Atoms of Fear: Reality Check on That Iranian Nuclear Programme

The flurry of headlines on the International Atomic Energy Agency report on the Iran nuclear programme has come and gone. The hype in some media outlets of "Iran has enough enriched uranium to build a bomb" has not been matched by a dramatic response from the Obama Administration.

Still, it's not a bad idea to knock down the distortions and exaggerations of the IAEA's findings. Blogger Cheryl Rofer offers an excellent scientific reality-check on Iran's stocks of enriched uranium:

Whoo-Hoo! Atoms of Fissionable Material Everywhere!
by Cheryl Rofer

As I put the tea water on to boil and turned on the tv this morning, I was assaulted by the claim that seems to be everywhere. Maybe you've seen it in the New York Times, or the Los Angeles Times, or heard the same CBS report that I did, or even read it on Kevin Drum [of Mother Jones].


It's a lie.

Much as I hate to do so, because psychology tells us that repetition will help to fix the erroneous message in our minds, I will quote the most egregious statement of this "news."

Iran has enriched sufficient uranium to amass a nuclear bomb – a third more than previously thought – the United Nations announced yesterday.

Ah yes. And if you live in Boulder, Colorado, or in Connecticut, or New York City, you have enough U-235 under your house (or perhaps block) to amass a nuclear bomb! Or, Kevin, all that sea water lapping up against the California coast has uranium in it too! I have a call in to the IAEA to inspect your homes!

The issue here is concentration. Mining uranium concentrates it from the ore. Purification and conversion to UF6 concentrates it further. The purpose of the enrichment centrifuges is to concentrate the fissionable U-235.

Concentration is not that hard to understand, but in our science-challenged society (yes, we all hated chemistry, where it was discussed in the first week), it seems not to be a consideration. See also this post from earlier this week.

The concentration of U-235 is 3.49% in the enriched uranium that the Natanz plant is turning out. The IAEA has found no evidence that any higher enrichment is being produced. 3.49% is not enough to make a bomb. Iran is not in a position to make a bomb, unless there is a bunch of hidden stuff that nobody has found, involving big buildings that can be seen by satellite surveillance.

It would take a reconfiguration of the Natanz facility that the inspectors would notice to produce bomb-grade uranium (concentration of U-235 of 90%). The inspectors also take environmental samples to verify the concentration of U-235. They would have to be kicked out of the facility and their video cameras taken down for Iran to do this.

There are a number of other things in that IAEA report that the media aren't bothering to report, like that the pace of enrichment has slowed. That doesn't support the idea that Iran is racing toward a bomb, so it's not relevant, I guess.

Bloggers who are trying to hold back this tsunami of misleading non-science: Sean Paul Kelly, Cernig.

I also know of one newspaper reporter who is trying to get the story straight, but he hasn't posted yet. I'll post more links as I get them.

Secret Britain-Iran Talks in 2005 on Iraq, Tehran Nuclear Programme?

The BBC is claiming that secret discussions between Britain and Iran took place in 2005 on Tehran's role in Iraq and Iran's nuclear programme.

A BBC documentary tonight will claim that Iran made an "extraordinary offer" to stop attacking British troops in Iraq if Western countries accepted Iran's uranium enrichment programme.

The claim is made by Sir John Sawers (pictured), who was Britain's top political representative in Iraq and is now currently Britain's ambassador to the United Nations. He claims, "The Iranians wanted to strike a deal whereby they stopped killing our forces in iraq in return for them being allowed to carry on with their nuclear programme."

The British government rejected the offer.

UPDATED --- Not a Bombshell: The Report on Iran's Uranium and US (Non-)Reaction

See Also: Text of the International Atomic Energy Agency Report on Iran’s Nuclear Programme



Update (2:45 p.m.): The lead story on CNN International's website, "Experts: Iran ready to build nuclear weapon",  is not a "scary interpretation" of the IAEA report: it is an outright distortion. Rather than quote from the report or the officials who compiled it, they refer to the "Institute for Science and International Security", who have "interpreted" the report.

Thus we get the scary side that "Iran does not yet have a nuclear weapon but does have enough low-enriched uranium for a single nuclear weapon without any of the explanation, details, and caveats offered by United Nations officials. Or, for that matter, other "experts" who might have offered the appropriate context for the report.

Robert Dreyfuss of The Nation offers a useful corrective: "Don't Let the Iran Headlines Scare You".

