Iran: New Technology, New Protest, New System?

The Latest from Iran (24 June): Peering Through the Clouds
LATEST Video: The “Neda” Protests (20-23 June)
Twittering Iran: What the “New Media” Means for Politics, Protest, and Democracy

Dr Colette Mazzucelli, who has written for our partner website Libertas, joins Enduring America to offer her thoughts on the possibilities and challenges of new technology in the current political crisis in Iran:

The aftermath of the Islamic Republic’s national elections are a testament to the will of a people to protest in unprecedented ways against the results of the June 12 vote. The reform movement has gathered momentum to demonstrate the widespread use of new technologies, cell phones, Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, and video imaging uploaded to the Web, as it voices popular opposition to the re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In the last week, this mass revolt has evolved into a direct confrontation with the rule of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; the nationalist argument that dissent is fomented by the interference of foreign powers fails to impress the protesters. Although the state ban on reporting by the Western media continues, citizen reporting of a brutal crackdown by pro-government militia, the Baseej, and the police provides a moment to moment chronicle of events.

Thus, the world bears witness to a loss of legitimacy in a theocratic regime that is neither republican nor respectful of human life.

Those Iranians who voted for the reformist challenger, Mir Hossein Mousavi, made the brave choice to lay down their lives for the right to be heard in peace without fear of retribution. The clerical leadership, whose grip on power is tightening, relies increasingly on the militarization of the regime in its attempts to quash popular grievances and to deny millions of Iranians the right to channel their dissent in peaceful ways. Will the Islamic Republic, legitimated by the 1979 Revolution, use this crackdown to deny the Iranian people their human right of expression, which is the popular hope for the future of the women and youth across the country? Or will another revolution spring in time from the right of Iranians in a republic to choose their leaders?

The outside world continues to rely on the images, the quotes, the accounts coming from Iranians in the midst of civil violence. In a week, their movement evolved well beyond a contested election within an accepted regime. The Supreme Leader’s edict at Friday prayers on June 19 stating that the election results were a “definitive victory” for Ahmadinejad unleashed a furor that crossed sacred red lines in the system. Observers arguing that the elections reveal the potential to open the system to democratic forces cite rising aspirations of key groups: the two-thirds of Iran’s population that is under 30 years of age and the university-educated women. These groups dominate a growing movement on the streets of Tehran and other smaller cities.

Since the 1979 Revolution, different governments have left their mark on the revolutionary Islamic Republic’s regime. Under Ahmadinejad, observers witnessed the progressive and systematic undermining of republican government. Institutions, which, in a republic should be responsible to break up government information monopolies, are under state control. Professional journalists inside the country are the victims of brutal repression. Public forums online, which normally allow a variety of ideas to challenge erroneous argumentation, are subject to deliberate interruption.

It is that Ahmadinejad effort to curb public space and responsibity that is now challenged by the reaction to the attempts to use the Presidential vote to propagate the myth of legitimacy. Even the Supreme Leader is now open to criticism from the segment of the population led by the protesters. The demonstrations have also exposed fissures within the clerical elite.

There is not yet a call for regime change, but will the crowds of protesters grow in size if Ahmadinejad is sworn in next month? In his campaign, Presidential challenger Mir Hossein Mousavi was able to tap into the frustrations of highly educated youth and a population where the elimination of illiteracy led to rising expectations. Their future is bleak in an economy that faces double-digit unemployment and high inflation.

It is here that the new media technologies come into play. In a vibrant marketplace of ideas, individuals must be exposed to diverse ways of thinking. A segmented marketplace, defined by scholars such as Snyder and Ballentine, is characterized by blockages that prevent the exposure of individuals in one market segment to ideas expressed in others.

On the surface, that segmentation can reinforce a system, as it seals off much of the population from troublesome political, economic, and social challenges or filters (and thus distorts) ideas until they are "acceptable". However, the segmentation can also leave areas open to capture by partisan segments. In the last two weeks in Iran, the media inside the country has not been able to compete with the amateur reporting of the citizens on the streets who use Twitter to provide real-time accounts of civil unrest. Their voices define a public space separate from state control.

