The Latest from Iran (2 December): Postures and a Resolution

1140 GMT: Checking in briefly from Holland, I find that economist and journalist Saeed Laylaz has been given a nine-year prison sentence, according to his lawyer. Reports yesterday indicated that Laylaz might receive a 15-year sentence.

The Latest from Iran (1 December): A Week of Expectation 

0600 GMT: First, the resolution. Iranian state radio are reporting that the five British sailors, detained last week on a racing yacht that strayed into Iranian waters, will be released. So quiet diplomacy seems to have trumped any thoughts that an Iranian faction --- let's say, the Revolutionary Guard --- might have had of using the incident to assert authority.

Then again, the Revolutionary Guard may have made its point, both to Britain and to others in the regime. It can flex both military and political muscle with its "defense" of Iran's borders by land or by sea and, for at least several days, set the rules of the game.

Rules that even the President might have to heed: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seems to be off on one of his I'm a World Leader, All Else Melts into Air mental journeys. His speech last night was a holiday snapshot of his Latin American tour, followed by more posturing against the "West". The "10 enrichment plants" stunt seems to have been given up, so now it's maybe we let inspectors in, maybe we don't. (Which, if you ask me, is tempting fate --- just ponder the case of a Mr S. Hussein)

That may work on the domestic front politically. Rather than directly address the challenges of an Ali Larijani, global evasion may signal that Ahmadinejad is too big for the trifles of Parliamentary Speakers. Still, the economy lurks, and it is there that the President may have to go hand-to-hand with the Majlis over his proposals.

And, beyond that, can Ahmadinejad strike the pose that the opposition beyond does not really exist, as Iran unites behind its world-leading position and nuclear sovereignty? I have the impression that he thinks he can.

Which is a convenient link to the calendar note: five days to 16 Azar.

A Gut Reaction to Obama's Afghanistan-Pakistan Speech: The Halfway House of The Long War (Part 1)

The second part of "A Gut Reaction", covering the Obama policy in Pakistan, will appear on Saturday.

This was a terrible speech. More importantly, it may come to mark a terrible moment in the Obama Presidency. Most importantly, it may come to mark --- in months and years to follow --- a terrible moment in American foreign policy.

The speech is not terrible in its rhetoric or delivery. It is not terrible in its declaration of lofty values. It is not even terrible --- though I think it is evasive and misleading --- in its opening five paragraphs on a past tragedy to rationalise a blank check for current decisions. It is terrible because it is void of political strategy. This speech is either a stunning exercise in being oblivious to failure or hoping against hope that failure will never be exposed.

Afghanistan Special: Josh Shahryar on the Obama Not-So-Grand Plan

I'm plumping for the latter, not just because the President does not seem the oblivious type but because the hodge-podge of measures looks to be an attempt to buy some time for either political fortune or divine intervention to save the day.

So, as we thought yesterday, the number of 30,000 troops is put forward primarily as a domestic political compromise, rather than as the culmination of a military strategy for the campaign against the Afghan insurgency. The US commanders get most of their request, which gives Obama some insulation (but only some, as there are a lot of critics inside and outside the military who want even more of a troops-first approach) against domestic sniping.

So Obama put in, albeit almost as an afterthought to the troop announcement, put in a brief section on non-military measures. For there are those in the US, let alone abroad, who might think that more than a stick is required for stability. And this President is at pains to make clear that Afghanistan 2009 is not another Iraq 2003-2007. (We'll save Obama's Afghanistan 2009 is not Vietnam 1967 for the moment

But, for his domestic audience, Afghanistan 2009 can be Iraq 2007-2009. So, after patting himself on the back for the "responsible" policy in the latter which lays the foundation for a US withdrawal, Obama promised that his soon-to-be-apparent Afghan success would mean the first American troops could leave in July 2011.

It's a neat trick. You like the "surge" myth? Well, you've got a sequel. Not sure about the "surge" myth? Well, just go with me and we'll begin drawing this adventure to a close in 18 months.