On Thursday, the International Atomic Energy Agency issued its latest report on Iranian nuclear production. It was a classic half-full, half-empty analysis: those wanting to play up the Iranian threat could note that that Iran has produced more enriched uranium than previously estimated, declaring that Tehran now has enough material for "one bomb". Those preferring a more measured response could highlight the conclusion  that Iran's enrichment programme has slowed "considerably".

Some in the American and British "mainstream" media will go for the scarier interpretation --- in The New York Times, it's Iran understates enriched uranium level by one-third in Paragraph One, Enough for a Bomb in Paragraph Two. However, it is not only Agence France Presse that is pointing to the slower pace of enrichment. The Washington Post headlines, "Iran Easing Aspects Of Nuclear Program" and leads with, "The slower pace was interpreted by some U.N. officials as a conciliatory gesture in advance of any diplomatic overtures by the Obama administration."

Indeed, UN officials are also providing the general reassurance that "the discrepancy results from Iran’s estimates versus careful measurement", rather than any deception by Tehran, and that "the inconsistency [is] reasonable for a new enrichment plant". That could be important, countering the soundbites of "experts" like Gary Milhollin on the higher level of enriched uranium: "It's worse than we thought".

Of course, enrichment is not the key issue for an Iranian nuclear weapons, as opposed to nuclear energy, programme. That issue is whether Iran is "weaponising" with any programme to develop nuclear warheads, and there is no evidence that Iran has reversed its suspension of that effort in 2003. As a UN official told The New York Times, "The material would have to undergo further enrichment if it was to be used as fuel for a bomb and...atomic inspectors had found no signs that Iran was making such preparations."

Most importantly, it is not the media reaction --- or even that matters here but the response of the Obama Administration. In the NYT, "a senior administration official" took a We're Watching line:

There is a steady timeline of improvement, especially in terms of mastering the efficiency of the centrifuges. Everyone’s nervous and worried about the possibility of Iran pursuing a clandestine capability.

There is no Administration response in The Washington Post.

Of course, with the President and Secretary of State outside the US, the Administration could be in a holding pattern until next week. Yet it's still significant, I think, that Obama's officials were not primed to return to the Bush Administration's blueprint of Sanctions, Sanctions, Sanctions. In effect, they've allowed the UN to take the lead, damping down any media hyperbole.

And that means, I think, that engagement with Iran is still the priority for this Administration. No bombshells here, just the steadier if slower emphasis on diplomacy.

So keep an eye on whether the Obama Administration plays up the drama of the higher enriched-uranium figures and refers to more sanctions against Iran, or whether it  plays down any threat, thus protecting the priority of engagement.

Text of the International Atomic Energy Agency Report on Iran's Nuclear Programme

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Report by the Director General

1. On 19 November 2008, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2008/59). This report covers relevant developments since that date.

A. Current Enrichment Related Activities

2. Since the Director General’s previous report, Iran has continued to feed UF6 into the 3000-machine IR-1 unit (Unit A24), and six cascades of Unit A26, at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP).1 Nine other cascades of Unit A26 have been installed and are under vacuum.2 Installation of the three remaining cascades of that Unit is continuing. Installation work at Units A25, A27 and A28, including the installation of pipes and cables, is also continuing.

3. The Agency has finalized its assessment of the results of the physical inventory verification (PIV) carried out at FEP on 24–26 November 2008, and has concluded that the physical inventory as declared by Iran was consistent with the results of the PIV, within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with enrichment plants of a similar throughput. The Agency has verified that, as of 17 November 2008, 9956 kg of UF6 had been fed into the cascades since February 2007, and a total of 839 kg of low enriched UF6 had been produced. The results also showed that the enrichment level of this low enriched UF6 product verified by the Agency was 3.49% U-235. Iran has estimated that, between 18 November 2008 and 31 January 2009, it produced an additional 171 kg of low enriched UF6. The nuclear material at FEP (including the feed, product and tails), as well as all installed cascades, remain under Agency containment and surveillance.3

4. On 29 September 2008, the Agency conducted a PIV at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), the results of which confirm the physical inventory as declared by Iran, within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with such a facility. Between 29 October 2008 and 15 January 2009, Iran fed a total of approximately 50 kg of UF6 into the 20-machine IR-1 cascade, the 10-machine IR-2 cascade and the single IR-1, IR-2 and IR-3 centrifuges. The nuclear material at PFEP, as well as the cascade area, remains under Agency containment and surveillance.3 Iran has transferred a few kilograms of low enriched UF6 produced at PFEP to the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories4 at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre for research and development purposes.

