Afghanistan: Former Taliban Ready for Talks with US

Related Post: Waiting for the US Strategy on Afghanistan and Pakistan

As we noted earlier today, we're still trying to assess how significant talks with former enemies, such as the Taliban, will be in the Obama Administration's strategy on Afghanistan-Pakistan. So this article from Global Post, based on the interviews of Jean Mackenzie with two former high-ranking members of the Taliban, takes on added significance. in the Mullah Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil (pictured), who was foreign minister during the Taliban regime, is of special interest: in October 2001 he tried to reach a deal with the United States , via Pakistan, in which Osama bin Laden would be handed over for trial.

EXCLUSIVE: FORMER TALIBAN SEE OPENING FOR TALKS
Jean MacKenzie

KABUL — Talking to the Taliban is all the rage.

Whether for or against, upbeat or down, everyone seems to be weighing in on the wisdom or folly of negotiating with the black-turbaned crowd.

President Barack Obama has even suggested that his administration may reach out to moderate elements of the Taliban.

GlobalPost has gained unique access here in Kabul to two former high-ranking officials of the now-deposed Taliban government to hear their view of the possibility of an opening for dialogue.

Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, who was the Taliban’s ambassador to Pakistan, and Mullah Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil, who served as foreign minister during the Taliban regime, confirmed in separate interviews that such talks were feasible, but that they would need to begin with a fundamental understanding that the view of this conflict looks very different from an Afghan-Taliban perspective.

Both emphasized they do not represent Mullah Omar and the Taliban’s active militant insurgency, but offered valuable insight into the likely debate within the Taliban’s inner circle about the various overtures from Washington to open talks.

Before any serious discussions can take place, they say, the warring parties at least have to agree on what they are fighting about. To date, that fairly obvious goal has been shrouded by rhetoric and misunderstanding.

Read the full article....

Obama and Enemy Combatants: "A War on Terror By Any Other Name Smells...."

UPDATE: Noah Feldman has written in The New York Times echoing the concerns set out by Andy Worthington below: "The Obama lawyers have not abandoned the argument for broad presidential power, just implied that such authority is unnecessary to get them what they want."

Last week there was a bit of fanfare to the Obama Administration's dropping of the term "enemy combatant" with reference to facilities such as Guantanamo Bay.

I was a bit unsettled by the implication that this was a fundamental change in the US approach to detainees, given the Justice Department's maintenance of the Bush Administration line in other cases in the War on Terror. The change in term so that "individuals who supported al Qaeda or the Taliban are detainable only if the support was substantial" appeared to be more of a shift in legal approach rather than a fundamental review of detention policy. It's not a scrapping of the Bush system but a more palatable face for it.

That concern has been reinforced by a detailed analysis from Andy Worthington at the Future of Freedom Foundation:

The Nobodies Known as Former Enemy Combatants

Changing the names of things was a ploy that was used by the Bush administration in an attempt to justify some of its least palatable activities. In response to the 9/11 attacks, for instance, the nation was not involved in a limited pursuit of a group of criminals responsible for the attacks, but instead embarked on an open-ended “war on terror.”

In keeping with this “new paradigm,” prisoners seized in this “war” were referred to as “detainees” and held neither as criminal suspects nor as prisoners of war, protected by the Geneva Conventions, but as illegal “enemy combatants,” without any rights whatsoever. Later, when the administration sought new ways in which to interrogate some of these men, the techniques it endorsed were not referred to as torture — even though many of them clearly were — but were instead described as “enhanced interrogation techniques.”

The Obama administration has clearly learned a trick or two from its predecessors. In its response to a court request for clarification of the meaning of the term “enemy combatant,” for use in the Guantánamo prisoners’ habeas corpus reviews (which were triggered by a momentous Supreme Court decision last June), the new government has responded to the challenge with a cunning sleight of hand. In a press release, the Department of Justice announced that it had dropped the use of the term “enemy combatant” and that it had adjusted its definition of those who can be detained so that, instead of holding people who were “part of, or supporting, Taliban or al-Qaeda forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners,” individuals who supported al-Qaeda or the Taliban “are detainable only if the support was substantial.”