The audacious and extraordinary use by the Iranian population of social networking tools and new media is a call to explore ingenious ways that America, in concert with Europe and other countries, can use public diplomacy to demonstrate solidarity with the people in Iran. Intervention in the classical sense is not an option. The Iranian people must decide their own fate without the interference of foreign powers.

At the same time, the brutal repression of the Iranian movement for reform is a striking illustration of “sovereignty as responsibility”, meaning that “sovereignty carries with it a responsibility on the part of governments to protect their citizens.” What are the international consequences of the failure, as in iran, to exercise that responsibility? In the aftermath of President Obama’s Cairo speech, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has the opportunity to forge a global coalition, which can weigh those consequences aand respond as events in Iran evolve.

It is difficult to ascertain, day to day, how widespread the popular defiance to the Supreme Leader is likely to be. In the absence of organized leadership, can this movement endure over the time period necessary to foment revolution? If challenges to the regime also emerge from the bazari or from the oil industry in the form of strikes that paralyze the economy, there could be changes in leadership. In Qom, an important center of Shiism, clerics are not unified behind President Ahmadinejad. Dissent among ruling conservatives is unlikely to subside in the wake of parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani’s statement about the election result, explaining that “a majority of people are of an opinion separate” from that of a minority.5

In his reference to the influence of outside powers, particularly Britain, the Supreme Leader spoke on behalf of the ultimate victor in the June 12 election, Iranian nationalism. Fundamentally, his address reiterated the myths which Ahmadinejad and his supporters in the Revolutionary Guard exploit to “overemphasize the cultural and historical distinctiveness of the national group, exaggerate the threat posed to the nation by other groups, ignore the degree to which the nation’s own actions provoked such threats, and play down the costs of seeking national goals through militant means". Inside the regime, the population is experiencing a militarization unprecedented in its 30-year history. The influence of the Baseej is particularly disturbing, given the wide latitude its members have to act beyond the rule of law. None of the horrific acts by these paramilitary forces to enforce the power of the state are condemned by the regime.

President Obama cited Martin Luther King in his recent statement: “The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.” The world must bear witness to what analyst David Gergen has termed a “Tiananmen Square unfolding in slow motion". New technologies can play a decisive role to prevent darkness from descending on the country.

In the last four four days, social networking tools have captured the fate of Neda, the name given to the young Iranian woman shot in the chest this weekend. As Robin Wright explains, Neda, which means “the divine calling,” has emerged as the symbol of a popular movement whose dynamics begin to resemble those of the 1979 Revolution. In the Shia country that is Iran, has the regime made her a martyr for the freedom its people die to achieve? Time will tell if those segments of Iranian society whose will to forge a democratic revolution is collectively anchored in the concern for people, not regimes.

The Latest from Iran (23 June): Preparing for Thursday

The Latest from Iran (24 June): Peering Through the Clouds

NEW Video and Transcript: Obama Press Conference (23 June)
NEW Iran: More than Khamenei v. Rafsanjani? (Gary Sick and a Response)
Iran Latest: A Khatami Action Plan?
Iran: Is 2009 an Update of 1979? A Debate in Three Parts
Iran: An Eyewitness Account of Monday's Demonstration
UPDATE Iran: Who Was “Neda”? “A Beam of Light”
The Latest from Iran (22 June): Waiting for the Next Move
LATEST Video: The “Neda” Protests (20-23 June)
Iran: 2+2 = A Breakthrough? (Mousavi and the Clerics)

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2125 GMT: We're taking some downtime. Thanks to all who followed us today and gave us feedback and information. More from about 0530 GMT.

2115 GMT: Reports that Iranian newspaper Keyhan has called for the arrest of Mir Hossein Mousavi, citing more than 2000 complaints.

2100 GMT: The Guardian Council-Khamenei manoeuvre for a five-day extension of the recount gets a reward: Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei withdraws his complaint about electoral fraud.

1830 GMT: Crackdown, then "Breathing Space". Iranian state media have been reporting that the Supreme Leader has granted the Guardian Council's request for five extra days to recount the Presidential vote. This is a bit curious, to say the least, since the Council was saying only yesterday that there was no possibility of the result being overturned.

