The Latest from Iran (10 October): The Death Sentences

NEW Nobel Peace Prize Shock: Ahmadinejad Wins!
Iran’s Power Politics: A Warning To Moscow
Iran: Karroubi Reply to Ahmadinejad’s Appearance on US TV (9 October)
Now, for the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize: Mehdi Karroubi
The Latest from Iran (9 October): Almost Four Months

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1920 GMT: A Bit of Official Hesitation? Press TV's website posts an article confirming the death sentences on three post-election detainees: "two are responsible for a deadly bombing and the remaining convict is a member of a terrorist organization". It names only Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani.

Some of the article is repetition of the very thin pretext for conviction: Zamani and the other member [Arash Pour-Ramani] of the "Iran Royal Association" are not tied to any criminal incident; however, "the group is responsible for a deadly bombing in the southern city of Shiraz back in April 2008, in which 13 people were killed and hundreds were wounded". The third detainee [Naser Abdul Hosseini] will die simply because his alleged membership in the Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization, the armed wing of the People's Mujahideen Organization of Iran.

Yet, if you read closely, there are a couple of chinks in the article's open-and-shut case. You'll notice in the headline, "In Iran, three 'terrorists' are placed on death row", the quote marks of uncertainty. And the text notes that Ali Zamani's case has been highlighted by Amnesty International.

1630 GMT: A report by AUT News names the three post-election detainees sentenced to death: "monarchists" Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani and Arash Pourrahmani (both of whom are in the mid-August "confession" video run by Press TV, posted in a separate entry) and Naser Abdol Hosseini, alleged to be a member of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran.

1530 GMT: Yahoo! Makes It into State Media. It looks like the allegation over Yahoo! passing 200,000 usernames to Iran authorities will now die down, as there is no verification of the Iranian Students Solidarity Organization's claim of a source inside the Iranian Government. Still, the Islamic Republic News Agency gave the story several paragraphs today.

1520 GMT: Radio Netherlands has posted an English summary of the condemnation by the Dutch Foreign Minister (noted in comments below) of the death sentence for Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani.

1505 GMT: Minutes after we told a BBC radio reporter of the death sentences for post-election detainees, the BBC website adds, from the judiciary official who spoke to the Iranian Students News Agency, that "MZ" (probably Mohammad Ali Reza Zamani) and "AP" had been convicted for ties with the Kingdom Assembly of Iran, a banned monarchist group, and "NA" for links with the People's Mujahideen Organization of Iran, which has sought the overthrow of the Islamic government since 1979.

On Thursday, an Iranian reformist website reported that Mr Zamani, 37, had been sentenced to death. It is unclear whether he is the "MZ" mentioned by Isna.

1445 GMT: Parleman News reports that Mir Hossein Mousavi met Thursday with the representative of Grand Ayatollah Mousavi-Ardebili in Tehran. The description of the discussion is vague, saying that it apparently centred on senior clerics' input into Mousavi's plans for a "social network" for the Green Path of Hope.

1435 GMT: The original Iranian Students News Agency report says only that three post-election detainees have received death sentences. The three cannot be named, according to the newspaper, because appeals are ongoing.

1410 GMT: More Death Sentences? Al Jazeera English, claiming information from Iranian Students News Agency, says a total of three post-election detainees, including Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani, have been sentenced to death by the Tehran Revolutionary Court.

Caution is needed here. We've been following this assertion, first posted by Twitter activists, for several hours. Those reports say three death sentences in addition to Ali Zamani. With the help of readers, we have now found the original ISNA story (see 1435 GMT), but there is no other verification.

0920 GMT: The Persian2English blog has published the English text of a new post-election movement, The Green Thinkers’ Network. Considering "What Is True Freedom For Iran?", the Network writes, "Are we liberal democrats? Is it even necessary to label ourselves with these names? Each name has a history. Why should we carry the history of liberalism on our shoulders? Maybe we can have new customs. In our custom we have religion, but also freedom."

0755 GMT: The Washington Post's alternative to Barack Obama for the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize? Neda Agha Soltan.

0630 GMT: Another quiet start after a relatively gentle Friday, but no doubt that there is one development of significance.

