And in the category of "Strange...But True?" from the WikiLeaks documents....
In September 2009, an Iranian political source --- who also happens to be trained in martial arts --- tells the US Embassy in Azerbaijan that the regime is pressuring martial arts clubs, despite suspicions that they could be assisting opposition groups, to provide instruction for the Ministry of Intelligence and the Revolutionary Guards.
The outcome supposedly went beyond training: the source maintains that one of his acquaintances killed at least six intellectuals and young "pro-democracy activists" before he himself was eliminated.
There may be even more in the report: in a document claiming specialised training in warfare and assassination, one topic is so sensitive that it has been removed by WikiLeaks before release (Paragraph 6)
THE ORIGINAL CABLE
R 010538Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1658
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0062
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0140
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM AJ IR
SUBJECT: IRAN: NINJA BLACK BELT MASTER DETAILS USE OF MARTIAL ARTS CLUBS FOR REPRESSION; xxxxxxxxxxxx
REF: a) BAKU 575
---
Iranian Martial Arts Clubs Used for Political Repression
¶1. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx a licensed martial arts coach and trainer xxxxxxxxxxxx, told Baku Iran watcher that private martial arts clubs and their managers are under intense pressure to cooperate with Iranian intelligence and Revolutionary Guard organizations, both in training members and in working as "enforcers" in repression of protests and politically motivated killings. xxxxxxxxxxxx who provided originals of his Iranian coaching license and technical certificate as xxxxxxxxxxxx. He claimed that his xxxxxxxxxxxx with difficulty maintained its independence from control by organizations affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard and/or intelligence service. xxxxxxxxxxxx
¶2. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx observed that Iranian internal security forces are highly suspicious of these clubs as potential vehicles for organization and "combat" training of future protesters and regime opponents. Nonetheless, he asserted that their main motivation is seeking to control these clubs is less driven by such fears as by a desire to deploy their trained membership at will for "special tasks." According to xxxxxxxxxxxx these tasks range from providing martial arts training to Revolutionary Guard members and Basij, assistance in protest repression, intimidation, and crowd control, to political killings. He observed that use of these clubs and their members provides the security forces with "plausible deniability" for dirty undertakings, as well as trained fighters and potential trainers.
Alleged Contract Killings
¶3. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx said he personally knew one such martial arts master whom he said was used by the Intelligence service to murder at least six different individuals over the course of several months in xxxxxxxxxxxx said that the victims included intellectuals and young "pro-democracy activists," adding that his assassin acquaintance was ultimately "suicided" by the authorities (i.e., killed in what was subsequently labeled a suicide). xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed that his club was raided and greatly restricted xxxxxxxxxxxx after he and the club manager refused to train Basij or lend them their facilities. He said that they also refused to mobilize their membership to assist in repressing local protesters xxxxxxxxxxxx. Although he has stopped working at the school, he claimed to be under relentless pressure to cooperate, xxxxxxxxxxxx
¶4. (C)xxxxxxxxxxxx (Note and Comment: A xxxxxxxxxxxx student recently echoed some of xxxxxxxxxxxx story, noting that xxxxxxxxxxxx could only be held at night as during the daytime his instructors are "required to train the Revolutionary Guard." The use of martial arts clubs members as political enforcers/repressors existed under the Shah, and, according to sources, exists today in several neighboring countries, including the Republic of Azerbaijan. End Note and Comment).
xxxxxxxxxxxx "Pragmatic" on Post-Election Protests
¶5. (C) On the topic of xxxxxxxxxxxx post-election protest activities, xxxxxxxxxxxx said that almost everyone he knew voted for Moussavi, and was angered by the fabricated result.
However, he claimed that there was considerable reluctance to turn to the streets once serious repression began. He said that xxxxxxxxxxxx are "very pragmatic"; while not afraid of protesting per se, they will only do so in favor of a tangible end result that they feel is clearly in their interest. He asserted that xxxxxxxxxxxx saw the election and subsequent fallout as a power struggle within the Tehran regime which had little to do with them or their felt interests. "People see it as an issue for Tehranis," he said, and are "reluctant to risk their necks" unless/until they feel that real regional policy changes are achievable.
¶6. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx