoeuvres in Tehran is to reduce Ahmadinejad's internal opposition. While the West responds to the military provocation of Ahmadinejad, he fights a definitive battle for his national legitimacy.

Rockets allow the Iranian leader to credit himself with the power that the June elections have called into question. So does the relaunching of the nuclear threat.

PACI: Let's start with the missiles: Why a bellicose military demonstration just now?

LUCAS: Iran is preparing itself for Thursday's meeting in Geneva [with the US, UK, France, Germany, Russia, and China] and wants to arrive there with the toughest possible stance. When the second uranium enrichment facility was revealed, Ahmadinejad's government said he would consider the visit of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, but 24 hours later he said he had done nothing wrong, and now he launches missiles. Tehran cannot afford to snub the talks but Ahmadinejad wants to meet the 5+1 powers in a strong position.

PACI: Monday the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps tested the Shahab 3, a powerful missile potentially able to reach Israel.

LUCAS: I do not think the launch changes the military situation. The timing is what matters most. Ahmadinejad wants to promote himself, and the West has fallen into the trap.

Iran is not currently violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty, according to which the second enrichment plant must be declared six months before receiving uranium. Even the Americans have said the plant will be operational "within a year". The Subsidiary Clause to the NPT, setting tougher conditions for the IAEA to inspect the facilities has never been ratified by the Iranian Parliament, although Iran accepted it on a voluntary basis between 2003 and 2007. No infringement therefore, so far. But in emphasizing the challenge of Ahmadinejad to the United Nations, the media gave him the political stature that the June vote had deprived him.

PACI: The Iranian president speaks to the world so that his own country hears him ?

LUCAS: Yes, and the American media have swallowed the bait. In New York, Ahmadinejad founded everything on the nuclear issue, thus managing to deflect attention from his domestic problems. He gave five interviews that accredited him as a leader, and he achieved an important point in using the nuclear threat to stabilize its legitimacy at home, where the opposition is far from being tamed.

PACI: Is it conceivable that he will succeed in a remobilization of the Iranian people as the country faces possible new sanctions?

LUCAS: Not this time. Two years ago the manoeuvre succeeded, but after the vote in June, national pride is no longer a strong point for Ahmadinejad: after all, all the election's candidates were in favor of nuclear power. Iranian people have realized that the President is using the excuse of endangered sovereignty in order to protect himself.

PACI: What do you think of the strategy of President Obama?

LUCAS: The White House already knew about the new installation in Qom. Why do they denounce it now?

Well, Obama was waiting for the right moment to increase pressure on the Iranian government, who must have understood this and spoke before Washington could unmask the "secret plant".

The US Administration is divided. Some sincerely support the diplomatic policy, others consider the dialogue as impossible and push for military action. Obama plays on both sides. His strategy is good, but the tactics suffers from these divisions. Iran is a key actor in the region: if it were to be attacked, the Middle East would be lost. America can not ignore it, not least because of its role in Afghanistan. This is why Richard Holbrooke [Obama's special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan] insists on negotiations.