Dr Ali Akbar Mahdi writes a guest post for EA WorldView to answer the question of a leading Washington journalist, "Is there a rift between the Supreme Leader and the President?":
All along, Ayatollah Khamenei's support for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been tactical and not based on what the clerics often refer to as "aqd-e okhovvat" (a tradition of "brotherhood contract", established by Prophet Mohammad in Medina).
Khamenei will support Ahmadinejad as long as the advantages of such support outweigh its disadvantages. However, Khamenei is starting to see how the obedient president is enjoying power and is slowly outgrowing his own skin. That is why different signals are sent out from Khamenei's lower associates to the President, such as letters from the Supreme Leader's offices and critical editorials in newspapers like Kayhan and Jomhouri Islami.
Yet, assured of a ride to the end of presidency, Ahmadinejad has begun acting more unpredictably and controversially than expected. Khamenei knows that he invested too much in him in the last presidential election –-- an investment which much of it has turned to be a loss. For his own sake as the leader above the political fray --- a priority which former President Hashemi Rafsanjani and other clerics have been highlighting to him --- Khamenei needs to distance himself from Ahmadinejad.
The process has begun but do not bank on a Banisadr-type departure. [The first President after the Islamic Revolution, Abolhassan Banisadr, fell out with Ayatollah Khomeini and fled Iran in 1981.] I see little chance of it happening till the end of his presidency.
All should be well aware of clerics' realistic and survivalist attitudes. When confronted with a mistake, one of their unwritten rules is to pretend the problem does not exist or minimise it as much as possible, hang on for a while till the issue gets out of the sight, then change the direction. They have done this time and again on variety of issues –-- political appointments, policy issues, and even religious matters. They often correct their ways but not in a way to give concessions to their opposition, competitors, and enemies.
In the case of Ahmadinejad and his latest controversies and frictions with the Principlists, and even Khamenei, the same rule applies. Just read the Supreme Leader's current comments today and how he distinguishes between the primary versus secondary issues. He says we should not magnify secondary issues in public, even if they are real and need our attention --- a commentary, in my view, which refers to Hashamei Rafsanjani's comments on sanctions and obedience to law at the latest session of the Assembly of Experts. [Rafsanjani implicitly criticised Ahmadinejad for dismissing sanctions as a "used hanky" with no effect on Iran.] Khamenei insists on the sincerity of "officials", and he implies that their
mistakes are to be corrected but not magnified because public airing of "personal vendettas" destroys the belief in the government and people's "self-confidence."
Ahmadinejad is still a good servant for the Islamic Republic in which Ayatollah Khamenei is the leader. He is still a valuable asset, but not so valuable that the leader is willing to go directly to his defense again. But if the Supreme Leader may not fight for the President any more, he is not going to admit that he made a mistake in backing Ahmadinejad in the first place.
Khamenei will give Ahmadinejad hints and clues to stay the course. but je is not going to dump him: in Khamenei's obsession with "enemies", that is an unacceptable gift to them. He will rein in Ahmadinejad, let his Presidency finish the course, and then choose his next battle.
A final point: some commentators regard Ahmadinejad's close alliance with and promotion of his Chief of Staff, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, as a prelude to Rahim-Mashai's own candidacy to be the next president. Rahim-Mashai may have such a dream but there is no way that the current Guardian Council will approve of him as a candidate: the final statement by this week's Assembly of Expert meeting targeted Rahim-Mashai when they condemned the "promotion of nationalism in the country" over the promotion of Islam.