Iran's New 13 Aban: An Eyewitness Account "I Have Never Seen as Much Violence"

Iran’s New 13 Aban: A First-Hand Account from the Streets
Iran: Josh Shahryar on the Significance of 13 Aban
Iran Video: The Tribute to 13 Aban’s Protesters
The Latest from Iran (6 November): The Day After The Day After

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From Persian Umpire (compare with the account offered by EA's Mr Azadi yesterday):

A strange sentiment crept in me today. A man in his late fifties was beaten by a group of people a meter away from me, and I enjoyed it. While I neither had the urge to join in, nor the time to think about it, the delight I took in seeing this man’s fearful face pushed me to encourage his assailants. I am glad I didn’t. In the mayhem, as he was begging them to stop, and kept yelling “why are you beating me?” I only thought to myself “you must be kidding”. He was a member of the Basij.

I had never seen as much violence perpetrated before me in one day. If another day compares to 13 Aban, it would be the 30th of Khordad, the day after Khamenei gave his gangsters the green light to show no merci to Iranians. 13 Aban was worse, maybe because I stayed on longer, or maybe because it was worse indeed. I had not seen so many security forces concentrated in one area before either. I covered 7-Tir Square, Karim Khan Avenue, Vali-Asr Square and the surrounding area today. Thousands of greens showed, mostly without green signs, and were met with thousands of simians, to whom if one grants the label Homo, their qualifications would not allow them to go any higher than Erectus.



The ape forces had one goal in mind, which was to prevent any crowd from forming. Their strategy: indiscriminate violence. At about 10:30 in the morning, before getting to Vali-Asr Square, we passed by the Beheshti metro station. A group of ten anti-riot IRGC members in camouflage uniforms and wielding batons suddenly rushed the station gate, frightening people who were exiting to flee inside. About seven or eight of the security men ran in while the others shut and held the gates behind them. After that, you could only hear the sounds of screams and thuds. Maybe some greens were among them, maybe not. One was carrying a shopping bag.

Something we have learned in the protests is that when the apes charge, you should avoid running, get on the sidewalk close to shop windows and keep walking, or just stand against the walls. They would normally go past you in pursuit of those who run. Today, the apes would get on the sidewalks on bikes, hold out their batons against the walls and drive on. If they were without bikes, they just ran through and waved their clubs, sticks, or chains. It didn’t matter who or what it hit.

I won’t give a moment-by-moment account of the day. Most of it was an uninterrupted sequence of severe beatings, bruises and blood, from which I remember snapshots. I also remember hearing gunshots on a couple of occasions. Arrests seemed to be indiscriminate as well. We saw Basij members picking on the young randomly, forcing them on their knees, handcuffing and blindfolding them, and then taking them away.

On Vali-Asr Avenue, north of the square, a policeman was shouting insults at an old man for having shown up to the demonstration. A young boy went over to the policeman and handed him a flower, to which his response was to slap the boy and throw him on the sidewalk. The boy picked himself up and left.

In the mayhem, we saw security and Basij forces get beaten up or hit by rocks also. On Karim Khan Avenue close to Vali-Asr Square, an eighteen or nineteen-year-old Basiji, wielding a rubber belt, started chasing a man on the street next to the sidewalk. The man was big and the Basiji was short, chubby, and his beard had barely sprouted. For the first time I saw a technique I’ve read about but difficult to perform, in action. Mid chase, the man suddenly stopped dead, turned around, grabbed the Basiji who was stunned, and slammed him against the side of a car. It took him a few seconds to get up. When he saw a group of people who were now rushing him, he ran, but they got to him and started pummeling him. At this moment, a fifty-something-year-old Basiji with short white hair, the man I mentioned above, appeared from behind a bus and ran toward the scuffle, with the same kind of strap in his hand, attempting to beat and scare the others to get the other Basiji out. Another group of people appeared and charged him. He fell to the ground a meter away from me and started receiving kicks and punches. This is when a group of Basiji apes arrived at the scene, surrounded the two other apes and dragged them away.

Later on, at 7-Tir Square, a Basiji, an older man again, was holding his head and was bleeding profusely. Another was propping him up and helping him cross the square to where their camp was set up.