Not that it's an easy trick, even for the sake of presentation. It's notable that, contrary to earlier leaks of 6000 additional forces from NATO countries to bolster his plan, Obama didn't cite a number last night. So far, he has only got a fig leaf of 500 more soldiers from Britain. With other allies like Canada now out of this battle, the President --- who emphasised Afghanistan-not-Vietnam because 42 countries were alongside the US --- is going to struggle to make this more than the US way, way out in front.

But let's leave such minor quibbles aside. The audacity of Obama's speech, and thus its terrible roar, was in the willful ignorance of matters closer to Kabul and indeed Islamabad.

Consider first of all the deception that underlay the speech. Five long paragraphs invoking 9-11 does not bring Osama bin Laden and his boys into Afghanistan. If Obama wants to follow the logic of his rhetoric, then the 30,000 US soldiers should be marching into Pakistan.

But that's not possible for political reasons (just as it hasn't been possible since bin Laden and Co. crossed the border in December 2001). So instead there has to be the convoluted horror story of the Taliban getting back into power in part of Afghanistan, inviting Al Qa'eda to a restored sanctuary, and posing no objections as more 9-11s are planned.

I'll leave the dissection of that nightmarish rationale to others who can explain clearly the defects of the thesis of the Taliban-Al Qa'eda "alliance".

Let's assume, however, that the fight in Helmand and Kandahar and Kunduz against Afghan insurgents is essential because of non-Afghan fighters across the border. For granting that assumption exposes the halfway house of Obama's solution: there is no political strategy to match his military escalation.

If the President picked up on anything between his initial escalation in March and last night, it should have been that he has no stable base
in Kabul. Eight months ago, he told the American public and the world that, in addition to the more than 30,000 forces being put into the country, the US would ensure that its Afghan partner focused on development, that it would not be mired in corruption, that it would make progress on security. Have a look between the lines of Obama's address yesterday --- General McChrystal saying that the security situation had worsened, the passing Presidential reference to "corruption" and the Afghan election --- and ask, "What did the March escalation achieve?"

The primary objective of the Karzai Government is to remain in power. If reducing corruption and fighting a battle to the death with the Taliban offered the maintenance of that power, then perhaps the Obama strategy would have a partner. If the US had some meaningful lever of pressure --- the threat of a political alternative? even a coup? --- against Karzai, then perhaps the Obama strategy would have a partner.

But we've been there and done that. Karzai and his circle have maintained power by cutting deals, whether you want to call that "corruption", and accepting that it cannot take on the insurgency throughout Afghanistan in a direct conflict. The Obama Administration considered taking Karzai out in its first three months and found that it had no good options to do so, either through the ballot box or beyond it.

Perhaps, and it is a big perhaps, the Obama Administration can get a convergence of interests with the Afghanistan Government through a political deal beyond Kabul. That's the meaning of Obama's briefly outstretched hand to "Taliban" members who will leave the movement. But the deal in question would have to be much more than that; in short, it would have to accept the Taliban and other insurgent groups as political actors in exchange for a renunciation of violence. And even if it is true that the CIA is broaching such a possibility, and that it is backed by the White House, this is a political negotiation that is far beyond Obama's extra 30,000 troops, far beyond his 9-11 rhetoric, and even beyond his conception of American power.

Israel-Palestine: European Union Steps In With Call for Peace Talks and Israeli Concessions

A draft document, to be discussed by EU foreign ministers next week, says that East Jerusalem should be the capital of a future Palestinian state compromised of Gaza and the West Bank. It also says that the EU did not recognise Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem.

The draft says that settlements, Israel's separation barrier and the demolition of Palestinian houses are "illegal under international law, constitute an obstacle to peace and threaten to make a two-state solution impossible". Israel's long-running economic blockade of Gaza was "unacceptable" under international law and "politically counterproductive."

