Iran: Scott Lucas Audio Interview with Fintan Dunne

The Latest from Iran (1 July): The Opposition Regroups

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Fintan Dunne, a freelance journalist who has already spoken with Professor Muhammad Sahimi of Tehran Bureau and with Professor Hamid Dabashi, was one of the most demanding interviews I've done recently but also one of the most rewarding, covering both the immediate and long-term conflicts and possibilities in the Iranian situation.

Iran: The Post-Election Challenge from Qom's Clerics

Iran: The “Ghaffari Tape” Criticising the Supreme Leader
The Latest from Iran (1 July): The Opposition Regroups

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In the furour over the Presidential election, the most intriguing political contest may have taken place, behind the street scenes, in Iran's religious centre, south of Tehran in the dusty city of Qom.

Within 72 hours of the 12 June vote, the clerics of Qom's seminaries had taken their place on the political stage. Former President Hashemi Rafsanjani tried to mobilise them for a public challenge to President Ahmadinejad's victory. That initial attempt failed; indeed it is a key reasons why Rafsanjani then kept a careful silence before an equally careful, "balanced" return to public life with his speech last Sunday. There would be no mass movement of the religious leadership behind any campaign. Instead, factions already aligned to particular political movements would reassert their positions. The Association of Combatant Clerics would ally itself with the efforts of former President Mohammad Khatami and, thus, Mir Hossein Mousavi; Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, prominent on the Guardian Council, would bolster Ahmadinejad's position.

As the public demonstrations against the election swell, some Western media noted the possible significance of Qom, indeed over-dramatising a possible "split" in the Iranian system; conversely, as the public challenge has been contained, notions of a clerical challenge receded. That, too, is a mistake: the debate not only over the election but over the guardianship of Iran's Islamic Revolution continues.

While there still has been no significant show of support for the President (note Press TV's slightly strained attempt this morning, via an interview with a clerical member of Parliament, to say, "No one is talking about the election anymore), opposition has emerged in scattered but sometimes dramatic ways. The criticism of Ayatollah Montazeri, the one-time successor to Ayatollah Khomeini, was to be expected; the current regime, led by Montazeri's replacement, Ayatollah Ali Khameini, still keeps the cleric under house arrest. He is not alone, however. Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani has claimed that the Iranian system is moving away from Khomeini's path and thoughts. Ayatollam Mousavi-Ardebili has criticised violence against the protestors and said recent events have weakened Iran's political and religious institutions. Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli has expressed displeasure. Ayatollah Makarem-Shirazi and Ayatollah Sane’i have made gentler interventions, and Ayatollah Haeri-Shirazi has written a careful but still challenging letter to the Supreme Leader. There are reports of "secret" meetings between Ayatollahs to consider developments and longer-term prospects.

The most dramatic challenge has come in a statement by Ayatollah Hadi Ghaffari on Ayatollah Khamenei. The leaked
audio on YouTube has created a stir with Ghaffari's criticism of the Supreme Leader's post-election conduct: Khamenei has ruined the honour of clerics with his handling of the political situation. (First reports said that Ghaffari had gone as far as to insult Khamenei as a "corpse-washer".) The ideals of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution are not being defended but destroyed.

None of this points to a Qom-led coup against President Ahmadinejad and, more importantly, Khamenei. On the other hand, these concerns are part of a much wider, more significant story of years past and years to come.

The Western caricature of Iran is that of a "theocracy" in which the "mullahs" hold power, working with secular politicians. That misconception misses the reality that a large section of Iran's clerical establishment are no friends of Ahmadinejad, whose policies and pronouncements have been seen as a challenge to the Iran envisaged by Ayatollah Khomeini. Indeed, it is not even accurate to speak on a unified clerical movement behind the Supreme Leader, whose selection in 1989 was a surprise to many --- given his relative junior status --- and has been seen as a triumph of politicians (ironically, given recent events, as part of manoeuvres by Hashemi Rafsanjani for authority) rather than a religious succession.

No surprise then that another video has supposedly resurfaced, this one of Ayatollah Montazeri considering the Iranian system of clerical authority, Velayat-e-Faqih, as he criticises Ayatollah Khameini. The text is clear: religion's true and proper place in the growth of the Islamic Republic has become "politicised" and thus corrupted.