Mehdi Karroubi's letter, posted in the name of his son, to the head of Iran state broadcasting may not seem that dramatic. On the surface, it restates Karroubi's charges of detainee abuse, made since late July, to counter the message of President Ahmadinejad put out on American television. It returns to the battleground of the "enquiry" by the three-member judiciary panel, which unceremoniously threw out Karroubi's claims last month.

But there is a broader message here, both symbolic and very practical. Ahmadinejad might be posing himself on the international stage as Iran's leader, but Karroubi's letter is a reminder that the President has very clay feet. And it comes after weeks in which the Government appeared to have cut off Karroubi's communications. The Etemade Melli newspaper was closed and the website of Karroubi's reformist party was taken down, shutting off the daily drip-drip of allegations that was wearing away the Government authority.

Now the cleric is back, with a resurrected website and the certainty that he is still noticed. He is not mincing words --- Ahmadinejad's "[US] interview was pure lies"; "traitors have viciously attacked me" --- and telling the authorities that he will not be stopped: "The late Imam [Khomeini] said that he would sacrifice his life for the people of this nation."

And the last line of the letter contains pages of meaning, after all the Government attempts to bottle up the opposition in a vacuum of news: "Despite all the efforts, borders have been broken and people have access to information."

Obama's Nobel Prize: There's Concerned...And Then There's Stupid

Instant Reaction: Barack Obama Wins Nobel Peace Prize
Video/Transcript: Obama’s Reaction to the Nobel Peace Prize

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The discussion on EA over the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Barack Obama has prompted a heated but constructive debate amongst a range of opinions. In contrast, here is a Hall of Infamy of reactions, replacing considered criticism with vitriol, nonsense, and headline stupidity:

Radio talk show host Rush Limbaugh: "Something has happened here that we all agree with the Taliban and Iran about and that is he doesn't deserve the award." (Friendly Tip to Rush: a bit of self-reflection might not be amiss here. How do you think you wound up on the side of Mullah Omar and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad?)

Former New York Times columnist William Kristol: "Mikhail Gorbachev won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990. A year later, he was out of power and the Soviet Union had dissolved. Let's hope the parallel extends this far: that a year from now the Democrats suffer a major electoral repudiation, and that the New Liberalism goes the way of Reform Communism."

Erick Erickson of the conservative website Red State (who spent all day Friday tweeting unfunny "putdowns"): "I did not realize the Nobel Peace Prize had an affirmative action quota for it, but that is the only thing I can think of for this news."

Andy McCarthy of National Review Online: "If today's headlines said, 'Barack Obama Wins Yasser Arafat Prize', that would be perfect."

Fox News babbling head Brian Kilmeade: Did Obama delay troop increase for Afghanistan so he could win the Prize? (No.)

Afghanistan: Was Pakistan's Intelligence Service Involved in Attack on Indian Embassy?

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Editor's Note: Josh Mull send this in on Thursday night, 15 hours after the bombing in front of the Indian Embassy in Kabul. We were caught up with other stories, and we also wanted to see if developments supported his theory. An hour ago, this emerged: "Afghan Ambassador to the US, Said T Jawad has claimed Pakistan's spy agency ISI was behind the suicide bomb blast at the Indian Embassy in Kabul on Thursday, which claimed 12 lives and injured over 80 people. Jawad said that there is enough evidence at the ground level to suggest that ISI was behind the attack."

Could Pakistani intelligence be linked to this attack? First we have some clues on the operational capability of the perpetrators: "The assailant in a car managed to enter the neighbourhood despite stringent security arrangements put in place. The 500-metre road stretch has been barricaded for a year in the wake of a deadly suicide assault on the Indian Embassy."

Further details came from an analyst via Twitter:

Vehicle was apparently a Lexus, to circumvent checkpoints there. Reportedly a VBIED [vehicle-delivered improvised explosive device] against National Directorate of Security (NDS) hospital, next to the Ministry of the Interior. More specifically, the blast was between the MoI, NDS hospital and Indian Embassy. That road is normally blockaded.