5. To date, the results of the environmental samples taken at FEP and PFEP5 indicate that the plants have been operating as declared (i.e. less than 5.0% U-235 enrichment). Since March 2007, 21 unannounced inspections have been conducted at FEP.

6. On 12 January 2009, Iran provided updated Design Information Questionnaires (DIQs) for FEP and PFEP. Iran informed the Agency in the DIQ for FEP that it plans to include a room for functional testing of single centrifuge machines. There were no other changes in the capacity of the facilities or of their schedules for operation.

B. Reprocessing Activities

7. The Agency has continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility. There have been no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities. While Iran has stated that there have been no reprocessing related R&D activities in Iran, the Agency can confirm this only with respect to these two facilities, as the measures of the Additional Protocol are not available.

C. Heavy Water Reactor Related Projects

8. The Agency last visited the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) in August 2008 (GOV/2008/59, para. 9). On 21 January 2009, the Agency again requested access to carry out a DIV at the IR-40. In a letter dated 26 January 2009 referring to previous communications concerning the submission of design information, Iran informed the Agency that it would not permit the Agency to carry out the DIV. In a reply dated 29 January 2009, the Agency reiterated its request for access to
carry out the DIV. In its response, dated 7 February 2009, Iran reiterated its view that since IR-40 was not in a situation to receive nuclear material, no DIQ was required, and, hence, the request for access to perform DIV was not justified. Iran requested that, as long as the decision stipulated in Iran’s letter of 29 March 2007 was valid,6 no DIV for IR-40 be scheduled.

9. Iran’s refusal to grant the Agency access to IR-40 could adversely impact the Agency’s ability to carry out effective safeguards at that facility, and has made it difficult for the Agency to report further on the construction of the reactor, as requested by the Security Council. In addition to the roofing having already been completed for the other buildings on the site, construction of the reactor building’s domed containment structure has also been completed, as observed in images taken on 30 December 2008, rendering impossible the continued use of satellite imagery to monitor further construction inside the reactor building or any of the other buildings.

10. On 7 February 2009, the Agency conducted an inspection at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant, at which time it was noted that the process line for the production of natural uranium pellets for the heavy water reactor fuel had been completed and fuel rods were being produced.

11. Using satellite imagery, the Agency has continued to monitor the status of the Heavy Water Production Plant, which appears to be in operational condition.

D. Other Implementation Issues

D.1. Uranium Conversion

12. As of 9 February 2009, approximately 42 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF6 had been produced at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) since 8 March 2008, the date of the last PIV carried out by the Agency at UCF. This brings the total amount of uranium in the form of UF6 produced at UCF since March 2004 to 357 tonnes, some of which was transferred to FEP and PFEP, and all of which remains under Agency containment and surveillance.

D.2. Design Information

13. As previously reported to the Board of Governors, the Agency has still not received preliminary design information, requested by the Agency in December 2007, on the nuclear power plant that is to be built in Darkhovin (GOV/2008/38, para. 11).

D.3. Other Matters

14. A PIV was carried out at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) on 13–14 December 2008. The fuel assemblies imported from the Russian Federation for use at BNPP remain under Agency seal. Iran has informed the Agency that the loading of fuel into the reactor is scheduled to take place during the second quarter of 2009.

E. Possible Military Dimensions

15. As detailed in the Director General’s previous reports to the Board (most recently in GOV/2008/59, para. 15), there remain a number of outstanding issues which give rise to concerns, and which need to be clarified, to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. As indicated in those reports, for the Agency to be able to address these concerns and make progress in its efforts to provide assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and
activities in Iran, it is essential that Iran, inter alia, provide the information and access requested by the Agency.

16. In a letter to Iran dated 2 February 2008, the Agency reiterated its request to meet with Iranian authorities, in Tehran, at the earliest possible opportunity, with a view to proceeding with the resolution of the issues that remain outstanding.

17. The Agency has still not received a positive reply from Iran in connection with the Agency’s requests and, therefore, has not had access to relevant information, documentation, locations or individuals.

F. Summary

18. The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. However, Iran has not implemented the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1, on the early provision of design information and has continued to refuse to permit the Agency to carry out design information verification at IR-40.

19. Contrary to the request of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not implemented the Additional Protocol, which is a prerequisite for the Agency to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Nor has it agreed to the Agency’s request that Iran provide, as a transparency measure, access to additional locations related, inter alia, to the manufacturing of centrifuges, R&D on uranium enrichment, and uranium mining and milling, as also required by the Security Council.

