The Latest from Iran (1 December): A Week of Expectation

2115 GMT: Hacking the State Media. HomyLafayette has the story of today's cyber-attack on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting:

At least a dozen web sites connected to the Islamic regime's radio and television broadcasters were hacked early this morning in an orchestrated operation. The attacked web sites include Radio Javan, Radio Payam, Radio Varzesh, Radio Tehran, Radio Qoran, the literary section of the state radio-television's web site, and the Jomeh Irani (NB Iranian Friday) program.

The hackers, calling themselves Y! Underground, substituted the homepages of the attacked web sites with the above image. The Farsi text reads, 'We will stand until the end.' The title of the pages became 'Defaced by Y! Underground.' Most of the web sites were quickly closed down by their technical staff....

Astonishingly, the literary section of IRIB's web site continues to show the image placed on it by the hackers.

2100 GMT: Ahh, This is Why Mahmoud's Upset. Full credit to Reuters for getting the possible story behind the Ahmadinejad warning to Russia tonight (see 2040 GMT). A "senior Russian diplomatic source" has said, "If there is a consensus on Iran sanctions, we will not stand aside."

This appears to be a continued Russian balancing act rather than a shift behind US-led sanctions. "Consensus" may mean that Russia will accept the measures only if China also is willing. And the source cautioned that economic punishment was a longer-term prospect: "We will be thinking about sanctions but this is not an issue of the next few hours or weeks. We would rather have Iran cooperating more openly and consistently with the IAEA and showing clear steps to lift concerns -- which are gaining greater foundation -- than introducing sanctions against Iran."

2040 GMT: More on Ahmadinejad's Defiance. If nothing else, these lines from the President's televised interview are attention-grabbing: ""[Western countries] need us more than we need them. It is psychological warfare and isolating Iran is impossible. Any finger which is about to pull the trigger will be cut off."

More significant may be Ahmadinejad's warning to Moscow to come back into line --- no sanctions, renewed co-operation --- with Tehran, as he criticised the Russian vote on the IAEA resolution criticising Iran's nuclear programme: "Russia made a mistake. It does not have an accurate analysis of today's world situation."

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1940 GMT: The Ahmadinejad Speech. After a 24-hour postponement, the President appeared on national television this evening. He offered, in the words of one viewer, "a geography lesson" for his tour of Latin America, comparing Iran favourably to its partners in Venezuela and Brazil.

Then, in the passage that Western media will pick up, Ahmadinejad declared, "Iran's nuclear issue has been resolved....We will hold no talks (with major powers) over this issue. There is no need for talks." He said that Tehran might allow inspectors to some sites or to none at all.

1715 GMT: And Today's Propaganda Warning. Islamic Republic News Agency, besides waving a finger at Hashemi Rafsanjani (1700 GMT) also gives a threatening push to Mir Hossein Mousavi. IRNA uses an interview with a Hojatoleslam to warn Mousavi that, if he keeps helping the enemies of Islam, he might suffer the fate of Abolhassan, Banisadr, the first President of the Islamic Republic who is now in exile in France.

1700 GMT: The Battle over Rafsanjani. Despite the explicit warning of Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani to back off, member of Parliament Ali Reza Zakani has maintained his assault on the family of former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, declaring that Rafsanjani's son Mehdi Hashemi is still the subject of a criminal investigation.

1645 GMT: It's not only EA readers who have debating which way forward for the Iranian opposition. Grand Ayatollah Montazeri has replied to four questions about the Green movement.

1630 GMT: The Prison Doctor's Death. A twist in the case of Ramin Pourandarjan, the doctor at Kahrizak Prison who died in November. After claims by authorities that Pouranjdarjan committed suicide or was the victim of a heart attack, Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi now says that the doctor died of poisoning. Only two weeks ago Doulatabadi's office said Pourandarjan had not been poisoned.

1335 GMT: The Potential Significance of the British Sailor Story. Mr Smith cuts through the stories (see 1155 GMT) to get to the possible importance of the detention of the five British sailors:

As I suspected, the sailors were indeed taken by the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps. Guess they want to boast their prowess in the Persian Gulf and warn about they will do inside or outside Iranian territorial waters in case of nuclear strike or even tougher sanctions.