As benign-sounding propaganda, in contrast to the Bush administration’s arrogant version, which almost always manifested a tangible disdain for Congress and the judiciary, this announcement has the alluring veneer of the “change” that Barack Obama promised throughout his election campaign, but in practical terms nothing has actually changed. The prisoners are now nobodies, with no label whatsoever to define their peculiar extra-legal existence, and the entire rationale for holding them without charge or trial — and the egregious errors made along the way — remain unaddressed.

In its filing with the District Court (PDF), delivered in response to a deadline of March 13, the government made clear that it was largely business as usual. In its opening salvo, the Justice Department claimed that the laws of war, which “include a series of prohibitions and obligations … developed over time” and which “have periodically been codified in treaties such as the Geneva Conventions,” or have otherwise “become customary international law,” are nonetheless “less well-codified with respect to our current, novel type of armed conflict against armed groups such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban.”

With this “current, novel type of armed conflict” standing in as a more palatable version of the Bush administration’s “war on terror,” the Justice Department proceeded to defend the President’s authority, under the terms of the Authorization for Use of Military Force, which was passed by Congress within days of the attacks, “to detain persons who he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored those responsible” for the attacks, as well as “persons whose relationship to al-Qaeda or the Taliban would, in appropriately analogous circumstances in a traditional international armed conflict, render them detainable.”

This statement raises a second flag of alarm, as this horrendously open-ended piece of legislation may have been appropriate at the time, but it was used by the Bush administration as the foundation stone on which all its subsequent forays into illegal and unconstitutional actions were based (including, it should be noted, holding these “detained persons” without charge or trial at Guantánamo for seven years), and it is disconcerting to realize that a conversation we should be having — which involves responding to the question, ”Is it justifiable, seven years and seven months after the 9/11 attacks, to claim that we are still involved in an open-ended and ill-defined ‘war’?” — has, instead, been swept aside.

Further disturbing signs that little, if anything has changed can be found in the government’s explanation of who, it asserted, can be held as the “nobodies formerly known as enemy combatants” in the “current, novel type of armed conflict.” In spite of claiming that these men must have “substantially supported” the Taliban, al-Qaeda, or other associated groups, the Justice Department specifically stated that it has the authority to detain not only “those who were part of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces” but also other “members of enemy forces,” even if “they have not actually committed or attempted to commit any act of depredation or entered the theatre or zone of active military operations,” and adds,

Evidence relevant to a determination that an individual joined with or became part of al-Qaeda or Taliban forces might range from formal membership, such as through an oath of loyalty, to more functional evidence, such as training with al-Qaeda (as reflected in some cases by staying at al-Qaeda or Taliban safehouses that are regularly used to house militant recruits) or taking positions with enemy forces.

This, of course, renders the word “substantial” worthless, as it allows the government to detain someone who never even “attempted to commit any act of depredation or entered the theatre or zone of active military operations” and may only have stayed in a house associated with those who did engage in militancy, which, to my mind, is not “substantial” support at all. Furthermore, the government asserts that “it is of no moment that someone who was part of an enemy armed group when war commenced may have tried to flee the battle or conceal himself as a civilian in places like Pakistan,” which effectively condemns anyone who may have traveled to Afghanistan before the 9/11 attacks to take the Taliban’s side against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan’s long-running inter-Muslim civil war (a conflict which had nothing to do with the United States or its allies) into a terrorist if they happened to be present in Afghanistan when the 9/11 attacks occurred.

In this, the government’s thinking was clearly in line with Judge Richard Leon, the District Court judge whose rulings on the habeas corpus cases of ten Guantánamo prisoners in the last few months resulted in decisions that six of the men (five Algerian-born Bosnians, and Mohammed El-Gharani, a former juvenile) were to be released, but that four could continue to be held. In the case of one of the four, the Yemeni Muaz al-Alawi, Judge Leon ruled that the government had established that he “was part of or supporting Taliban or al-Qaeda forces,” because he “stayed at guest houses associated with the Taliban and al-Qaeda … received military training at two separate camps closely associated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban and supported Taliban fighting forces on two different fronts in the Taliban’s war against the Northern Alliance.”