Photographs of the vehicle used for the attack indicated it's a larger car, too small for an industrial vehicle or truck. This lends credence to the Lexus theory although it's not 100% solid.

This was a well-funded and well-coordinated attack. It would not be impossible for the Taliban to accomplish something like this, but it would take a long, long time and extensive resources to spare. On top of that, some considerable luck would be involved getting past the layers of security. Luck or (abnormally expensive) bribery.

Did the attackers have help? For that we have a bit more information:

A number of Indian mission employees were among the casualties, a spokesman for the militant movement told Pajhwok Afghan News over the telephone from an undisclosed location.

Zabihullah Mujahid said Khaled, a resident of Paghman district, carried out the attack on the embassy. At least 35 Afghan and international security personnel were killed and several others injured in the assault, he claimed.

Right away we can knock out the claim of 35 killed, seeing as how the Taliban did not have any forensic teams in the area, and certainly the perpetrator wasn't around to do any counting. But the real meat is in the assertion that they managed to kill Indian workers. What does the Islamic Emirate of the Taliban care about a handful of Indians when they just wiped out 35 (their claim) security personnel and Minstry of Interior collaborators with the Crusaders? Why make the point?

It could be that Pakistan's intelligence service ISI was directly involved (acquisition of vehicles, clearances, etc) since they would definitely have the ability to acquire them easier in Kabul than the Taliban would. And they certainly have motive to help: in the last few days the Indian Foreign Minister has expressed the desire to negotiate with the Taliban as well as India's support for a continued US presence in Afghanistan. A report leaked to Indian papers on Wednesday detailed a supposed plot by ISI to infiltrate Taliban fighters into Kashmir and India. (http://www.zeenews.com/news568886.html).

That leaves me stuck with two theories. Either this was an extremely sophisticated and devastating attack by the Taliban against the Ministry of Interior, or it was a terribly ineffective attack by the Taliban and ISI against the Indian embassy and/or Indian personnel. Nothing I've listed is enough to confirm either theory, but we do have hints. If anyone can add to this, please do so.

Iran's Power Politics: A Warning To Moscow

The Latest from Iran (10 October): Karroubi is Back

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In the aftermath of the Geneva talks on Iran's nuclear programme, there are clear signals that Tehran wants some re-assurance of Russia's support. Moscow may have backed away from its initial signal, after the revelation of the second enrichment plant, that it might accept tougher sanctions, but there is far more in play, as Iran tipped off in its high-profile references at Geneva to "regional issues". Beyond the headlines on "missile defense", positions from the Middle East to the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Basin are being contested.

These two articles from Iran Review--- the first by Dr Hassan Behestipour on the Iran-Russia-US triangle and the second by Behzad Ahmadi Lafuraki on the threat of Russia's accommodation with NATO --- are far more than academic exercises in making the point:

Iran and Washington’s Game with Moscow
Dr. Hassan Beheshtipour

After Obama was elected president in February 2009, relations between Russia and the United States somehow changed after two years that had passed since the Munich meeting. The new administration had given up past conservative policies and Obama paid a visit to Moscow in July 2009. In the new era, Washington ignores repression of Chechens by Russia, which in turn, helps the United States in Afghanistan.

The United States has also temporarily postponed implementation of its missile defense shield for Eastern Europe in order to convince Moscow to be more cooperative on Afghanistan and Iran. Russia has tried to expand its relations with pro-West Arab countries as well as countries critical of the United States in Latin America in order to secure a foothold in a region which has been traditionally considered a US backyard. This will not only increase political clout of Russia, but also provide Moscow with a good market to sell arms.

Perhaps the zenith of the confrontations between Moscow and Washington in recent months has been establishment of a missile shield by the United States in the Czech Republic and Poland. Hearing about postponement of the plan, Moscow has taken contradictory stances on it. While President Medvedev has welcomed the development, Russian military are skeptical about the true intention of the United States and consider the move to be aimed at deceiving Russia and buying time.

However, the Russians have officially announced that in return for the postponement, they would give up a plan to deploy missiles in Kaliningrad, which is a Russian enclave near the border with Poland.