Interpretation? It appears that opposition pressure, both in private maneouvres such as the Mousavi visit to Qom (with the follow-up endorsement of the candidate by the Association of Combatant Clerics), the public plans for marches tomorrow and Thursday, and the even more public Karroubi and Khatami initiatives today have unsettled the Iranian leadership.

They haven't broken the protest movement. And --- although this may be only a pawn in the chess game --- they have incurred the rhetorical wrath of the international community for the violence of recent days. Throw in the still-to-be-determined "Neda" symbolic factor, and you have a regime trying to stall developments.

Now the full White House strategy to maintain flexiblity on Iran unfolds. Obama, in a pre-planned, tips his hat to the power of the Internet and "new media" by asking Nico Pitney, who has blogging on Iran for The Huffington Post, to pass on a question from the Iranian people.

It's a nice move which ensure Obama can pay heed to those "Iranian people" and maintain his position. The question, "Will Obama deal with Ahmadinejad?" is handled with, "The thing for the Iranian Government to consider is legitimacy in the eyes of its own people....Ultimately this is up to the Iranian people to decide who their leadership is going to be."

The vague far-from-footnote is in Obama's, "What we can do is to say unequivocally is there are sets of international norms and principles about violence, about dealing with peaceful dissent."

So what does the President do if demonstrations tomorrow and/or Thursday are met with more "violence" by Iranian security forces?

1638 GMT: First question tests Obama on steps, rather than rhetoric, on Iran: Is there any "red line" that can be crossed that would suspend US engagement with Iran?

The President sidesteps the question and falls back on "rights and responsibilities" language in referring to the Iranian Government before issuing a holding comment: "We don't know how they're going to respond yet. That's what we're waiting to see."

To the follow-up question, "Should there be any consequences?", Obama holds his line, "The world is bearing witness" to the events in Iran.

1630 GMT: President Obama has just opened his press conference with "a few words" on Iran. The world is "outraged and appalled" at the treatment of protesters. So while the US "respects the sovereignty" of Iran, everyone must "speak out" about the violence wielded against the demonstrators. The Iranian Government "must heed the will of its own people and govern through consensus, not force."

Nothing new here: pointed general rhetoric to express concern and even anger about the images witnessed in recent days but no specific actions or even threats to punish the Iranian Government and suspend Obama's tentative "engagement". The coded response to those who are pressing for US intervention? "The Iranian people can speak for themselves."

Obama extended the statement by denouncing Iran's use of a fictional "Western intervention" to justify its repression, and he returned to the denunciation of the Iranian Government's abuse of rights. This is, however, a stay-the-course statement while trying to fend off domestic critics who want that "Western intervention" to become fact rather than fiction.

1510 GMT: Reports that Mir Hossein Mousavi's Facebook page says he will attend Wednesday's march (4 p.m. local time) to Iranian Parliament in Baharestan Square.

1505 GMT: Further on that British sideshow (1045 GMT). The tit-for-tat diplomatic "happy slapping" has begun: Iran expels two British Embassy staff so London sends two Iranian diplomats packing. Believe it or not, however, this is not as bad as it could have been: if Tehran had unilaterally pulled its Ambassador (a de facto suspension of relations), that would have been more serious than this choreographed manoeuvre.

1410 GMT: We've just posted urgent news on a purported "action plan" by former President Mohammad Khatami for protests.

1408 GMT: From an Iranian activist via Twitter: "We are having difficulty getting updates to u as so many of our contacts been arrested - life here is v/v/dangerous now."

1315 GMT: More coming in on the next moves of the opposition movement. Reports that supporters of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi will assemble in front of the Iranian Parliament building tomorrow at 4 p.m. local time. Karroubi has also written an open letter to Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting: ""Is your mission the inverse representation of the beating and killing of people by plain cloths [paramilitary Basiji]?"

There are reports that people are gathering in Azadi Square and building blockades and that anti-riot vans are on their way to the scene.

BBC Persian is reporting that all staff, not just the editor-in-chief (see 1215 GMT) of the pro-Mousavi newspaper Kalameh have been arrested. Other journalists have also been detained today.