From the point of view of an impartial observer, of course, the problem with Judge Leon’s ruling was that none of these allegations related to “hostilities against the U.S. or its coalition partners,” but he also endorsed the government’s additional claim that, “rather than leave his Taliban unit in the aftermath of September 11, 2001,” al-Alawi “stayed with it until after the United States initiated Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7, 2001; fleeing to Khowst and then to Pakistan only after his unit was subjected to two-to-three U.S. bombing runs.”

In other words, Judge Leon ruled that Muaz al-Alawi could continue to be held because, despite traveling to Afghanistan to fight other Muslims before September 11, 2001, “contend[ing] that he had no association with al-Qaeda,” and stating that “his support for and association with the Taliban was minimal and not directed at U.S. or coalition forces,” he was still in Afghanistan when that conflict morphed into a different war following the U.S.-led invasion in October 2001. As Leon admitted in his ruling, “Although there is no evidence of petitioner actually using arms against U.S. or coalition forces, the Government does not need to prove such facts in order for petitioner to be classified as an enemy combatant under the definition adopted by the Court.” In the new world of Obama’s Justice Department, all that needs changing are the words “enemy combatants” — to “nobodies formerly known as enemy combatants” — and the conclusion is the same.

Therefore, the Obama administration’s cosmetic tinkering with its predecessor’s supposed justification for holding prisoners at Guantánamo is bitterly disappointing, as it appears, at heart, to endorse the lawless policies introduced by the Bush administration, and also to perpetuate some of its most damaging errors. In spite of claims by the Justice Department that its position “draws on the international laws of war to inform the statutory authority conferred by Congress,” the Obama administration has, in reality, wholeheartedly endorsed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (the founding document of the “war on terror”), has failed to demonstrate that it has any willingness to pour scorn on the Bush administration’s claims that prisoners can be held without being either criminal suspects or prisoners of war, has endorsed its predecessor’s decision to equate the Taliban with al-Qaeda, even though there was never any justification for doing so, has overlooked the fact that the majority of the prisoners were bought for bounties (PDF) and were never screened according to the Geneva Conventions, has ignored the fact that the evidence against them (whether of “substantial” support or not) was often extracted through the use of torture, coercion or bribery, and has also defended the Bush administration’s self-proclaimed right to detain demonstrably peripheral figures in the Afghan conflict as “terror suspects.”

An additional demonstration of the absurdity of the Obama administration’s position involves another case reviewed by Judge Leon, that of Ghaleb Nasser al-Bihani, a Yemeni who had served as a cook for the Taliban and an affiliated group of Arab recruits. In a verdict that also fits with the new administration’s disturbingly loose definition of “substantial support,” Judge Leon ruled that “faithfully serving in an al-Qaeda-affiliated fighting unit that is directly supporting the Taliban by helping prepare the meals of its entire fighting force is more than sufficient to meet this Court’s definition of ‘support,’” and added, “After all, as Napoleon was fond of pointing out, ‘An army marches on its stomach.’”

To gauge how wrong this is, we need only compare al-Bihani’s case to that of another Yemeni prisoner, Salim Hamdan. Last August, Hamdan, a driver for Osama bin Laden, was tried at Guantánamo in the military commissions conceived by Vice President Dick Cheney and his close advisers (including, in particular, his legal counsel David Addington), sentenced and sent home in November to serve the last few weeks of a five-month sentence delivered by a military jury. As I wrote when Judge Leon made his ruling about al-Bihani, “Hamdan is now a free man, whereas al-Bihani, a man who never met Osama bin Laden, let alone driving him around, has just been told, by a judge in a U.S. federal court, that the government is entitled to hold him forever because he cooked dinner for the Taliban.”

I added, “If President Obama is genuinely concerned with justice, he needs to act fast to tackle this squalid state of affairs, which does nothing to undo the previous administration’s disdain for and mockery of the laws on which the United States was founded.” That was just seven weeks ago, but now, despite his fine pronouncements in August 2007, when he declared, “We will again set an example to the world that the law is not subject to the whims of stubborn rulers, and that justice is not arbitrary,” it seems that Barack Obama doesn’t care, and that his sympathies are far more in line with the arbitrary justice instigated by those “stubborn rulers” — George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, David Addington and Donald Rumsfeld — than they are with the military judge and the military jurors involved in Salim Hamdan’s case, who, effectively, set a seven-year limit on the detention of minor players in the “war on terror” by giving Hamdan a short sentence, despite convicting him of “providing material support for terrorism.”