Bilateral relations between Moscow and Washington

Despite the rhetoric between the United States and Russia after the election of Obama, bilateral conditions are still plagued with many challenges. The fact that Medvedev received Obama at his family resort in Moscow and the warm meetings between the two sides on the sidelines of G20 meeting in Weisberg, US, have shown that neither of the two sides want their differences to lead to a major confrontation. In other words, Russia is planning to compete with the United States for benefits while it had resigned to some form of confrontation with the US under the Bush Administration. Therefore, Russia will not seek war and conflict with the United States in the coming years. Unlike the past, the Russians know where and how to deal with the Americans and when and where to confront them in order to both guarantee their own interests and make the rival withdraw.

Role of Iran in Washington’s game with Russia

This policy, however, has cost Russia dearly as the country has damaged its international credit as a result of giving in to US pressures over Iran’s nuclear case. The Americans have made the most of the Russians to achieve their goals the latest instance of which was adoption of the fourth Security Council resolution against Iran in early 2009. In order to keep its bargaining power in the face of the United States, Russia cannot afford to lose the Iran trump card. But what obstacles lay ahead of Russia?

In order to curb further US advances toward its western and southern borders, it should first build confidence in its relations with countries like Iran because Russia is usually faced with two charges in relation to its foreign policy.

Firstly, Russia opposes US unilateralism at international level, but pursues a similar policy in the region. International experts maintain that international and regional forms of unilateralism are equally inefficient and cause distrust, thus, reducing cooperation among nations.

Secondly, in its interactions with the United States, Russia easily trades its allies’ interest with the West when needed, but when its own national security or national interests are at stake, like what happened with the missile defense system, it would not be ready for any deal with the West. Continuation of this policy, which is considered by journalists as trading other countries’ interests for its own, will isolate Russia in the long run.

Vladimir Eskusirov and Andrei Terekhov, Russian correspondents of Nezavisimaia Gazeta in Tehran wrote an article on Monday saying that Tehran was surprised by the Russian president’s remarks who noted that ‘under some circumstances, sanctions are the only choice’. Those remarks seem strange because Russia is well aware that Iran has no nuclear weapons.

Last Friday, the Russian president issued a special statement on the uranium enrichment facility near Qom and noted that construction of a new enrichment plant is against frequent requests by the United Nations Security Council for Iran to stop uranium enrichment on its soil.

Russian analysts maintain that Washington had reserved news about the new plant secret until October 1 when Iranians had to make a final choice. Interestingly, Obama told Medvedev about the new plant only on Wednesday with China and Russia being fed accurate information on Thursday, that is, later than France and UK. Statements by the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, who said in an interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that Russia expected its allies to immediately share any information on Iran with Moscow, clearly indicated that Moscow was not happy with the current state of affairs. Russia was unhappy both with the level of cooperation with Western members of P5+1, and with Iran which had not said anything to Russia about the new plant.

In reality, if Russia wants to have Iran’s cooperation, it should prove that Moscow is a trustworthy partner, not a country which passes good times with others while sharing bad times with Iran and other critics of the West.



NATO’s Call on Russia for Cooperation: Goals and Possibilities
Behzad Ahmadi Lafuraki

After the tension in Russia’s relations with NATO increased due to what happened in Southern Ossetia in August 2008, the two sides met at high level on the Greek island of Corfu on June 29, 2009 and agreed to resume political and military cooperation.

The then NATO secretary-general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, announced resumption of NATO – Russia cooperation and mentioned reduction in weapons of mass destruction and fighting illicit drugs as major fields in which the two sides can collaborate. His successor, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, also called for resumption of negotiations with Kremlin in order to create a new atmosphere and work out new strategic partnership according to which both sides could cooperate on Afghanistan, terrorism, and piracy. He declared reduction of common security concerns in Europe and fighting common threats as the main areas of cooperation between NATO and Russia.

The turning point in renewed relations between NATO and Russia, however, is a recent decision by the United States to give up its plan for the establishment of a missile defense shield in eastern and central Europe. Just one day after the announcement of the above decision by US officials, secretary-general of NATO declared that a major hurdle on the way of expanding relations with Russia has been removed and the two sides should now focus on commonalities. The secretary-general did not suffice to general terms and pointed to four main areas of cooperation between Russia and NATO, that is, fighting terrorism at international level, fighting drug trafficking in Afghanistan, preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons, and establishment of joint missile defense systems.