The demonstration never took the magnitude and concentration of Qods Day. It was never allowed. Everyone was fleeing from the security forces, regrouping in the side streets, or recovering from tear gas and beatings. The largest group of people I saw walking on Karim Khan and chanting anti-government slogans reached two or three hundred people at best. There were pro-government demonstrators who appeared from time to time, with loudspeakers and chanting. The largest of those were a few hundred people. I remember one of their new slogans: “Death to the velvet dictator.” Whatever that means.

Before I go and crash, as I am beat, grimy, and tired, let me tie in 13 Aban with Rafsanjani’s Super Duper Plan. Since its inception and the supposed detente between Rafsanjani and Khamenei, the plan has been viewed by many in Iran as false hope and a ruse by the Supreme Leader to buy time and create diversion at best. 13 Aban was another promise broken, another U-turn, another glimmer of hope faded. We are facing a regime in which reform has no practical representative. Neither the leaders of the green movement, nor Rafsanjani or the Marjas, have managed to get meaningful concessions from the Supreme Leader. What I keep hearing is, “What are they going to say now? More of the same?” 13 Aban has left us no doubt about Khamenei’s desire to utterly crush the opposition. Many in Iran view him as a man who does not negotiate, and the perpetrator of all that has happened since the elections.

Something is abuzz in the air in Tehran tonight. It is angry talk about meeting violence with violence. Patience is running out and I am now hearing about switching to the same language as the opponents. How viable that is, or whether we will go down that road will be determined in the future, but 1979 is before our eyes. Take away hope and it won’t be long before reform will give way to overhaul. So far, some are wondering whether reforms have hit a dead end. “Reconciliation” is a funny word now. Maybe it is just a reaction to a brutal day on the streets, or an existential phase, inevitable after six months of going in circles. But one thing is clear. Early on, the movement’s demand was taking back the votes. Today, it is stomping on the Leader for an “Iranian Republic”. He may succeed in crushing the opposition, but may someone save his soul if he fails.

Comments

[Roe Lassie]

Iranyar,

Firstly your English makes sense so don't worry about that.

I hope you are wrong about the time scale, though I can understand why you hedge your bets for a longer rather than shorter time.

Some observations though, as someone has already said can anyone believe how far things have actually come in such a short time?! I mean who in their wildest dreams 6 months ago would have believed not just the open chants against Khomenei, but the tearing down and stamping on his picture?! Sometimes I think we need to just remember how far we have actually come.

I know that when we visited Iran some years ago in every taxi in every city every single person complained about the regime and that they had to go. So I guess what we are seeing spilling out is 30 years of anger against an oppressive regime.

I know people are frustrated that Obama is dealing with Ahmadinejad, but I am hopeful that the one thing he might be able to do is restrain Israel - so I remain hopeful that an attack will not come from quarter - I don't think they could do it without American support. (It would have been very different under his predecessor is all I can say)

Finally the other thing to keep in mind is Khomenei's health - of course no one can predict how long he will survive, but what will happen when he does die - which is guaranteed!
If the rumours are true that he is being kept alive with opium, then my word but they must be fairly pumping it into him now - they most certainly will not want his death any time soon.

[scott harrop]

Last I heard, Khomeini was still dead. ;-}

And about Obama dealing with Ahmadinejad/Khamenehi, oh the ironies here. So what would this curious Bush-like sentiment (yer either with us or agnst us) counsel Obama to do?

If Obama now cuts off negotiations with A/N's representatives, (as if they somehow don't represent Iran) what then?

If I read them right, Musavi, the Larijanis & various other figures appear to be criticizing of the IAEA deal on nationalist grounds, that is, that too much "trust" is being put in the untrustworthy west.... (one could be forgiven for a hard-headed political analysis -- and suspecting they are also loathe to see A/N get credit for the breakthrough -- understandable)

So imagine then. Obama is being asked to give up pressing for a very promising deal via interlocutors at least nominally tied to A/N so that he can hope that others come to the table... who (for domestic political rivalry reasons) may well be even less likely to accept the IAEA deal.

Somebody care to explain how this would be a gain.?