That may be only the start of the matter, however. The IRGC could also use this case to flex their muscle against internal challengers. Conversely, other key figures, including President Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader, may have to consider their manoeuvres versus the Revolutionary Guard.

Which is not dissimilar to the "British sailor" incident of two years ago, when 15 of Her Majesty's finest ---military in this case --- were detained. That ended, of course, with the release of the 15, an accomplishment for which Ahmadinejad took credit (although Ali Larijani was a central figure in the negotiations).

Two years on, and in a very different political context, will the IRGC again step back?

1145 GMT: Another Distraction. Looks like the international press will also be mesmerised by the story of the five British (civilian) sailors who have been detained after straying into Iranian waters. The standard line taken by Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, chief of staff to President Ahmadinejad, "The judiciary will decide about the five ... naturally our measures will be hard and serious if we find out they had evil intentions," is racing across "Western" newspapers as an ominous sign.

The distraction extends to some rather fatuous speculation, as in this from The Guardian of London, "If the sailors arrested in the Persian Gulf are being punished for being British, Tehran's fear of the BBC could be a factor".

1015 GMT: Playing Down The Bluff. Less than 48 hours after shaking its fist with the "10 enrichment plants" declaration, the Iranian Government is edging away. Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast said this morning that there's not much to see here: If we do not get guarantees (for the delivery of the fuel), naturally we will have plans to move towards self-sufficiency. This is nothing unusual. Officials of some countries have rushed into adopting stances which may be indicative of the fact that they are concerned or angry." (CNN, incidentally, misses the story completely, distorting a general Mehmanparast statement ---"We will not do away with our rights" --- into "Iranian Legal Threat over Nuclear Plans.")

Meanwhile, something for the US to think about if it wants to push confrontation: a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman drew the line against further sanctions, "We should properly resolve this issue through dialogue. All parties should step up diplomatic efforts."

0715 GMT: Better Late than Never. The Associated Press has caught up with the politics of Iran's "10 enrichment plants" declaration, headlining, "Iran Nuke Plans Largely Bluster, Experts Say".

0710 GMT: Iran Contest of the Day. If the Supreme Leader's life was commemorated by Hollywood (see 0655 GMT), what would the title be?

0655 GMT: International news will be dominated today by President Obama's speech on US policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Indeed, it will be interesting to see if there is a breathing space for the Administration on its next steps towards Iran, as everyone in Washington --- including Congressmen and activists pressing for a cut-off of  talks and tougher sanctions --- switch their attention to the Af-Pak political and military corridor.

Which, of course, does not mean that life stops in Iran. Amidst the debate about the state of the Green Movement and its goals, the plans for the demonstrations on 16 Azar are taking shape. Revised routes have now been posted. Here, for example, are the paths of protests in Tehran:

1. Azadi Square - Revolution Square - Tehran University


2. Hafte-Tir Square - St., Karim Khan - Asr Square - Keshavarz Blvd - Street workers - Tehran University


3. Tehran University dormitory complex - North Kargar Ave - Tehran University


4. Amir Kabir University - Cross-Asr - Tehran University


5. Ferdowsi Square - Street Revolution - Tehran University.

There are notes of activities at universities, and you can even follow a second-by-second countdown clock.

Meanwhile, the Supreme Leader took on another enemy on Monday. He stared down "Hollywood" in a meeting with with artists and directors of the Iranian television series "Hazrat Yousuf," a story from the Koran. The challenge to "Western" film was another setpiece in Ayatollah Khamenei's campaign for cultural purity from the arts to the universities to the seminaries.

46 Years Before Obama's Afghanistan (Video): Kennedy and Vietnam

Just a bit of historical reflection, which may or may not be connected with events of today. I suspect a lot of readers and viewers will be familiar with the first of these interviews, in which President John F. Kennedy declared about the conflict in South Vietnam, "In the final analysis, it is their war."

