In August 2007, a well-placed Iranian approaches the US Embassy in London with an offer. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), with its "central and preeminent role in the Iranian
government", will co-operate with the US in Iraq, but "a U.S. terrorist designation of the IRGC would prevent any such cooperation".
This source, in making the offer, provides confirmation of the Revolutionary Guards' support for attacks against US forces in Iraq during the height of post-2003 violence:
Attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq by militias using Iranian-provided ordnance had actually increased from May to July, despite Iran's claim to support Iraqi stability. xxxxxxxxxxxx stated that the USG would soon see (he was vague on how soon) evidence of Iranian security cooperation in the form of diminished attacks, taking the July discussions in Baghdad --- as opposed to those held in May --- as the point at which the IRGC had decided it could go forward with such cooperation.
And who is this Iranian who spoke with such knowledge and, apparently, the authority to make the offer to the Americans?
The brother of the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Yahya Rahim Safavi.
There is no record of an American response to the offer. Rahim Safavi was replaced as IRGC commander within weeks of this meeting, although there is no apparent connection between the two events.
THE ORIGINAL CABLE
O 170834Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4983
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0270
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0455
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0700
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 0132
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0430
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 0157
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0908
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 2505
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 0460
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0564
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0255
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0160
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0695
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0490
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 0236
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 0129
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2362
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 0080
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2976
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0567
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0474
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0168
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0976
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 003175
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2017
TAGS: PTER KPRP PGOV PHUM PREL BA KU IR IS UK
SUBJECT: IRAN: BROTHER OF IRGC'S SAFAVI SAYS A U.S. TERROR
DESIGNATION OF IRGC WILL PRECLUDE IRAQ SECURITY COOPERATION
¶1. (C) Summary. xxxxxxxxxxxx Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) xxxxxxxxxxxx told London Iran Watcher xxxxxxxxxxxx that Iran's cooperation on security in Iraq, though not yet evident, would be forthcoming, but in the same breath argued that a U.S. terrorist designation of the IRGC would prevent any such cooperation. xxxxxxxxxxxx for the USG to hold its hand on designation came xxxxxxxxxxxx engaged with the invited group at length on Tehran's view of U.S.-Iran relations, Iraqi security, and the nuclear issue. xxxxxxxxxxxx candid remarks, which included extremely vigorous exchanges with xxxxxxxxxxxx alternated between aggressive characterizations of Iran's relations in the Persian Gulf, admissions of the IRGC's presence and role in Iraq and Afghanistan, and apparently earnest statements of Iran's desire for cooperation with the United States. xxxxxxxxxxxx appeared to pay close attention to xxxxxxxxxxxx message on need for Iran's behavior in Iraq to match its stated support for Iraqi stability and for Iran to weigh the benefits of the E3 3 incentives package and "suspension for suspension" offer which remains on the table. End Summary.
xxxxxxxxxxxx Private Plea on IRGC Designation
¶2. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx made his private plea on not designating the IRGC under U.S. law after a three-hour long larger group discussion during which xxxxxxxxxxxx had stressed that attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq by militias using Iranian-provided ordnance had actually increased from May to July, despite Iran's claim to support Iraqi stability. xxxxxxxxxxxx stated that the USG would soon see (he was vague on how soon) evidence of Iranian security cooperation in the form of diminished attacks, taking the July discussions in Baghdad -- as opposed to those held in May -- as the point at which the IRGC had decided it could go forward with such cooperation. xxxxxxxxxxxx described how IRGC orders to "our allies" are "in the pipeline," but it takes time for such orders to be disseminated throughout Iraqi militia networks and acted upon ("it is a very large machine, with delayed effect").
¶3. (C) By way of illustration of this delayed implementation phenomenon, xxxxxxxxxxxx said there had been an unintended attack "by our (Shiite Iraqi) allies" on UK forces immediately after the release of the UK naval hostages last April. xxxxxxxxxxxx said the IRGC had indeed issued an order for attacks on UK forces, in response to what he called an earlier UK attack on the Iranian consulate in Basra, but that Iranian expression of unhappiness had been satisfied with the hostage episode, and that IRGC authorities were consequently exasperated by the militia attack occuring shortly after the hostage resolution. xxxxxxxxxxxx said their Iraqi "allies" explained the incident as the result of a standing "general order" to launch such attacks, which had not yet been rescinded. xxxxxxxxxxxx indicated that similar organizational snafus lie behind the current continuing attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq.
¶4. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx went on to argue, however, that a USG designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization would effectively end all interest, or political ability, of the IRGC to cooperate with the USG on Iraqi or Afghan security. He stressed that, unlike "a few years ago, under Khatami," the IRGC plays a central and preeminent role in the Iranian government and that, if the IRGC is designated as a terrorist organization, the USG will have no Iranian partner with which to engage on security or other issues of mutual concern. xxxxxxxxxxxx said it makes no difference to Iran whether the proposed IRGC designation is done under U.S. domestic law or international authority -- all sanctions, financial measures and designations are seen by Iranian authorities and the public as authored by America, with international partners such as the E3 plus 3 and the UN as mere cutouts for U.S. initiatives. The practical effects of such measures are unimportant to the Iranian Government, but the symbolic and psychological consequences do matter.
Group Discussion Highlights
¶5. (C) The evening's larger group discussion had several highlights:
-- A (surprising) degree of self-professed confusion by xxxxxxxxxxxx at the what he called the "multiple and conflicting signals" on Iran policy from various parts of the USG including the Congress;
-- An open acknowledgment by xxxxxxxxxxxx that the IRGC is present and operating in both Afghanistan and Iraq (with U.S. occupation and Sunni attacks on Shias given as a justification);
-- xxxxxxxxxxxx description of Shiite militias in Iraq as "our allies, whom we created against Saddam;"
-- Fiery statements by xxxxxxxxxxxx on U.S. injustices perpetrated over the years against Iran, on Iran's resolve and capabilities to launch military and asymmetric responses, and on how Iran should replace or join with the United States as the Gulf region's "co-manager," all of which provoked vehement rejoinders from xxxxxxxxxxxx;
-- xxxxxxxxxxxx reflections on a more mature Iran's no-longer-revolutionary approach to its foreign relations;
-- xxxxxxxxxxxx repeated return to the theme of desiring a constructive and cooperative relationship with the U.S., first on Afghanistan and Iraq and secondly on the nuclear issue;
-- xxxxxxxxxxxx near-gloating remarks on Hezbollah's 2006 conflict with Israel; and
-- xxxxxxxxxxxx description of the United States as having become Iran's "hostage" in Iraq ("you cannot stay and you cannot leave ... your forces there and in the region are our target").
Comment
¶6. (C) Although impeccably turned out, outwardly genial, and speaking with confidence and an evident sense of authority, xxxxxxxxxxxx appeared to be under significant stress and at great pains to listen carefully and closely to all interlocutors, and especially to xxxxxxxxxxxx (standard) comments on the E3 plus 3 offer, as well as the need for Iranian behavior change in Iraq. xxxxxxxxxxxx apparently genuine desire to engage and move towards cooperation was coupled to his equally apparent sense that Iran is entitled to use violent means against us until such time as there a change in the USG's "regional behavior."
Biographical Background
¶7. xxxxxxxxxxxx