[Iranyar]

@Roe Lassie

Yeah I agree that it's really some progress this 6months but the thing is that has surfaced now is that the regime wont succumd, they wont give in a inch. That's what we know from the IRI by now. We didn't know that when 2-3 million iranians were out in the capital. We thought that raf/khat/marjas would be backing them up.

some thoughts

> dont u think the regime almost wants to infuriate the world and have israel striking against them?
> obama has 3y more left. what will happen with a republican comes to power?
> what is beingf wanted by the majority of the greens? and what is wanted by karroubi and mousavi? i dont think they want the same future for iran. the latter dont want an secualr republic like most of the greens.
> how should you deal with a regime that doesn't care and almost doesnt need a majority of its population? they know that they sit on the oil and may give their irgc thugs some nice salary and the oil-workers. they dont care so much bout the rest.
> If khamenei dies I think irgc will put one of their mullahs in place...jannati/yazdi. But I think his death will only rep things up even more...because then it's an allout new-coup d-etah regime throughout. and that the vaccum that khamenei leaves wont be filled with any prestige such as if montazeri would be it, which i hiiiihgly doubt. Like just imagine the 3rd supreme leader being on every poster, picture, billboard and welcomeplate in every office, street, momument, shop in iran. highly unlikely.

But the positive part is that the regime is soon about to exploit its roughest tactic on the ppl which soon aint gonna leave them to much more options or force than it has done which makes them volnerable. Imagine urself having a bad dream and u hit the bad guy so much and for so long but he still keeps smiling, then u really get afraid and may think of retreating or runaway. Look at the uni's some dabestans too, common day-2-day life anger, sportsvevents, hijacking IRI holidays, all this wont ever dissapear. and every1 that they beat/arrest/rape has say at least 5-6 close relatives or feinds and 15-20 ppl that they know good....which they all make much more angry by doin this...hate gives birth to hate as they say. But Im really surprised by the tolerance of the greenies to not being violent.
The pinnacle is when the majority of the poeple are like the ones who are out now...they have to feel like they have nothing to lose and never opt for anything else.

btw the idea of having karrubi starting a new tvchannel from dubai or what it was would be a huge blow for IRI if they wouldnt be able to stop it because the iranians feel like this is from one of the insiders doing this and not MKK or monarchist. but i heard he lacks the fund.

[JP]

"The battle over the Revolution has to do with permanent values and only a simpleton would try to reduce it to an argument over this or that economic policy. As Imam Khomeini once put it perfectly: “REVOLUTION is not about the price of watermelons”."

The idea of a battle over "permanent values" is a contradiction in terms. By definition, that which is permanent is unchangeable -- it endures regardless of conditions.

If the "permanent" value requires outside support, or maintenance through coercion or force, by definition it isn't permanent. It's mutable (changing).

Political transformation is almost always proceeded by economic transformation.

The French revolution, for example, may not have been just about the price of bread, but the price of bread was a catalyst for political transformation. In a market economy, economic power is political power. Dramatic changes in the alignment of economic power often result in corresponding changes in the political structure (and visa versa).

In reference to the current situation in Iran, I have no idea how things will ultimately unfold. If people strive for a more representative system, it is hard to see how that can be achieved through a resort to violence. Economic pressure and solidarity are tools that require time and patience, but they are more compatible with the end of a free society.

[Samuel]

@Moandor,

You are right regarding the slogan. I misread the original story.
If the velvet dictator slogan was by pro-governtment folks it is still an idiotic slogan.

[Samuel]

"The idea of a battle over “permanent values” is a contradiction in terms. By definition, that which is permanent is unchangeable — it endures regardless of conditions."

No it is not. That is only true if you view the world in a rigid, unthinking way. A Revolution like the Iranian one or the Russian one or the Chinese one contain permanent values. (In Soviet Society it might have been belief in anti-imperialist militancy, collectivization of production and indeed society, solidarity with the international proletariat etc.,). Within a broad set of beliefs policies are changed or MODIFIED according to current conditions.

In order to stay dry one does not walk around with an open umbrella all the time regardless of whether it is raining or not.

[JP]

Samuel,

In terms of the broad sweep, I guess I'm more cynical about these kind of things. Ultimately revolutions are about power and the way the power is organized and distributed. At the core that's about the only common, enduring element in revolutions.