In analyses over the years, intelligence officials have stated that no more than 50 of the prisoners at Guantánamo had any meaningful connection with al-Qaeda, the Taliban or other terrorist groups. By that rationale, the Obama administration should be working flat-out to release the other 190 prisoners as soon as possible. Under its own definition of “significant support” for these organizations, however, the administration has, instead, raised the possibility that, after seven years’ imprisonment in conditions that ought to be a source of shame to any civilized society, a large number of these prisoners — these “nobodies formerly known as enemy combatants” — still have a long way to go before they can hope to see the end of their ordeal.

From The Archives: Hit or Miss in Pakistan (18 September 2008)

First published on our partner website Libertas:

[This] leaves only the Pakistani military, whichever way it chooses to play the hand with the Americans, as the only significant force in the country with a symbolic and real modicum of power. If Zardari protests this, the prospect of his overthrow emerges. If he accepts his emasculation, he is no more than an irrelevant figurehead. Either way, it’s an effective coup.

Last Thursday, I embarked on a new, challenging, and exciting project, working with postgraduate students at the Clinton Institute for American Studies in Dublin . Introducing a course on contemporary US foreign policy, I tried out the idea of dissecting that morning’s Page 1 story, whatever it might be, in The New York Times.

I punched in the URL and upon the large screen is the headline, “Bush Said to Give Orders Allowing Raids in Pakistan”.

The opening paragraph confirmed I had more than enough for discussion, “President Bush secretly approved orders in July that for the first time allow American Special Operations forces to carry out ground assaults inside Pakistan without the prior approval of the Pakistani government, according to senior American officials.”

Well, there you go. By chance rather than design I could open the course with perhaps the most significant development in US foreign policy this year. Significant because the US Government was making clear that it was taking the war against the Afghanistan insurgency across the border into Pakistan. Even more so because the US would be fighting not just with bombs from the air but special forces on the ground. Especially so because the US would do so without the overt co-operation of the Pakistani Government.

To be blunt: on Monday, Asif Zardari finally reached his goal of becoming Prime Minister of Pakistan, a country portrayed as a steadfast ally of the US in the “War on Terror”. By Thursday, Washington didn’t give, to use the academic term, “a rat’s ass” about the thoughts of Zardari. On Monday, Pakistan’s military was portrayed as side-by-side with American counterparts; by Thursday, there was the prospect of armed clashes between the two sets of troops.

With allies like these, who needs....? You fill in the blank.

The backdrop to this story is now well-known. On 11 September 2001, the Head of Pakistan’s intelligence services, Mahmood Ahmed, was in Washington discussing co-operation with US officials. Indeed, as the planes hit the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Ahmed was having breakfast with the chairmen of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Within 24 hours, discussions had become a showdown. Undersecretary of State Richard Armitage set out a seven-point ultimatum to Ahmed. When Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf confirmation to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that the American conditions would be met, the essential alliance in the War on Terror had been established.

There were holdover tensions from Pakistan’s years of support for a liaison with the Taliban. In January 2002, Seymour Hersh of The New Yorker blew the whistle on the hundreds, maybe thousands, of Pakistanis who had fought on the wrong side and been captured by the Americans during fighting in Afghanistan . The detainees were shipped to Kunduz, from where Pakistani helicopters took them home. As US attentions turned to Iraq , the inconvenience that Osama bin Laden was also now sheltered in Pakistan ’s autonomous tribal areas as gradually accepted. Months turned into years, and President Musharraf’s attention (and that of his critics) turned to internal political/judicial matters and, eventually, the imposition of martial law.

So what has happened to re-make Pakistan from sturdy if arguably ineffectual partner of the US in regional politics and the War on Terror into obstacle to US operations? No doubt the forced handover from Musharraf to Zardari is a partial explanation; there is no sign of American faith in the reliability of the new President, who is likely to be focused on his battle with the judiciary rather than a showdown with Al Qa’eda.