1300 GMT: This hour's Press TV English coverage of Iran (see updates throughout the day)? Nothing. Not a whisper. Nothing to see here, move along.

1215 GMT: More arrests of journalists. The latest detainees are Seyed Alireza Beheshti Shirazi, editor-in-chief of the pro-Mousavi newspaper Kalameh and his son. There are also reports that a reporter for either The Washington Post or The Washington Times has been taken into custody.

1145 GMT: We've just posted a discussion between two Enduring America colleagues, Steve Hewitt and Chris Emery, on whether 2009 in Iran is an update of the events in 1979.

1125 GMT: The Financial Times of London reports that Kargozaran, "a political party affiliated with Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani" has called upon Mir Hossein Moussavi to form a “political bloc” for a long-term campaign to undermine the “illegitimate” Government.

1109 GMT: Press TV English's blackout continues: not a word in its current newscast on Iran. The website is more forthcoming: headlines are of the Guardian Council's statement that "there has been no record of any major irregularity" in the Presidential vote and of President Ahmadinejad taking the oath of office between 26 July and 19 August.

1045 GMT: A Very British Sideshow: as we await further news on developments in public and behind the scenes, the diversionary story of Britain --- that most sinister country, according to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khameini --- continues.

Last night, the Foreign Office advised British citizens that only those with "essential" reasons should travel to Iran, and the British Embassy began advising families of staff that they might have to be removed from the country.

This morning, Iranian state media were playing up news of a forthcoming rally by students in front of the British Embassy. Later reports, however, said that the rally had been cancelled as it had been denied a permit by the Ministry of the Interior.
Meanwhile, there were reports --- soon denied by the Iranian Government --- that the Iranian Ambassador to the UK had been recalled.

Significance? It's possible that the Supreme Leader, and subsequent Government showcases such as yesterday's Foreign Ministry conference, have overplayed the "Western threat" card. It's one thing to deploy the weapon of rhetoric, another to raise the prospect of violence against Western nationals. So the Iranian leadership, which has been careful not to attack the US Government as the primary enemy of Tehran, may be edging away from a precipice in relations.

0800 GMT: CNN's International Desk reports, "Reports from inside Iran say the problem in organizing a strike is communicating the messsage to shops & businesses not on Web."

0730 GMT: There's a curious missing-of-the-point in current media coverage, which is focusing on the Guardian Council's pre-emptive declaration that any vote recount will not change the outcome of the Presidential election. Since this move is about as unexpected as the Sun rising in the East, it might be more productive to consider how the protest movement is already looking beyond the Council to its next public and private political challenges.

0700 GMT: Press TV English's current approach is to ignore events in Iran. They are headlining US drone strikes on Pakistan, the US military in Afghanistan, and US unemployment, but not a word on their own backyard.

0630 GMT: Lara Setrakian (see her report on Monday's demonstrations in 0600 GMT update) also writes of protest resignations by faculy at Amir Kabir University in Tehran and Sani Sharif University. These follow the resignation of up to 120 faculty members at Tehran University and other academics across the country.

Morning Update 0600 GMT: Little change from our late night update. We're still waiting for reports on any general strike, but political developments are pointing towards a key rally on Thursday. The support for Mousavi from the Association of Combatant Clerics, while still limited to "reformist" backing, showed that he could mobilise important groups to come out into the open, and the opposition campaign continues to evade the tough Government restrictions to get out information and organise. Yesterday, that was shown by the statement from Presidential candidate Mehdi Karroubi, disseminated widely, for the Guardian Council to declare the election void.

The hard part, of course, is on the ground. The Government's priority will be to prevent any repeat of the million-strong march of 15 June; conversely, the protest movement will look for a gathering large in both size and symbolism.

Behind the scenes, there is little sign of shifting apart from the Association's endorsement of Mousavi after his trip to Qom. Former Presidential Rafsanjani remains very quiet. The Supreme Leader has let others take the public lead after his Friday address, and President Rafsanjani is silent (only speculation, but I think he is being kept under wraps for fear that he will further inflame opposition).