Russia also lost no time to show positive reaction to the US decision by commending Washington. Kremlin did not suffice to lip service and announced that it will stop deployment of new missiles in Kaliningrad.

The above developments and Rasmussen’s call on Russia to cooperate with NATO indicate a U-turn in NATO’s security policy, on the one hand, and Moscow’s keen interest in improving relations with the United States and NATO for better management of challenges, on the other hand. Since Russia’s relations with NATO have been constantly a function of the country’s relations with the United States and Europe, improvement in bilateral relations between Washington and Moscow has left its mark on Russia’s relations with NATO and common goals have overshadowed discrepancy in values.

On the whole, the West has reached the conclusion that convergence with Russia will be more beneficial for the security of transatlantic system than isolation of the country. Two main reasons have prompted Russia to cooperate with NATO despite threats posed to it by eastward expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The first reason is that Moscow is willing to be part of the transatlantic community. The second reason is having common security concerns with other NATO members, including the issue of stability in Afghanistan and drug trafficking in that country, fighting terrorism, especially transnational Islamist tendencies, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as challenges it is facing due to increased population and influence of China. In doing this, Russia is pursuing the following three goals:

1. To avoid isolation in international issues which are related to global security like Afghanistan by being present in international decision-making bodies such as NATO;

2. To prevent NATO from possibly taking anti-Russia positions; and

3. To creates opportunities for solving problems in the Caucasus by cooperating with NATO on such issues as Afghanistan or terrorism.

On the other hand, the United States and its allies are currently attaching more significance to Russia’s cooperation with NATO as problems like the instability in Afghanistan or the nuclear standoff with Iran greatly overshadowed the war in Georgia and its consequences. As for Afghanistan, it is possible for Russia to either limit the number of NATO flights over its airspace or instigate Central Asian states, as it did with Uzbekistan, to shut down US bases on their soil, thus, causing serious problems for NATO in supporting its forces in Afghanistan.

As for Iran, it seems that the United States has managed through introduction of the missile shield plan and its later rescission to make Moscow cooperate with Washington on Iran’s nuclear case. In fact, the United States has taken advantage of something that did not exist and has dealt with Russia over it. This has precedence in the US foreign policy and many similar instances can be seen in relation to various issues in the world. It was in line with this policy that as soon as the United States announced its decision to rescind the missile shield plan, Rasmussen moved to ask Russia to put the maximum possible diplomatic pressure on Iran in order to prevent Tehran from building a nuclear bomb.

The secretary-general of NATO warned the world on September 19, 2009 and on the verge of Group 5+1 meeting that if Iran were turned into a nuclear power, its model would be followed by some neighboring countries and emergence of multiple nuclear powers would not be in the best interests of NATO and Russia.

Since Russia has been consistently following a defensive policy toward NATO in the past decade and considered NATO’s decisions a function of the interests of its main power, that is, the United States, it seems that improvement in Washington – Moscow relations would certainly lead to improvement in Russia’s relations with NATO, just as happened in 2002.

The signs of such improvement are already on the horizon. Russian leaders have not ruled out the possibility of more sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program and have even expressed concerns over Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.

The Latest from Iran (9 October): Almost Four Months

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1955 GMT: More on The Friday Prayer. State media's rather sanitised version of Ahmad Khatami's remarks is now being supplemented by other accounts summarising his attack on post-election protesters. He claimed that, on Qods Day, the foreign media focused on a "few thousand Republicans", who were enemies of Islam, rather than the millions of supporters of the Government and regime.

1655 GMT: A Friday Prayer Diversion. Ahmad Khatami's turn to give the address, and he (or at least the state media summarising him) continued the Ahmadinejad approach of looking overseas to avoid looking at home. He declared, "The meeting [at Geneva on Iran's nuclear programme] was a great victory for the Islamic Republic of Iran to such an extent that even the Western and Zionist media had to admit defeat."