Afghanistan-Pakistan: 5 Things Obama Will Say Tonight (and The One He Won’t)
Afghanistan: The Hole in Obama’s Plan (Is There Any “There” There?)

I doubt many are familiar with the follow-up, however. A week later, President Kennedy made clear to another interviewer:

What I am concerned about is that Americans will get impatient and say, because they don't like events in Southeast Asia or they don't like the Government in Saigon, that we should withdraw. That only makes it easy for the Communists. I think we should stay.

We should use our influence in as effective a way as we can, but we should not withdraw.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uG7jjF6xuKM[/youtube]

2 SEPTEMBER 1963: PRESIDENT KENNEDY WITH WALTER CRONKITE OF CBS

MR. CRONKITE. Mr. President, the only hot war we've got running at the moment is of course the one in Viet-Nam, and we have our difficulties here, quite obviously.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY. I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the Government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it—the people of Viet-Nam—against the Communists. We are prepared to continue to assist them, but I don't think that the war can be won unless the people support the effort, and, in my opinion, in the last 2 months the Government has gotten out of touch with the people.

The repressions against the Buddhists, we felt, were very unwise. Now all we can do is to make it very clear that we don't think this is the way to win. It is my hope that this will become increasingly obvious to the Government, that they will take steps to try to bring back popular support for this very essential struggle.

MR. CRONKITE. Do you think this Government has time to regain the support of the people?

PRESIDENT KENNEDY. I do. With changes in policy and perhaps with personnel, I think it can. If it doesn't make those changes, I would think that the chances of winning it would not be very good.

MR. CRONKITE. Hasn't every indication from Saigon been that President Diem has no intention of changing his pattern?

PRESIDENT KENNEDY. If he does not change it, of course, that is his decision. He has been there 10 years, and, as I say, he has carried this burden when he has been counted out on a number of occasions.

Our best judgment is that he can't be successful on this basis. We hope that he comes to see that; but in the final analysis it is the people end the Government itself who have to win or lose this struggle. All he can do is help, and we are making it very clear. But I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake. That would be a great mistake. I know people don't like Americans to be engaged in this kind of an effort. Forty-seven Americans have been killed in combat with the enemy, but this is a very important struggle even though it is far away.

We took all this—made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure. We also have to participate—we may not like it—in the defense of Asia.

* * * * * * *

9 SEPTEMBER 1963: PRESIDENT KENNEDY WITH CHET HUNTLEY OF NBC NEWS

MR. HUNTLEY. Mr. President, in respect to our difficulties in South Viet-Nam, could it be that our Government tends occasionally to get locked into a policy or an attitude and then finds it difficult to alter or shift that policy ?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, that is true. I think in the case of South Viet Nam we have been dealing with a Government which is in control, has been in control for 10 years. In addition, we have felt for the last 2 years that the struggle against the Communists was going better. Since June, however—the difficulties with the Buddhists—we have been concerned about a deterioration, particularly in the Saigon area, which hasn't been felt greatly in the outlying areas but may spread. So we are faced with the problem of wanting to protect the area against the Communists. On the other hand, we have to deal with the Government there. That produces a kind of ambivalence in our efforts which exposes us to some criticism. We are using our influence to persuade the Government there to take those steps which will win back support. That takes some time, and we must be patient, we must persist.

Mr. HUNTLEY. Are we likely to reduce our aid to South Viet-Nam now?

The PRESIDENT. I don't think we think that would be helpful at this time. If you reduce your aid, it is possible you could have some effect upon the government structure there. On the other hand, you might have a situation which could bring about a collapse. Strongly in our mind is what happened in the case of China at the end of World War II, where China was lost—a weak government became increasingly unable to control events. We don't want that.

Mr. BRINKLEY. Mr. President, have You had any reason to doubt this so-called "domino theory," that if South Viet-Nam falls, the rest of Southeast Asia will go behind it ?

The PRESIDENT. No, I believe it. I believe it. I think that the struggle is close enough. China is so large, looms so high just beyond the frontiers, that if South Viet-Nam went, it would not only give them an improved geographic position for a guerrilla assault on Malaya but would also Live the impression that the wave of the future in Southeast Asia was China and the Communists. So I believe it.