Striking a contrasting tone, the draft states that the EU says it hopes the 10-month partial settlement freeze "will become a step towards resuming meaningful negotiations" and welcomed Israel's removal of some of its hundreds of checkpoints and obstacles in the West Bank.

Israeli officials were quick to criticise the EU. The Foreign Ministry said:

The move led by Sweden damages the ability of the European Union to take a role and be a significant factor in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.
After the important steps taken by the government of Israel to enable the resumption of negotiations with the Palestinians, the European Union must now exert pressure on the Palestinians to return to the negotiating table. Steps like those being led by Sweden only contribute to the opposite effect.

Enduring America on the Road: Talking Obama in Holland

I'll be visiting the University of Leiden today to talk to staff and students about the first year of the Obama Administration (suspect that a certain place called Afghanistan might pop up in conversation). I'll try to check in, as Mike Dunn holds everything together and keeps the peace here. Please keep latest news and ideas coming in.

Middle East Inside Line: Thomas Friedman Saves the Arab World

Sharmine Narwani, writing in The Huffington Post, takes apart Thomas Friedman's lecture to Arab peoples, "America vs. The Narrative":

Hard as I try, my mouth is fixed in an unattractive gape -- unable, it seems, to correct itself. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, in his usual clumsy attempts to suggest liberal sympathy while in fact propagating many, many Mideast myths, has caused this unfortunate disfigurement.

In his most recent column on Saturday, Friedman decided to help us understand a phenomenon sweeping the Arab and Muslim worlds, and was generous enough to coin an actual phrase to simplify this concept for the benefit of all Western civilization -- he calls it "The Narrative."

According to the New York Times columnist, "The Narrative is the cocktail of half-truths, propaganda and outright lies about America that have taken hold in the Arab-Muslim world since 9/11." Yes, he capitalizes it. Like "The Donald." Or "The Treaty of Versailles."

Kind of him to generalize this way. It would have been far more difficult for me if I actually had to think about the Arab-Muslim world as a diverse grouping representing real-life individuals from varying cultures, histories, religions, political persuasions and stages of social, political and economic development.

In his column, Friedman expands on his "The Narrative," saying these Arab-Muslims feel that "America has declared war on Islam, as part of a grand "American-Crusader-Zionist conspiracy" to keep Muslims down."

I don't suppose that our declaration of a grandiose "War on Terror" which refused to distinguish between extremist Salafi militants and legitimate resistance movements -- dubbed a "mistake" by no less a figure than British Foreign Secretary David Miliband earlier this year -- had anything to do with that perception?

Miliband wrote in the Guardian in January that the term "War on Terror" is "misleading and mistaken," and that efforts to "lump" extremists together had been counterproductive, playing "into the hands of those seeking to unify groups with little in common."

How positively Friedman-esque.

He might further note that the current Obama administration has also ceased to use such terms because they have been singularly divisive and entirely unsuccessful.

But I digress. My mandibular deformity was actually caused by Friedman's pronouncement that for at least two decades...

"U.S. foreign policy has been largely dedicated to rescuing Muslims or trying to help free them from tyranny."

Where does one begin, pray tell? Tyranny, might be a good starting point. Friedman may care to note that two of the most tyrannical governments in the Arab world -- Egypt and Saudi Arabia -- are, in fact the US's closest allies in the Arab Mideast. Egypt has been ruled with an iron fist by President Husni Mubarak for three decades, a man who hits slam-dunks every election year by garnering an eyebrow-raising 90% of the popular vote -- and whose prisons are notorious torture cells for political dissidents. The theocratic Kingdom of Saudi Arabia doesn't even try to feign democratic trappings. No elections, state-controlled media, zero tolerance for dissent -- women forbidden to drive by religious mandate.

So let's count the Egyptian and Saudi populations out from Friedman's description, because they probably don't feel like they have been "freed from tyranny." Let's instead turn our conversation to his "rescuing Muslims" scenario.