Iran: More than Khamenei v. Rafsanjani? (Gary Sick and a Response)

The Latest from Iran (23 June): Preparing for Thursday
Iran Latest: A Khatami Action Plan?
Iran: 2+2 = A Breakthrough? (Mousavi and the Clerics)

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I think Gary Sick's work is among the best in US-based analyses of Iranian politics, and this blog is no exception. He considers the Supreme Leader's decision "to get out in front as the spokesman of the regime" and focuses on the manoeuvres of former President Hashemi Rafsanjani as he "stay(s) behind the scenes as a master strategist".

That said, I think Sick reduces the situation too much to a Khamenei v. Rafsanjani contest. Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad Khatami, and Mehdi Karroubi are far from bystanders or foot soldiers in this battle; indeed, they have moved towards centre stages in the last few days (see our posts over the last 48 hours on the developing steps in the protest movement). And there are numerous arenas in this contest, from the seminaries at Qom to Parliament possibly to the inner sanctum of the Revolutionary Guards.

And I think Sick (like Robert Fisk in his column today in The Independent of London) risks "disappearing" the demonstrators who have reshaped political dynamics since a week ago Monday. This is not to say, of course, that People Power replaces Rafsanjani in any potential showdown with Ayatollah Khameini and President Ahmadinejad. On the other hand, Rafsanjani, Mousavi, Khatami, and Karroubi depend on a continuing protest and, yes, resistance for leverage in their political challenge. It is very much a hand-in-hand relationship (at the risk of stretching an analogy, as was the case in the Philippines in the toppling of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986).

So I think we may be past the point where, as Sick puts it, there will be "a negotiated solution in which everyone saves face". But whether negotiation or confrontation, this is not just (again to borrow Sick's analogy) a chess match. It is three-dimensional chess, and there are more than two players.

Reading the Crisis in Tehran

GARY SICK

Here are a few observations about the situation in Iran based on my own experience of watching the Iranian revolution and hostage crisis from the White House thirty years ago.

Don’t expect that this will be resolved cleanly with a win or loss in short period of time. The Iranian revolution, which is usually regarded as one of the most accelerated overthrows of a well-entrenched power structure in history, started in about January 1978 and the shah departed in January 1979. During that period, there were long pauses and periods of quiescence that could lead one to believe that the revolt had subsided. This is not a sprint; it is a marathon. Endurance is at least as important as speed.

There may not be a clear winner or loser. Iranians are clever and wily politicians. They prefer chess to football, and a “win” may involve a negotiated solution in which everyone saves face. The current leadership has chosen, probably unwisely, to make this a test of strength, but if they conclude that it is a no-win situation they could settle for a compromise. The shape of a compromise is impossible to guess at this point, but it would probably involve significant concessions concealed behind a great public show of unity.

Leadership is key. Ayatollah Khamene`i, the rahbar or Leader, has chosen – again probably unwisely – to get out in front as the spokesman of the regime. Unlike his predecessor, the father of the revolution Ayatollah Khomeini, he has openly taken sides with one faction over another. He is clearly speaking for the ultra conservative leaders of the Revolutionary Guards and their equally reactionary clerical supporters, who fear any possible threat to their dominant power. Curiously, President Ahmadinejad has largely vanished from sight, which adds to the impression that he is more of a pawn than a prime mover in this affair.

On the other side is Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, the erstwhile colleague and now principal antagonist of the rahbar. He has chosen, as he usually does, to stay behind the scenes as a master strategist, leaving the public field to Mir Hossein Mousavi and the other disappointed candidates and their followers.

The irony of two former colleagues now competing for power over the expiring corpse of the Islamic Republic that they created with such grandiose expectations, is lost on no one. The important sub text, however, is that these two understand very well what they are doing. They know how a revolt can be turned into a revolution. They also know they have everything to lose. The shared consciousness of high stakes has until now prevented an all out political confrontation between rival factions in the elite. That may help explain why the rahbar and the Revolutionary Guards were so reckless in their insolent contempt of the reformers and the public. They may have believed that no one would dare take it to this level.