In politics there are no "permanent values" -- every arrangement is provisional and contingent. Reality is dynamic and things change. A system of political organization which may be well-suited to one moment, might be ill-suited at another time (e.g. centralization can be positive in some circumstances -- such as times of crisis; but over an extended period of time it can also stifle innovation and create its own set of crises).

Soviet leaders may have talked about the international proletarian revolution, and perhaps many of the leaders believed it. At the end though Stalin, et al, simply replaced one form of authoritarian rule with another form. In some respects there were differences with respect to increases in say literacy, but in others it was a case of "meet the new boss, same as the old boss".

[Samuel]

@Me

"I learnt to use AK-47..."

I'm very encouraged by all this talk of violent counterrevolution from the pro-Greenies. I would not mind it at all if those Greenies started to clean their AK-47's right about now. Actually it's a Kalashnikov with that heavy piston it does not have to be cleaned all that much.

Just be aware that once the Greenies do that the Basij will also bring out an AK or two as the picture below clearly shows. For those interested those are Romanian AK's in the picture. Iran makes its own AK's these days--and a fine version it is.

http://english.khamenei.ir//components/com_mhasgallery/img_pictures/originals/20080526_1439601590_17.jpg

[Samuel]

JP,

But look at China. Some Revolutionary values have changed, even radically since the time of Mao. Yet China today is one of the two superpowers in the world and it will be THE superpower if the Americans continue these losing wars against Muslims.

China has dramatically changed its economy from Mao's period but it has not adopted western values either. If not for the Chinese Revolution and everything that followed China would have remained a miserable, pathetic, undeveloped, western exploited non-entity. Think of the Opium Wars.

China certainly was not a case of "meet the new boss, same as the old boss”.

[Betty Balassanian]

It is said power corrupts. It seems to corrupt the clergy most. Throughout history they have used religion to their advantage, to empower themselves meanwhile suppressing brutally those who dare oppose them. An ancient, cultured people in desperate need of good government. Unfortunately that has rarely been the case throughout Iranian history.

[JP]

Samuel,

China is an interesting case.

In terms of industrialization, China today is no longer a feudal economy thanks in part to economic liberalization begun under Deng Xiaoping. In respect to the way that economic power is distributed, the current period has some resemblances to the one party rule of the KMT under Chiang in the 1930s and 1940s (e.g. a small coterie is reaping extreme economic benefits -- concentrations of wealth are also located heavily in cities along the eastern coast with tension growing in the interior and west). In some respects the revolution has come full circle. History never fully repeats itself, but the current period bears some resemblances to the pre-revolution period in terms of economic structures -- a kind of crony capitalism -- than it did under Mao.

The economic development in China is also creating political pressures that in time may yield to greater liberalization (e.g. the creation and growth of a middle class tends to result in political demands in time; the only way to reverse those demands is to stifle entrepreneurial innovation, shut the country off from the world again, and in turn reverse economic gains).

China today may still be an authoritarian state, but with economic growth, I would not be surprised to see greater political liberalization. The pursuit of materialism in modern China is something that people in the West understand quite well. These were not values held during Mao's period -- in fact, he would likely frown upon many of the changes that have taken place today.

There are some resemblances between China today and the U.S. during the period of industrialization during the "Gilded Age" (when our own crony capitalists exerted disproportionate control over our political system). This is a stark contrast from China under Mao. Political power in China is still more centralized today than it was in the U.S. during Gilded Age; although, the parallels with that period are greater now than they were under Mao.

Economic structures and political structures are related. If the goal is to create static political structures, it is necessary to do as the Spartans and Mao did (and as the North Koreans do to this day) -- and still, in time, the reality of an ever-changing world tends to wear down even the most closed society.

As the cliche goes, the only thing that is constant is change.

Values change in response to internal and external changes.

In theology there may be "permanent values"; in politics, the world is always in flux. Closed political systems can maintain an illusion of static, permanent values, but this illusion is maintained through artificial constraints at a heavy price. Closed political systems are like a form of inbreeding. In time, they are not good for the health of a nation.

[Samuel]

JP,

I do not believe for a second that that permanent values of the Iranian Islamic Revolution of the Ayatollah Khomeini means that one has a rigid, static society. As I've pointed out before the Revolution has gone through periods of greater and lesser liberalizations. I'm repeating myself but the reformists were in control of the Presidency for eight years and before that there was President Rafansjani, today the idol of reformists.