Hundreds of thousands of Arab and Muslim men, women and children ceased to exist after our onslaughts in Iraq and Afghanistan. US politicians cheered on Israeli troops as they decimated entire civilian neighborhoods in Lebanon in 2006 and in Gaza in 2009, destroyed non-military infrastructure vital to these areas and killed over a thousand innocent civilians in each place. Israel fired off one million cluster bomblets in Lebanon, most of these in the war's final three days while ceasefire agreements were being negotiated - knowing full well that 98% of victims are civilians, a third of them children. Says Friedman:

"Have no doubt: we punched a fist into the Arab/Muslim world after 9/11...primarily to destroy two tyrannical regimes -- the Taliban and the Baathists -- and to work with Afghans and Iraqis to build a different kind of politics. In the process, we did some stupid and bad things. But for every Abu Ghraib, our soldiers and diplomats perpetrated a million acts of kindness aimed at giving Arabs and Muslims a better chance to succeed with modernity and to elect their own leaders."

Forgive me, but is Friedman saying that our invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were about regime change? I foolishly thought we had sold the notion to the global community that this was about bringing Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda to justice for their role in 9-11. If this is so, Arabs and Muslims should forgive us for being liars as well.

"A million acts of kindness?" Name three.

And then Friedman posits that "most of the Muslims being killed today are being killed by jihadist suicide bombers in Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan and Indonesia..." Tell you what. Name three Americans who can read and do not know that the US government funded, groomed, armed and created the jihadists we are fighting in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq today.

"You need to tell us what it (Islam) is and show us how its positive interpretations are being promoted in your schools and mosques," Friedman urges Arabs and Muslims worldwide. Perhaps if we ceased our efforts to block the popular and balanced coverage of Al Jazeera's English channel from being broadcast on our television screens, we would get a clearer picture of the Muslim word, Tom.

Most galling, however, is Friedman's attempt to coin a phrase and insert it into our own nation's narrative. It smacks of Hasbara, a Hebrew term -- often interpreted as 'propaganda' -- used by Israel and its supporters to direct the Middle East debate and reshape public opinion abroad.

This is a matter of significant priority for the Israeli government, and it has at its disposal a veritable army of Hasbara activists in all the important international capitals and campuses. For an unusual -- meaning, available to the public -- example of Hasbara in action, one need only look to the 116-page document "The Israel Project's 2009 Global Language Dictionary" published on Newsweek's website, with talking points for Hasbara activists on everything from Iran's nuclear energy program to the Gaza War to illegal Settlements in the West Bank.

I can only imagine that Friedman wrote this column at 3 am one morning in a full-flegded Jerry McGuire moment that he will hopefully come to regret. He has no facts whatsoever to back up his assertions, and his only source for information on this supposedly widespread "The Narrative" that has infiltrated the collective Arab-Muslim brain is -- wait for it -- the claims of an anonymous "Jordanian-born counterterrorism expert."

Forgive me for saying this because I actually think well of Jordan and its resourceful citizens. But, the current Jordanian establishment, like many other Arab and Muslim elitists, is so far up the collective US, Israeli and Saudi arse, it would take major surgery to find it, let alone free it. Find some new friends, Friedman.

"Many Arab Muslims know that what ails their societies is more than the West, and that The Narrative is just an escape from looking honestly at themselves," concludes Friedman.

Tom, look honestly at yourself. Do you really think that if Arab-Muslim societies were free of external interference and able to elect their leaders in democratic elections, they would hold these alleged grievances?

I suggest that our double standards in dealing with the Middle East and our many, many failed policies there, including propping up brutal leaders to do our bidding, justifiably engenders resentment and anger, not just in the region, but globally too. You ought to have passed by Europe during Israel's Gazan military adventure earlier this year when hundreds of thousands of Europeans in all their major cities protested angrily against the IDF's killing spree. Then again, maybe we would have been forcibly subjected to another one of your columns on the Misinformed European Narrative.