Now that it has arrived at this point, both protagonists are faced with decisions of unprecedented gravity. There has been nothing like this in the thirty year history of the Islamic Republic, and today there is no Khomeini father figure to moderate and mediate among the warring factions. They must improvise in conditions of severe uncertainty. If anyone tells you that they know how this will turn out, treat their words with the same regard you would have for any fortune teller peering into a crystal ball.

For the United States, the watchword should be Do No Harm. The situation in Iran is being exploited for short term domestic political purposes by those who have been looking for an opening to attack the Obama administration. Wouldn’t it feel good to give full throated expression to American opposition to the existing power structure in Iran? Perhaps so — but it could also be a fatal blow to the demonstrators risking their lives on the streets of Tehran, and it could scotch any chance of eventual negotiations with whatever government emerges from this trial by fire.

The crisis in Iran is an Iranian crisis and it can only be resolved by the Iranian people and their leaders. There is no need to conceal our belief in freedom of speech and assembly and our support for the resolution of political disputes without bloodshed. But we should not be stampeded by domestic political concerns into pretending that our intervention in this crisis could be anything but pernicious.

Can President Obama play chess as well as he plays basketball?

Iran: Is 2009 an Update of 1979? A Debate in Three Parts

The Latest from Iran (23 June): Preparing for Thursday

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Yesterday, an analyst from BBC Persian Television, speaking on BBC News 24 on Monday, predicted the protests are going to wither and die because of the government’s crackdown and heavy security across Tehran. He also criticised comparisons with 1979. I asked two Enduring America contributors, Steve Hewitt and Chris Emery, "Is he right?"

Is the 1979 Analogy Relevant?

STEVE HEWITT: I agree. Iranian society then was united against the Shah with a strong rallying figure in the form of Khomeini, whereas today it is just very polarized.

CHRIS EMERY: I agree that analytically there is little point in making analogies with 1978-9. Khomeini did not just have a cause or a sense of injustice, as Mousavi has today, he also had a constitutional template for a radical overhaul of Iran's political system and foreign relations developed over years. He also had a far-reaching network for achieving his goals; Mousavi, on the other hand, is improvising.

However, a key point is that the analogy is acting and active INSIDE Iran.

It is also influencing, I think, the State's response to the crisis. The authorities are afraid of the analogy and trying to not repeat the Shah's mistakes (but i think failing). The analogy is not just about wishful thinking by Westerners hoping for an overthrow of the system. Its imagery and psychology is omnipresent on the streets of Iranian cities (with kids who cannot remember it still indoctrinated by the imagery and sense of what the youth achieved in 1979). For example, I think that if there is a general strike, many will feel this evocative of 1978 and this sense of historical momentum will be as significant as any economic disruption.

The analogy maybe be false, but that doesn't mean it is insignificant. The Vietnam analogy in Iraq was false but was an undeniably important cultural and historical lens in which many Americans viewed the imagery and reporting of events there. It mobilised opposition. My Lai = Abu Ghraib, Tet = Falluja, language such as "quagmire" and "stay the course"....

Is the Current Regime Vulnerable?
HEWITT: Interesting points, especially in terms of the government’s response. But how can you measure the forces that you describe? And what about the millions who support the government and [President] Ahmadinejad? Where do they fit in the equation?

EMERY: You can't measure those forces (you couldn't in 1978-9). However, there are certain signposts from the past that will increase momentum to the point of critical mass. I mentioned a general strike. Another significant signpost would be if elements of the regime's security forces refuse to fire on the people and join the demonstrators, though we are miles away from that (bar a few reported isolated incidents).

I think you have hit upon the other point. The Shah, because of his own paranoia and managerial style, shrunk his power base to a very small few. He even used to meet his ministers and military leaders one at a time to discourage any unity; he was obsessed about being ousted by the military). He had deliberately weakened outside institutions and alliances. He also alienated all sections of Iranian society; even the North Tehran bourgeoisie mostly hated him. The whole system was reliant on him.

Now, the notion of an Islamic Republic is defended by the Guardian Council, Expediency Council, Revolutionary Guard, Majlis [Parliament], Presidency, Judiciary, and of course the Supreme Leader. It is defended even by Mousavi, Khatami, and Rafsanjani! There may be human rights activists and Iranian intellectuals centred on this issue, but there is not an intellectual culture proposing a complete political alternative, as in the example of Ali Shariati.