Mr. BRINKLEY. In the last 48 hours there have been a great many conflicting reports from there about what the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] was up to. Can you give us any enlightenment on it?

The PRESIDENT. No.

Mr. HUNTLEY. Does the CIA tend to make its own policy ? That seems to be the debate here.

The PRESIDENT. No, that is the frequent charge, but that isn't so. Mr. [John A.] McCone, head of the CIA, sits in the National Security Council. We have had a number of meetings in the past few days about events in South Viet-Nam. Mr. McCone participated in every one, and the CIA coordinates its efforts with the State Department and the Defense Department.

Mr. BRINKLEY. With so much of our prestige, money, so on, committed in South Viet-Nam, why can't we exercise a little more influence there, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT. We have some influence. We have some influence and we are attempting to carry it out. I think we don't—we can't expect these countries to do everything the way we want to do them" They have their own interest, their own personalities, their own tradition. We can't make everyone in our image, and there are a good many people who don't want to go in our image. In addition, we have ancient struggles between countries. In the case of India and Pakistan, we wound like to have them settle Kashmir. That is our view of the best way to defend the subcontinent against communism. But that struggle between India and Pakistan is more important to a good many people in that area than the struggle against the Communists. We would like to have Cambodia, Thailand, and South Viet-Nam all in harmony, but there are ancient differences there. We can't make the world over, but we can influence the world. The fact of the matter is that with the assistance of the United States and SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization], Southeast Asia and indeed all of Asia has been maintained independent against a powerful forces the Chinese Communists. What I am concerned about is that Americans will get impatient and say, because they don't like events in Southeast Asia or they don't like the Government in Saigon, that we should withdraw. That only makes it easy for the Communists. I think we should stay.

We should use our influence in as effective a way as we can, but we should not withdraw.

Afghanistan-Pakistan: 5 Things Obama Will Say Tonight (and The One He Won't)

I'm not sure we had to wait 92 days --- from the delivery of the recommendations of General Stanley McChrystal, the US commander in Afghanistan, to President Obama's speech tonight at the US Military Academy --- to get this outcome. It's pretty much, in substance and in rhetoric, what we've predicted throughout the autumn. But politics is politics, especially when the "easy" solution of an Afghan election to hold up as a beacon of progress didn't materialise.

So here's what America and the world gets this evening:

46 Years Before Obama’s Afghanistan (Video): Kennedy and Vietnam
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1. SEND IN THE TROOPS: McChrystal asked for 40,000 more troops (though he wanted even more). He gets 30,000.

Obama will frame this as a carefully-considered compromise. He shows Presidential strength 1) in not simply giving the military its full demands and 2) delivering most of that demand as a sign of US resolve and commitment. The President carried out the same manoeuvre --- really, the very same manoeuvre --- in March.

In fact, this is effectively an adoption of McChrystal's proposal, albeit through a bit of staging. Obama will also declare that NATO is going to put in 6000 more forces. Though this is more for show than substance --- think of Britain's total of 500 additional troops --- it gets the number close to 40,000, and I suspect there will be some US "support forces" that will make their way into the package.

2. SOFT POWER, SOFT POWER, SOFT POWER: Obama will then need to skip quickly past the troop numbers, because there are a lot of folks (and not just on the "left" of the Democratic Party) who are not happy about escalation. So he will dedicate a long section of his speech to the US civilians who will be working in important sectors from agriculture to education to health care to assist Afghanistan's development.

Obama will be careful not to give numbers because someone might check the back story. Yes, this was also in the March speech, and since then, the US has only been able to get several hundred people into the field.

3. MR KARZAI, DO YOUR JOB: Obama will emphasise that the US additional effort must be matched by a sustained effort by the Afghanistan Government to cleanse itself of corruption as it takes over responsibility for security and other operations. He will say that the the US is a dedicated partner but that Kabul must be just as dedicated.

The sleight-of-hand here will be that this is a new theme in American policy. It's not: Obama made the same demands on Kabul in March, and they were repeated by his officials, notably Secretary of State Clinton, throughout the spring. But, of course, the summer was filled with stories of money going astray, political intrigue, and the failure at the show of democracy.