This is not the Soviet Union of Gorbachev where glasnost and perestroika were totally unprecedented.

Let me give you an example outside Iran but closely related to the Revolution. In my opinion there is no one more loyal to the values, the aspirations, the dreams of the Iranian Revolution in its totality than Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Although obviously not an Iranian this man studied in Qom and spent many years in Iran. It has even been said that Nasrallah is like a son to the SL which I find to be completely believable.

Today Hezbollah controls vast areas of Shiite Lebanon, areas where no one even comes closing to forcing women to wear the Hijab. This is but one example that can be cited. I know some will say that Nasrallah is simply waiting for the day he finally takes over all of Lebanon to end the current pragmatism.

The truth is that Hezbollah, the great champions of the Islamic Revolution have been pragmatic, flexible, adaptable to meet the realities around them while remaining loyal to the Khomeini vision.

Speaking of flexibility the Iranian Govt. under Imam Khomeini did not hesitate to deal with the Great Satan at the time of the Iran-Contra controversy because such dealings were for the benefit of the Iranian Revolution.

This notion of the Iranian Revolution being rigid, static, or "frozen in time" is nothing more than a caricature dreamed up by reformist propaganda.

[JP]

Samuel,

I don't think that the Iranian Revolution is rigid or static -- clearly the Iranian system has some dynamism. It is also true that the revolution has come full circle in many ways.

Iran is more self-reliant in many ways than it was before the revolution. Some good was accomplished in the years before the present time. Ahmadinejad inherited a pretty good foundation. Although, in four years he appears to have squandered much. He is to Iran what George W. Bush was to the U.S.

Nominally the state maintains its Islamic roots; however, in practice its ruling elite today seem to enjoy the fruits of earthly power in a manner that is clearly not disinterested.

In terms of governance, the political elites seem to have been seduced more by secular crony capitalism (they seem more like adherents of Putin or the Shah than adherents of the Imam). Their words and deeds are not in harmony.

Of course they will deny this, but the truth is what it is. A leader does not amass an earthly fortune of hundreds of millions, or billions of dollars while in political power, if that leader puts the interests of the people before his own. This was true in the time of the Shah; this is no less true today. Imam Khomenei enjoyed public confidence in part because he exercised power with an eye towards national interests -- he did not use political power simply as a means to enrich himself.

If economic gains were more widely shared; unemployment was low; and inflation was largely in check, I suspect more people would be supportive of the current political arrangement. The cronyism which exists within the current regime and the mismanagement of economic affairs by cronies weakens the overall health of the Iranian state.

To the degree that the economy is well-managed, the regime will enjoy some degree of internal confidence. To the degree that political leaders mismanage the economy, it loses confidence -- especially when the political leaders profit when others do not. Political and economic power are inter-related.

In reference to Hezbollah, it co-exists right now within a relatively open society inside Lebanon (albeit tenuously). If Iran enjoyed the same electoral and press freedoms that currently exist in Lebanon, there would be more transparency and greater accountability -- the political system would have a means for removing incompetent members of the government; people would have a stake in the political process, because the political process would offer a means for accommodating legitimate grievances (especially as they relate to the conduct of earthly affairs). As it stands now, there is no check against earthly incompetence in the Iranian political system. That is part of the problem. Using violence and coercion do not remedy the underlying problem.

In reference to Hezbollah, it is also too bad that Iranian hardliners have not taken the lessons of the Doha compromise into account. Whether the compromise holds is an open question, but the willingness of the parties in the conflict to seek mediation and avoid another civil war demonstrates the kind of pragmatism that you highlight.

[kevina]

"No it is not. That is only true if you view the world in a rigid, unthinking way. A Revolution like the Iranian one or the Russian one or the Chinese one contain permanent values. (In Soviet Society it might have been belief in anti-imperialist militancy, collectivization of production and indeed society, solidarity with the international proletariat etc.,)."

Samuel, did it ever occur to you that countries will, almost inevitably, outlive some of the values of Revolutions? Like, oh the Bolshevik Revolution?

Your countrymen seem to be saying that many of the ideals of '79 no longer apply. I would agree.

[Samuel]

JP,

I don't disagree with you that the Govt. must pursue more effective economic policies. And please there is plenty of debate about that in parliament and other venues. Look at how many of AN's nominees for the Cabinet have been rejected over the years.