The catalyst, however, is the Bush Administration’s last roll of the dice in Afghanistan. As I noted Monday, the President’s statement two weeks ago offered both victory without substance and a challenge without an answer. If the small number of US troops being pulled with Iraq belied a long-term occupation that is increasingly out of touch with political developments, the small number of US troops being sent to Afghanistan showed that the Administration has nothing but a small bandage to slap on its new Number One Emergency Case.

An extra 9000 boots on the ground won’t cover much of the problem area in Afghanistan. At most, it will allow the US to carry out well-publicised operations to clear the Taliban from villages which are likely to vulnerable during the next counter-attack of the insurgency. Put very bluntly, in the absence of effective political and economic reconstruction, Washington has to hope that local leaders and their militias are strong enough to keep the Taliban out. It’s notable, for example, that Herat in the western part of the country is relatively stable under a local regime on good terms with Iran, while Mazar-al-Sharif in the north is “secure” because of the local but forceful presence of General Dostum.

This doesn’t add up to long-term influence, however, for the Americans and it far from signals long-term authority for the Kabul Government of Hamid Karzai. So Washington gets the worst of both worlds: potential rivals reap the benefits from the areas that they control or influence while the US carries the can for instability in other regions.

Even if European governments and other allies in NATO and the International Security Assistance Force were willing to shift a token number of soldiers to the conflict zone in the south and centre of the country, that wouldn’t offer any resolution of the underlying problems. And it certainly wouldn’t address the emerging headache for the Americans and Kabul , the insurgent violence in the east along the Pakistan border.

So, if you haven’t got the troop numbers or a meaningful plan of reconstruction to bring villages into a secure nation, what do you do? Well, you resort to those limited but hopefully effectively targeted operations that “decapitate” the opposition. That means air power and that means special operations on the ground, special operations to assist with targeting of the airstrikes and special operations to liquidate the bad guys.

It is no coincidence that the “surge” in Iraq has included recently-hyped “fusion cells”, small units of specially-trained soldiers to capture and kill insurgents. And, given the incomplete if not false impression that this has made a long-term difference in Iraq the Americans will be trying to spread the model to the next battleground.

But even as this strategy covers up the problem of the lack of long-term troop numbers to “stabilise” Afghanistan, it ignores some fundamentals of special warfare. Even the Iraq example should be instructive: the “fusion cells” complement the cultivation of local leaders and their militias to secure a particular area. In Pakistan, where is that cultivation of leaders in the tribal areas going to take place? Well, given that the airstrikes and operations are alienating that leadership, their families, and their communities, the answer would be Nowhere. Tribal leaders have already responded by promising to raise forces to fight the US .

And here’s another lesson that it ignores. You can’t limit the effect of dropped bombs and elite forces trained to kill. Far more important than any ripples of stability you hope to get on the other side of the border are the waves of instability you set off in Pakistan. The warning of the Pakistani military leadership that it will opposed American ground incursions may be a bluff or even the Janus trick of giving a stern face of defending their people and sovereignty while privately giving another face of acceptance to the Americans. But, at a minimum, Zardari is exposed as a political leader with barely a shred of authority.

And, in Pakistan with its recent history, what do you think that means? I’m guessing that it leaves only the Pakistan military, whichever way it chooses to play the hand with the Americans, as the only significant force in the country with a symbolic and real modicum of power. If Zardari protests this, the prospect of his overthrow emerges. If he accepts his emasculation, he is no more than an irrelevant figurehead. Either way, it’s an effective coup.

I’ve only seen one commentator reach back for the historical parallel. In 1969/70 the Nixon Administration, frustrated at the mobility of the Vietnamese insurgency, starts the airborne demolition of Cambodia. Eventually that tearing apart of the Cambodian “sanctuary” took the ground from under the country’s leadership, and Prince Sihanouk was overthrown. The eventual victors who promised to restore sovereignty and dignity? The Khmer Rouge.

It’s not an exact replay of history, and Pakistan may not have to be reset to Year Zero. Neither, however, does the American strategy offer any advance. Seven years after promising that it would pursue the War on Terror to preserve the security and sovereignty of those were “with us”, Washington is now shredding that assurance.