1445 GMT: Flashback: The "Confession" That Means Death. We're posting the Press TV report from mid-August on Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani, the post-election protester sentenced to death earlier this week.

1230 GMT: Karroubi's Back. The reformist leader has written a sharp letter to the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, refuting claims made by President Ahmadinejad on US television and asking for time to present the evidence of detainee abuses. We've posted the English text.

And, on the day that the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded, we've revived our entry on the drive to name Karroubi as the 2010 recipient.

0915 GMT: Urgent Correction. Readers have let us know (and thanks to all of you!) that the date for the major protest is 4 November, not 3 November as we originally reported, and that the occasion is Iran's Heritage Day as well as the anniversary of the 1979 takeover of the US Embassy.

0825 GMT: A Quick Reply on 4 November Demonstrations. It took only a few minutes for readers to confirm the information on Iran's streets about the forthcoming protest (see 0745 GMT). The poster (on left) has the following caption:

Join, my dear. On 13 Aban [4 November] we will greet the anti-riot police and security forces with flowers. And sitting down on the streets in silence, we will turn night into day and day into night with our unity

Invitation by the Student Society, Office of Strengthening Unity (Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat), University of Tehran, the People & Students’ Green Movement

0745 GMT: 25 Days and Counting? A reader notes our statement "no major gatherings scheduled" (0630 GMT) and replies, "Do you know about the demonstrations being planned by the Sea of Green for 13 Aban (November 3), anniversary of the taking of US hostages in 1979?" [N.B.: Other readers later corrected this --- the date is 4 November, Iran's Heritage day.]

I have noticed references to this but have been awaiting further information on whether intentions have turned into plans. Any assistance from readers most welcome.

0730 GMT: A University Correction? We linked yesterday (1845 GMT) to a Government document which ordered the closure of a University newspaper after it implied that the Holocaust had been a historical event. A sharp-eyed reader has noted that the date on the document is Iranian Year 1387 --- last year --- rather than 1388.

0645 GMT: Credit to Michael Slackman of The New York Times. Yesterday he published a full review not only of the Revolutionary Guard's involvement in a coalition bid for 51% of Iran's state telecommunications company but also background cases such as the Guard's takeover of the management of Imam Khomeini Airport, the current Parliamentary investigation of the telecom deal, and "concerns in Iran over what some call the rise of a pseudogovernment".

Although the story is weeks old, it hasn't been noticed much in the Western media, and the Revolutionary Guard's role in the Iranian economy is one of the most important long-term aspects of this political crisis. The only clanger in Slackman's piece is his necessity to put in an irrelevant comment from Flynt Leverett, a former US National Security Council official: “In a strategic sense, I don’t think Iran is in a fundamentally different place than it was before elections, not in the way it approaches negotiations or the way it looks at its foreign policy."

If Slackman really wanted to establish significant in that quote from Leverett, which belongs in a piece on US-Iranian relations, he would link it to the former NSC official's continuing attempt to establish the legitimacy of the Ahmadinejad Government. For it is that legitimacy that it is at the political heart of possibly illegitimate moves by the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps.

0630 GMT: On Monday it will be four months since votes for President were counted/misaltered/manipulated in Iran, and the anniversary is being welcomed with one of the quietest phases in the post-election conflict. With no major gatherings scheduled, and with politicans and some clerics focused more on private talks than public statements, this is wait-and-see.

The anticipated Parliamentary fireworks have not materialised, and President Ahmadinejad is trying to stay out of trouble by not mentioning alleged abuses, his Ministers' records, or the Iranian economy. One interesting on the last of these: Iran state TV reported yesterday that the quota of subsidised gasoline/petrol for each person will be cut by 45%. Some US-based specialists interpreted this as a reaction to anticipated tighter sanctions from Washington; the simpler explanation is that the Iranian Government needs to cut costs.

Now into the Iranian weekend. No chatter yet about Friday Prayers --- we'll have a look now to see who's leading them. Expect instead more murmurs about detentions and punishment; slowly the death penalty passed on protester Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani, and some activists are also raising cases such as the trial, with possible death sentences, of seven member of the Baha'i faith.