Of course unlike other countries in the Region Iran does not receive 5+ Billion dollars every year from a superpower. We should also note that Khatami and Rafsanjani have zero credibility when it comes to the issue of corruption.

I have said that while AN is not personally corrupt he does depend too much on yes men and has opposed some very capable individuals, Naqdi the current head of the Basij for one, simply because they haven't fallen into that category.

I don't agree that western style democracy necessarily leads to better economic policy. Lee Kuan Yew, the famous former leader and founding father of Singapore (one of Asia's economic miracles) has spoken on this issue much more eloquently than I ever could.

[Ali]

@simple mind
Re:"Say Ali, you referenced Mousavi and Sazegara as “leaders” of the Green movement. That’s very interesting. Did I miss an announcement somewhere? When did Sazegara become so designated?"
This is a dynamic grassroots movement, in my opinion, leaders of such a movement are not designated and/or assigned. Everyone will do what they can, people will leadership and management skills will do what they do best, as well. Now if they do it well enough, and consistently enough, then they'll become leaders. Also the movement is not tied to a particular person, and this is what makes it strong, because not single point of attack for enemies.

Sazegara has been doing 10 minute youtube broadcasts everyday since this all began. I have listened to a few, and they are good. He gives instructions for civil disobedience, gives tips on staying safe, and how to organize groups of Greens in schools or places of work. He provides consistent messaging such as the need for staying non-violent, and tips about other movement and counter-movement tactics. I haven't confirmed this, but his broadcasts are disseminated in Iran through various medias.

Google Trend will show you this effect: http://www.google.com/trends?q=sazegara and most of the queries are from inside Iran.

Also if he wasn't such a torn in the coup government's eye, they wouldn't have broadcasts this video on state TV: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X4yS5_cJXjc

"I remember his leadership of the Referendum Movement — before he became a fellow at WINEP. Anybody know if he still has his gig with Voice of America? And wouldn’t that be a curious (ok, problematic) platform from which to be a leader of the Green Wave?"

I see your point, but in my opinion this movement's leader is not its decision maker, at least not yet! The people make the decisions, and leaders provide general advice and guidelines. People cheer and follow their champions, and as soon as they sense mistrust, they would shift direction. Just look at how Rafsanjani was cautiously cheered during his Friday sermons and then when people saw that he is not aligned with them, he was put away. So if Sazegara steps out of line, he would be put away as well.

Again in my opinion, you can look at Sazegara as the leader of the troops and a catalyst for the movement. Giving it a hand to achieve its goal, but not setting its goals.

[JP]

Samuel,

Rafsanjani is clearly personally corrupt. His personal fortune stands as a testament to that reality. Ahmadinejad is still a relative newcomer, but give him time. The IRGC component is additionally problematic (e.g. the IRGC side makes the system look more Russian-mafia style "Kleptocracy" than a technocratic, authoritarian regime like China). Iran has tremendous innate potential based on its human capital, its geographical location, and its natural resources -- but its political structure tends to squander many of these strengths.

As far as subsidies go; the U.S. may not provide a direct subsidy to Iran, but the indirect subsidy that it provided via oil consumption from 2005-2008 was much more than $5 billion a year. Neither Rafsanjani nor Khatami oversaw the economy at a time like 2005-2008 when oil revenue was through the sky.

In terms of economic policy and public corruption, there's not much question that western democracies outperform more closed political systems over the long-term.

Democracies are built on the premise that there is no perfect political system, because men are not angels by nature.

There is also an understanding that two heads are smarter than one. As Abraham Lincoln once said: "You can fool some of the people all of the time; and you can fool all of the people some of the time; but you can't fool all of the people all of the time. It is even harder to do this when you have to fool a lot of people."

The advantage that a China, or Singapore has is that it can pivot much more quickly and enact "best economic practices" without needing to explain or justify their decisions to an electorate that's made up of non-specialists.

The centralization of decision making though is a mixed blessing -- especially when the decision makers are insulated from the consequences of their decisions. The virtues may be amplified, but so are the vices. A democratic system tends to spread risk and benefits of risk much more widely. It's unwieldiness and seeming chaos is part of its virtue.