And that is why the Presidential vote has a lasting significance, whatever happens in the near future with the demonstrations. Those ballot boxes are a symbol of the wider corruption that Montazeri claimed was undermining the Revolution. And, long after they have been put away, their symbolism --- whatever actually happened on 12 June --- remains.

As pne of our correspondents noted, after a lengthy glance at Qom last week, "This is not over."

Iraq: Day One of the "Post-American" Era

It's not as if there was nothing happening in Iraq yesterday, marking the formal "withdrawal" of the US military from the cities (even as 130,000 remain in the country). There were public celebrations, a confident speech by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki which did not even refer to the American troops, and a bombing in Kirkuk that killed 33 people. There was even an embarrassing nationally-television auction of energy rights which pointed out the economic challenge; in the end, foreign investors only sealed the deal for the largest of eight oil and gas fields.

Still, as Dan Balz bluntly put it, "Have We Forgotten Iraq?" Amidst newer crises, including one in the country next door, war fatigue, and an Obama rather than Bush Administration, the situation is not quite violent enough (despite recent bombings) and far too complex to hold attention.

Juan Cole, excellent as always, offers an immediate guide to the situation behind the "withdrawal":

The casualty toll in the Kirkuk bombing on Tuesday has risen to 33, with about 100 injured.

Four US troops were killed in Iraq on Tuesday, as well, though the circumstances are still murky.

The Iraqi civil wars kicked off by the American invasion of 2003 continue. I'm sure a lot of observers think it is all one internal war, but it is not. It is multiple. Nor is the bombing relevant to the American withdrawal from the cities, as some press reports are implying, since there were never very many US troops in Kurdistan or the Iraqi north generally. (Though settling the Arab-Kurdish problem before they leave will be essential to a good exit for Americans).

A bombing like this in Kirkuk means something different than a similar event in Baghdad or in Shiite Nasiriyah in the south. A lot of the violence in the south is among Shiite militias; there are few Sunnis, and their freedom of movement is constrained (a Tikriti "r" is different from the "r" used in the south, and so the religio-ethnic difference can sometimes be heard; plus, Sunnis typically don't know the details of the lives of the 12 Imams sacred to the Shiites and so can fairly easily be caught out.)

A bombing in Baghdad typically indicates continued conflict between Sunni Arabs and Shiite Arabs, though my best guess is that Sunni Arabs are only 10-15% of Baghdad now, so that the bombings are more helpless raging revenge than effective guerrilla politics.

But in Kirkuk, even if it is the radical vigilantes ("Salafi jihadis" or what the US press calls 'al-Qaeda in Iraq') that are behind the bombing, it has a different significance. Kirkuk is the arena for a potentially epochal struggle between the Arabs (both Sunni and Shiite) and the Kurds (mostly Sunni, who do not speak Arabic as their mother tongue).

Read rest of article...

Afghanistan Strategy: Obama "WTF?" to His Military

Earlier this year we paid close attention to the conflict between White House advisors and military commanders over the latter's request for increased troop levels to "win" Afghanistan. The dispute was resolved in the short-term by a compromise plan to send more than 20,000 additional personnel, and it has been overshadowed recently by the change in command in Afghanistan. It was only a matter of time, however, before the bottom line --- is a force level of more than 60,000 (compared with 38,000 at the start of this year) going to be enough? --- was going to be resurrected.

Today it appears that the Obama camp has made a move to pre-empt additional military demands.

Bob Woodward reports in The Washington Post, "National security adviser James L. Jones told U.S. military commanders here [in Afghanistan] last week that the Obama administration wants to hold troop levels here flat for now, and focus instead on carrying out the previously approved strategy of increased economic development, improved governance and participation by the Afghan military and civilians in the conflict."

There are a number of levels to Jones' message and its appearance in a report by Woodward, investigative reporter turned trusted White House insider. The first is that this has the Presidential seal of approval: "Jones was carrying out directions from President Obama, who said recently, 'My strong view is that we are not going to succeed simply by piling on more and more troops.'" The second is that the White House is putting out the message that non-military measures have to take priority in any long-term resolution:

"This will not be won by the military alone," Jones said in an interview during his trip. "We tried that for six years....The piece of the strategy that has to work in the next year is economic development. If that is not done right, there are not enough troops in the world to succeed."