So this will be a "Political Ground Zero" moment: all starts anew.

4. YOU TOO, PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT (AND YOU KNOW WHO YOU ARE). The political shift behind this speech, although it will not get a direct reference, is that Washington thinks it's on firmer ground with the Government in Islamabad. This is because President Zardari, after months of US effort, has effectively been pushed aside. The US wants to deal with Prime Minister Gillani and the Pakistani military, and it seems that the alliance is developing.

With this apparent political evolution, Obama will lay down the challenge for Pakistan to keep moving against the "Taliban", as it has appeared to down with summer offensives. He may even make direct reference to the Bin Laden spectre, suggesting that Pakistani forces can complete a job that was botched in 2001.

No reference, by the way, to the US drone and missile attacks: those might be effective in Washington's eyes, but it gives the appearance that Washington's military is running Pakistan's war.

5. EXTREMIST, EXTREMIST (WHO'S AN EXTREMIST?). Lots of that word in Obama's speech tonight. It's how you sell an escalation when the political and military situation is far from clear and far from winnable. So Al Qa'eda will pop up all over the rhetorical map this evening, even though it's not much of a presence in Afghanistan.

Obama's trick will be to move from Pakistan, where there are the Al Q bad guys, to the sanctuary/haven/breeding ground for extremism in Afghanistan. And there I think even his skills will be challenged: who exactly is the US fighting in the country? The word "Taliban" is the catch-all for a variety of insurgent groups: does Obama dare say that the US strategy is to split off some of those groups by negotiating with "extremists"?

WHAT HE WON'T SAY:

"We're screwed."

Sorry. No deep analysis here. Just being blunt. Even before Enduring Americawe were writing on "Watching America" on the Libertas website that the problem for Washington was the lack of a political centre to its efforts. The "hole in the doughnut" was the weakness of President Zardari and the shakiness of an Afghan Government whose authority didn't extend much beyond Kabul.

While the hole may have been filled in Pakistan, Obama is still trying to cover it with distractions in Afghanistan. If he was being real, he would declare to the US public that President Karzai might be on difficult ground in his own country but he has out-manoeuvred Washington in the last few months to assure power in Kabul, if not beyond. Those deals have kept Karzai in power, but they of course are not the battle against the "extremists".

The great and glorious myth of the American "surge" in Iraq is that throwing in more boots on the ground suddenly rescued a country from civil war. What that myth never acknowledges is that the most important political development was of a stronger central government emerging in Baghdad in 2007/8. So the US Government could bolster, with money as well as discussions, "local" Sunni militias and groups against "Al Qa'eda". All of this might be building later conflict --- what happens when those local groups and the national government compete for authority and profits? --- but by then US forces hopefully would have been able to draw down and call it victory.

No such scenario exists in Afghanistan. There is no "Al Qa'eda" spectre that can be used for the US strategy with local groups --- the contest is between an assortment of indigenous factions. There is no strong national authority.

So Washington either puts forth or supports a wondrous solution in which those factions reach an accommodation over power, one which hopefully means they won't kill each other and anyone who gets in the way (that is the option put forward by Karzai and by the Pakistani Government, though it is not clear how they would achieve this), or the US Government treads military and political water and hopes they don't get sucked down if the undertow of violence gets stronger.

I don't think the Obama Administration has a way forward on the first option, which is why the President after 92 days has finally decided to put on the public face of more troops and a largely-mythical non-military effort. Welcome then ---- over months and over years --- to the second option.

Just don't say: we're screwed.

Afghanistan: The Hole in Obama's Plan (Is There Any "There" There?)

Earlier this morning, I posted an analysis of President Obama's proposed US policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, to be unveiled tonight in a speech at the US Military Academy. My overriding conclusion? "The 'hole in the doughnut'...[is] the shakiness of an Afghan Government whose authority doesn’t extend much beyond Kabul."

Moments later, I read this from Juan Cole:

Obama Partnering with Afghan Government: But is there any there there?