This is why we won't see a similar revolution. That's not to say, however, that the analogy won't be acting upon a movement that may radically shake up the political establishment but not bring down the Islamic Republic.

Myths and Chinese Models?
HEWITT: And what about the regime deploying powerful myths of its own, such as US and British interference in Iranian affairs? I think in the long run the regime is finished having destroyed its credibility by stealing the election, but in the short term the protests will fail just as they did, using another historical analogy, 20 years ago in Beijing.

EMERY: I think that's a reasonable assumption. However, the question is how the regime modifies its style. Some have suggested that the authorities have the Chinese model in mind. They are going to normalise relations with the West, invest in technologies such as nuclear power, end sanctions, and aim to make Iran as prosperous as possible. They reason that the problem is simply a lack of economic opportunities for the young. They hope to distract the youth with materialism whilst creating a wider base of vested interests not wishing to challenge the regime in the future.

Iran: The "Mousavi Revolutionary Manifesto" for Change (Gary Sick)

The Latest from Iran (22 June): Waiting for the Next Move
Video and Transcript: The Moment of Truth? Mousavi’s Speech at Saturday’s Protests

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On Saturday, hours after his speech to marchers in Jeyhoon Street, Presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi posted a lengthy letter to his supporters. (We posted the video and letter in a separate entry.) Yesterday Gary Sick, one of the top US specialists on Iran, offered a critique: "It is apparent from this statement that Mousavi’s movement — and Mousavi himself — have evolved enormously in the past week....[This] is truly a revolutionary statement."

Mousavi's new revolutionary manifesto

[On Saturday], Mir Hossein Mousavi, the presidential candidate who has come to represent the democratic aspirations of the Iranian people, issued a formal statement.

Although he denounces the “lies and fraud” of the leadership, particularly in the recent election, he views the fraudulent election as only as the symptom of something far more serious. He describes a revolution gone wrong, a revolution that was originally based on attention to the voice of the people but has resulted in “forcing an unwanted government on the nation.”

This moment is “a turning point,” he says, and he defines the ” the movement that is forming around him of having a “historical mission” to accomplish nothing less than “renewing the life of the nation” according to its own ideals.

He acknowledges, interestingly, that his own voice at the beginning was less ‘eloquent’ than he would have wished and that the people were ahead of him in turning the movement green. But now he accepts the “burden of duty put on our shoulders by the destiny of generations and ages”

He denounces both extremes of the political spectrum: those on one hand who believe that “Islamic government is the same as Tyranny of the Rightful;” and on the other, those who “consider religion and Islam to be blockers for realization of republicanism,” i.e. those who believe that Islam and democracy are incompatible.

Mousavi says his call for annulment of the election and a revote, supervised by an impartial national body, “is a given right.” Theobjective is nothing less than “to achieve a new type of political life in the country.”

That is truly a revolutionary statement. He says he will stand by the side of all those seeking “new solutions” in a non-violent way. He accepts the principles and the institutions of the Islamic Republic, including the Revolutionary Guard and the basij, but denounces “deviations and deceptions.” He demands reform “that returns us to the pure principles of the Islamic Revolution.”

He calls for freedom of expression in alll its forms, and says that if the government permits people to express their views “there won’t be a need for the presence of military and regulatory forces in the streets.”

It is apparent from this statement that Mousavi’s movement — and Mousavi himself — have evolved enormously in the past week. The candidate started as a mild-mannered reformer. After the searing events of the past several days, he has dared to preach a counter sermon to Khamene’i’s lecture on Islamic government. Although he never mentions the Leader by name, there is no overlooking the direct contradiction of his arguments. This open opposition to the Leader by a political figure is unprecedented.

Mousavi has in fact issued a manifesto for a new vision of the Islamic Republic. The repression and disdain of the government has brought the opposition to a place they probably never dreamed of going. And no one knows where any of the parties are likely to go next.

But for outside observers, it is like standing on the edge of a glacier and feeling the ice begin to crack under your feet.