Gary Sick, academic and former US Government official, offers this perspective:
The question of external intervention in a Middle East country is not necessarily limited to Libya. Judging from recent events, this is a contingency that may have to be faced in other locations as well.
Let me put in my own two cents’ worth concerning US/Western policy choices:
First, as always, do no harm. Will an intervention make things better or worse? If we don’t know the answer that that question, is it worth the risk?
Second, can a genuinely legitimate coalition be assembled? The UN Security Council is one route, but it would be awfully good in the case of Libya or other Middle East states to have the full support of the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity if appropriate, and /or the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The more support going in, the better. I commented very briefly on this during a CNBC segment this morning.
Third, what exactly is required? No-fly zones sound good, but there is no guarantee they would stop military forces on the ground. I am perhaps more skeptical than some other observers that air power is the determining factor in this battle. I would need more evidence to be persuaded. In Afghanistan the United States provided Stingers (shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles). We came to regret that, since many of them eventually fell into the wrong hands. But such weapons — or even the threat of such weapons — would greatly inhibit Libyan air operations. But above all, getting dragged into a ground war inadvertently, even with the best intentions, is not an attractive option.
The French have started the ball rolling on recognition of the rebels, which could isolate Tripoli and perhaps facilitate direct aid — both humanitarian and military — to the rebels. Is direct aid not a really attractive option that could be implemented almost immediately?
Lastly, I think there is not (nor perhaps should there be) an automatic trigger in which X number of deaths = intervention. The Libyan people took on this task, and we may have similar circumstances appearing elsewhere. This is not a case of ethnic cleansing or racial/sectarian hatreds. It is a struggle for political control.
Libyan forces have said they want to do it themselves. They have also said they could use some targeted assistance. Clearly, in this case, most of the world wants to see the insurgents win, but if others come in and fight their battles for them, what does that do to their cause?
It seems to me that this is an instance where pragmatism and caution should prevail.