President Barack Obama's commitment to "finish the job" in Afghanistan by sending 55,000 US troops to that country (counting the 21,000 he dispatched last winter shortly after being inaugurated) depends heavily on a hope of building up an Afghan government and army over to which the US can eventually turn control. But one of the questions we seldom hear any detail about concerns the country's governmental capacity. Does the government function? Can it deliver services?

Afghanistan-Pakistan: 5 Things Obama Will Say Tonight (and The One He Won’t)
46 Years Before Obama’s Afghanistan (Video): Kennedy and Vietnam

As might be expected, governmental capacity is low, but here are some specifics. Months after the controversial presidential election that many Afghans consider stolen, there is no cabinet, and parliament is threatening to go on recess before confirming a new one because the president is unconstitutionally late in presenting the names. Almost no one bothers to attend the parliamentary sessions. The cabinet ministries are unable to spend the money allocated to them on things like education and rural development, and actually spent less in absolute terms last year than they did in the previous two years. Only half of the development projects for which money was allotted were even begun last year, and none was completed.

In other words, we can say of the Afghanistan government what Gertrude Stein said of her inability in later life to find her childhood home in Oakland, California: "There is no there there."

President Hamid Karzai pleaded with the lower house of parliament on Monday to delay its winter recess by one week so that he can present his final cabinet nominees for confirmation, according to Pajhwok. Speaker of the House Yunus Qanuni sniffed that the parliament was responsible for setting its own recess, implying that he would not be strong-armed by the president. (Qanuni is a Tajik formerly a leader of the Northern Alliance, and has long been a rival of Karzai, running against him in 2004; he was a counselor to Abdullah Abdullah, Karzai's main rival in the August 20 presidential election.)

But Qanuni seems to have been one of the few members of parliament who cared one way or another. Nader Khan Katawazai, an MP from Paktika, complained that only 30 of the 238 MPs attended Monday's session. This is the government we are being asked to prop up with blood and treasure? Only 30 legislators bothered to come in to work?

By law, Karzai was supposed to have presented his cabinet to parliament within two weeks of being sworn in (which was two weeks ago). Since he has been insisting he was the winner since early September, he should have had time to put together a cabinet. But he presumably had to make some substitutions once he admitted that three of his current cabinet members were under investigation for corruption. (12 other former cabinet members, having fled the country, were also being looked at for criminal prosecution.

That is the government that the US has been propping up for the last 8 years. 15 cabinet members that Interpol is looking into?

Even the non-corrupt ministers may not be confirmed by the parliament because of substantial dissatisfaction with the inability of many of them to spend the development money their ministries had in the kitty.

Seven ministries spent only 40% of their allocated budget in the past year, according to Pajhwok News. And, the sums expended on development projects declined 10% last year from the two previous years!

Let's repeat that. The Afghanistan government presides over the fifth poorest country in the world. It has millions of dollars in aid to spend for the betterment of its constituents. But it actually managed to spend less on these tasks this year than in previous years, despite having more money.

The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development expended 10 billion Afghanis from its allocation of 22 billion Afghanis;

The Public Works Ministry spent 6 billion of 18 billion Afghanis;

The Water and Energy Ministry 9 billion of 17.6 billion Afghanis;

The Education Ministry 3 billion Afg of 8 billion Afghanis;

The Public Health Ministry: 2.3 billion out of 5.5 billion Afghanis;

The Finance Ministry spent 3.5 billion out of 5.5 billion Afghanis;

The Agriculture Ministry spent 1.5 billion out of three billion Afghanis.

The chairman of the National Economy Commission, Siddiq Ahmad Usmani, continued that 500 development projects were supposed to have been pursued last year with the 111 bn. Afgh. budget allotment, but in fact, "But work on only 263 of 500 was carried out which are yet to be completed,"

The low governmental capacity of the Afghan state bodes ill indeed for Obama's success in Afghanistan. He will be constantly looking for a reliable partner. He will find shifting quicksand.

Meanwhile, the Taliban, whom no one is accusing of apathy or inefficiency, have begun deploying donkey suicide bombs against foreign troops.