Pakistan: Mr Obama's Air War Coming to the Cities?

The New York Times reports this morning:

According to senior administration officials, two of the high-level reports on Pakistan and Afghanistan that have been forwarded to the White House in recent weeks have called for broadening the target area to include a major insurgent sanctuary in and around the city of Quetta.

That might mean little for folks who have not heard of Quetta, which is the capital of the province of Baluchistan in northwestern Pakistan. The city was briefly prominent in Western media in the first days of the 2001 war in Afghanistan, when there were massive demonstrations against the American bombing and even talk of a local uprising against the central Government.

If this step is adopted, however, it may pose a double challenge to the US and the Pakistani Government. It could spread the insurgency in Pakistan, rather than stopping support for the insurgency in Afghanistan. And it could be the sign that Pakistani sovereignty (and thus the Zardari Government) is dispensable.

US bombings and missile strikes have been carried out for years in the Northwest Frontier Provinces, and they have increased under the Obama Administration. This proposal, however, would take the air war to an area controlled by the central Pakistan Government rather than local tribes. And Quetta is no small town: the 2005 population was more than 850,000.

Of course, President Obama has yet to decide on the proposal, but the story in the Times, fed by civilian and military officials, is a clear sign of pressure for its acceptance. The airstrike expansion is not only in the report of General David Petraeus, which has been treated with scepticism by the President; it is also in a study by Lieutenant General Douglas Lute which has been received with general approval.

And there's more: "[Advisors to Obama] are recommending preserving the option to conduct cross-border ground actions, using C.I.A. and Special Operations commandos." A "senior official" confirmed, "It is fair to say that there is wide agreement to sustain and continue these covert programs. One of the foundations on which the recommendations to the president will be based is that we’ve got to sustain the disruption of the safe havens."

It seems, however, that those "safe havens" are growing ever-bigger. And it seems that the Obama Administration is on the brink of decisions that will turn those havens into a new centre of battle, one with far more dangers than the intervention in Afghanistan.

Why a US "Surge" Won't Work in Afghanistan

Speaking at the Royal Institute of International Affairs last Wednesday, Rory Stewart offered an incisive examination of the difficulties with a military-first approach to Afghanistan. The following extract is taken from The Times of London:

The situation in Afghanistan is somewhat aggravating and a little surreal. We have been there now for seven years - but I don't know if the British Government knows why. Do we have a policy? Or are we simply waiting to discover what the Obama Administration wishes to do and go along with it?

This year the US is expected to spend more than $50 billion on military and civilian aid. We are talking big sums but we don't have a clear account of what we are doing.

When the US invaded in 2001, its objective was to ensure that al-Qaeda could never again build training camps in Afghanistan. That was achieved with relative ease and with a limited number of special forces and intelligence operatives.

By 2002 we were beginning to talk about development. We launched national solidarity programmes, gave money to villages. But over the next two years it became fashionable in policymaking circles in Britain and the US to say that there was no point in focusing on Afghanistan as an arena for counter-terrorism or a recipient of charity - we should be building a state.

This was when Britain and Nato decided to deploy more troops. Britain has increased the numbers in Helmand province from 250 to 5,000. The belief then was that they were there to help state-building, not to fight the Taleban, which was why John Reid, the Defence Secretary, said to much mockery that he “hoped that the British troops would return without a shot fired”. There was little sign then of any overt Taleban presence, and it was relatively safe for Westerners to travel through Helmand.

I sat down in Kabul with a senior member of the British Embassy and the Number 2 of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan in 2005 and asked: “Why are you deploying British troops to Helmand?”

They said: “To improve economic development, to improve governance and eliminate corruption, to improve road security and, in particular, to deal with the narcotics problem.”

I said: “You'll provoke an insurgency”. They replied: “No, you're traumatised by Iraq. Opinion polls show that in Helmand British and American troops are very popular.” I asked: “What type of timeframe are you looking at to see improvements?” They said six months.