20. Regrettably, as a result of the continued lack of cooperation by Iran in connection with the remaining issues which give rise to concerns about possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme, the Agency has not made any substantive progress on these issues. As indicated in previous reports of the Director General, for the Agency to make such progress, Iran needs to provide substantive information, and access to relevant documentation, locations and individuals, in connection with all of the outstanding issues. With respect to the alleged studies in particular, an important first step is for Iran to clarify the extent to which information contained in the documentation which Iran was shown, and given the opportunity to study, is factually correct and where, in its view, such information may have been modified or relates to non-nuclear purposes.

21. Unless Iran implements the above transparency measures and the Additional Protocol, as required by the Security Council, the Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. The Director General continues to urge Iran to implement all measures required to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme at the earliest possible date. The Director General, at the same time, urges Member States which have provided such documentation to the Agency to agree to the Agency’s providing copies thereof to Iran.

22. Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related
activities or its work on heavy water-related projects, including the construction of the heavy water
moderated research reactor, IR-40, and the production of fuel for that reactor.

23. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
--

NOTES

1 For more detail on the configuration of FEP, see GOV/2008/38, para. 2.

2 On 1 February 2009, 3936 centrifuges were being fed with UF6; 1476 centrifuges were installed and under vacuum, and an
additional 125 centrifuges were installed but not under vacuum.

3 In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material at the facility, e.g. some waste and samples, are
not under containment and surveillance.

4 GOV/2003/40, paras 7 and 18; GOV/2004/83, paras 14 and 73–74.

5 Results are available for samples taken up to 22 November 2008 for FEP and up to 20 April 2008 for PFEP. These results
have shown particles of low enriched uranium (with up to 4.2% U-235), natural uranium and depleted uranium (down to
0.4% U-235 enrichment).

6 GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14; GOV/2007/48, para. 19.

Engagement with Iran? An Additional View of Professor Gary Sick's Analysis

On Tuesday, we published Chris Emery's summary of last week's talk in London by Professor Gary Sick on Iran and the state of US-Iranian relations. A reader who was also at the talk has offered these additional observations:

Chris Emery has written up some excellent notes on Professor Sick's analysis, so I won't re-hash though them all. I think that the one article covering the talk, Bronwen Maddox in The Times of London, missed the point a little bit. She went for the sensational headline grabber, "Why an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities is not an option", rather than writing about the larger picture which Sick examined. These include the re-definitions of Israeli/Arab/Iranian roles and their positions in the Middle East due to the redistributions of power in the last eight years. I also think it's a bit too early to render a judgement of whether Sick is as off the spectrum with the Obama Administration as Maddox makes out.

Sick seemed to be almost exactly replicating Trita Parsi's power-cycle competition thesis on the threat and rivalry reassessment, developed for 1990-92, to the current era- which in a nerdy way is pretty fascinating. I might be looking into this a bit too much but I have noticed an increase in the material overplaying the threat depiction of Iran to Israel, echoing the very aggressive posture of Israel's Shimon Peres in 1992. - http://jcpa.org/text/ahmadinejad2-words.pdf See, for example, Joshua Teitelbaum in the Hoover Digest on "What Iranian Leaders Really Say About Doing Away with Israel", Jeremy Issacharoff's recent piece in the Washington Times,  anda bunch more.

Sick kept repeating the need to reassure the Arab states (particularly Saudi Arabia/Egypt) and Israel that if there was a rapprochement towards Iran, they would not be left with a role deficit and/or isolated in the region. And I liked the point about U.S.-Iranian relations not being a foreign policy problem but a domestic problem.

Sick urged the US to hold back the full negotiation efforts with Iran until after the election, and let the "engagement" debate develop organically in Iran throughout the election campaign. I think the last thing [former President Mohammad] Khatami needs is to be considered America's candidate in the race. Although Sick didn't go into details about the Iranian election, it will be interesting if it ends up being a two-way race between Khatami and Ahmadinejad. The Iranian electorate will be faced with a choice based on two very divergent policy differences and governing styles, and it will then be the first really contested election in Iran's post-revolutionary period in which people will be choosing between two candidates with not only divergent ideas but also divergent records.

Sick urged the Obama Admininstration not to repeat the mistakes of Bush in having an incoherent policy towards Iran; however, I think "mixed signals" has been a perpetual theme of America's Iranian policy for the last thirty years. I would have liked to hear more about what should be on the agenda for U.S.-Iran talks.