The immediate message, however, is that Obama does not want the military taking the lead on this issue or --- as they did in the first weeks of his Presidency --- working the media to undercut him. Conscious that, in January, the generals tried to lock Obama by putting completed reviews on his desk, Obama despatched Jones to Afghanistan as the new US commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, is conducting a 60-day evaluation of "all the issues in the war". Now it is the military, not the President, who will be locked in:

Jones has told Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Adm. Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that they should focus on implementing the current strategy, completing the review and getting more Afghan forces involved in the fight before requesting additional U.S. troops for Afghanistan.

The battle in Washington and in the field will continue, "One senior military officer said privately that the United States would have to deploy a force of more than 100,000 to execute the counterinsurgency strategy of holding areas and towns after clearing out the Taliban insurgents." However, as the balance of the article makes clear, the White House will be pointing its military towards bringing in more Afghan forces rather than coming back with requests for additional US boots on the ground. Here is the message, brought by Jones to the generals and by Woodwardian anecdote to the US public:

During the briefing, [Marine Brigadier General Lawrence D.] Nicholson had told Jones that he was "a little light," more than hinting that he could use more forces, probably thousands more. "We don't have enough force to go everywhere," Nicholson said.

But Jones recalled how Obama had initially decided to deploy additional forces this year. "At a table much like this," Jones said, referring to the polished wood table in the White House Situation Room, "the president's principals met and agreed to recommend 17,000 more troops for Afghanistan."....Soon after that, Jones said, the principals told the president, "oops," we need an additional 4,000 to help train the Afghan army.

"They then said, 'If you do all that, we think we can turn this around,' " Jones said, reminding the Marines here that the president had quickly approved and publicly announced the additional 4,000

Now suppose you're the president, Jones told them, and the requests come into the White House for yet more force. How do you think Obama might look at this? Jones asked, casting his eyes around the colonels. How do you think he might feel?
Jones let the question hang in the air-conditioned, fluorescent-lighted room. Nicholson and the colonels said nothing.

Well, Jones went on, after all those additional troops, 17,000 plus 4,000 more, if there were new requests for force now, the president would quite likely have "a Whiskey Tango Foxtrot moment." Everyone in the room caught the phonetic reference to WTF -- which in the military and elsewhere means "What the [expletive]?"

Nicholson and his colonels -- all or nearly all veterans of Iraq -- seemed to blanch at the unambiguous message that this might be all the troops they were going to get.

Jones, speaking with great emphasis to this group of Iraq veterans, said Afghanistan is not Iraq. "We are not going to build that empire again," he said flatly.

Iran Audio and Text: The "Ghaffari Tape" Criticising the Supreme Leader

Iran: The Post-Election Challenge from the Clerics of Qom
The Latest from Iran (1 July): The Opposition Regroups

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Last week, Ayatollah Hadi Ghaffari made a lengthy speech criticising the post-election conduct of the Iranian Government. That in itself was not surprising; other clerics have expressed unease with the events of the last three weeks. Ghaffari went further, however, with his direct challenge to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Unsurprisingly, the leaked audio has created a stir inside and outside Iran. Another copy on YouTube is overlaid with less-than-flattering caricatures of Khamenei.

The audio is in Farsi, of course. Translated extracts, provided by the National Iranian American Committee, follow:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FvNOK3LJtMY[/youtube]

GHAFFARI: Khamenei, your recent actions and behavior has brought shame to us clerics. Our image in the streets and bazaars has been tarnished as everyone is placing us in the same category as Ahmadinejad....Khamenei, you are wrong, your actions are wrong. I believe in the Velayat-e-faqih [system of clerical authority] more than you....

I’m not preaching these messages so that I could be associated with the West. I loathe the West and will fight to the last drop of my blood before I or my land succumbs to the West. On the contrary, I’m preaching these messages on the count that the respect for our profession is gone....

Young people are not praying anymore, whose fault is that? It is your fault Mr. Khamenei, it’s your fault for placing us in the same line as that lunatic Ahmadinejad....Ahmadinejad is nobody, you should congregate with us instead of him.