I had just come from Iraq, where I had been an administrator of a province in the south and I said: “This is nonsense; will you write on a piece of paper that these are the kinds of improvements you're going to see, and if you don't see them, will you agree not to say: ‘We didn't have enough troops or enough helicopters' or ‘We are where we are, it is too humiliating to withdraw'. Will you accept that if these improvements don't come in six months the policy was wrong?” They agreed.

From that moment on, I have become increasingly frustrated. A Taleban insurgency has exploded but policymakers will not acknowledge that their original objectives have not been achieved. Instead, they blame implementation, the type of helicopters or previous commanders. Now policymakers have moved on from development, state-building and counter-insurgency to “preserving the credibility of Nato” and regional stability: “We are in Afghanistan to hold Pakistan together.”

Enter General Petraeus and his surge of 17,000 troops. There is good evidence that by deploying a further 30,000 troops “King David” turned the situation around in Iraq. I was in Baghdad this month, and walked streets I would not have been able to walk three years ago. I was not wearing a helmet, nobody was shooting or throwing rocks at me. So can General Petraeus conclude that by deploying more troops to Afghanistan he will be able to pull off the same thing?

There are two different accounts of what he hopes to do by deploying more troops in Afghanistan. One is straight from the counter-insurgency manual: clear/hold/build. Clear out the Taleban, secure populated areas and allow the forces of sustainable economic development to flourish, good governance to come and the Afghan police and security services to back us so we can go home.

The more cynical explanation is that the surge is an attempt to whack the Taleban round the head because they will not negotiate unless they are hurting. This is, broadly speaking, what Henry Kissinger believed of the Vietcong in 1968. The US increased troop numbers to drive them to the table to make concessions.
Neither approach will work. The Afghan groups do not resemble the Vietcong or the Sunni tribal groups in Iraq. The Shia-run Government in Baghdad could cut a deal with the Sunni groups because they are both relatively powerful and coherent factions backed by mass politics. Go to any southern Iraqi town and you will find a man in a buttoned-up shirt without a tie who says: “I am the head of this party” and who can mobilise thousands.

Go to a town in Afghanistan and ask who is in charge and you find six or seven figures with varying sorts of power - perhaps a tribal chief, maybe the police chief or sub-district commander. They do not have mass movements behind them. When we talk about driving the Taleban to the table, we forget that these groups are more insubstantial and fragmented than we acknowledge. The Kabul Government lacks political depth or legitimacy; the Taleban is elusive.

But I'm not a radical pessimist. Being realistic about our limitations does not mean that Britain must accept the status of a third-rate power. We can achieve many things in Afghanistan that are worthwhile for us and for the Afghans. We have made serious progress in education, health and rural development; Afghans are asking for simple things such as roads, electricity and irrigation and we have the skills to provide them. We should focus on the progressive, pro-Western centre and north, rather than pouring almost all our resources into the insurgency zones of the south and the east where schools are often destroyed as soon as they are built.

We need a much lighter military footprint. We cannot afford to keep 80,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan for a decade. US and European voters won't support it, it is an extravagant distraction from more important strategic priorities, including Pakistan and as long as we are seen as an occupying power, there will be Afghans who want to fight us.

We should plan now to reduce the size of our military commitment and decide what we can do with fewer troops. This does not mean abandoning Afghanistan entirely. The US and its allies should use special forces and intelligence operatives to ensure that al-Qaeda never again finds Afghanistan a safe and comfortable environment in which to establish training camps. Even a few thousand international troops and US air support would be a serious deterrent to civil war. But most importantly we must continue to provide generous long-term financial support to the Afghan Government and its military.

Policymakers are now more cautious about Afghanistan and say that their only objective is stability.
But even this is implausible. Pakistan is 20 years ahead of Afghanistan on almost every indicator and is yet to achieve the kind of stability we dream of in Afghanistan. Instead, we must think in terms of containing and managing a difficult, poor and unstable country without sinking too much into this difficult task. We must husband our resources for the many other crises already erupting - from the British banking sector to Pakistan.

There are many small simple things we can do to help Afghan society. All require us to forge a long-term engagement with the country. But such a policy is only possible if we reduce our investment in money and troops and develop a lighter, more affordable and ultimately more sustainable relationship with Afghanistan.