Afghanistan Follow-Up: US Government v. Karzai (and the CIA) on "Corruption" (Miller/Partlow)

Yesterday we posted an article from The New York Times on the battle between the US and Kabul over whether an aide to Afghan President Hamid Karzai should face trial for corruption. We suggested it pointed "to how difficult and vicious the politics may become".

Guess what? Less than 24 hours later, we have our proof. And here's the twist: Obama Administration officials are not only sniping at Karzai. They're also ready to take down the CIA. Greg Miller and Joshua Partlow report for The Washington Post:

Afghanistan: Latest US v. Karzai Fight over Corruption (Filkins/Mazzetti)

The CIA is making secret payments to multiple members of President Hamid Karzai's administration, in part to maintain sources of information in a government in which the Afghan leader is often seen as having a limited grasp of developments, according to current and former U.S. officials.

The payments are long-standing in many cases and designed to help the agency maintain a deep roster of allies within the presidential palace. Some aides function as CIA informants, but others collect stipends under more informal arrangements meant to ensure their accessibility, a U.S. official said.

The CIA has continued the payments despite concerns that it is backing corrupt officials and undermining efforts to wean Afghans' dependence on secret sources of income and graft.

The U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said a significant number of officials in Karzai's administration are on the payroll. Paul Gimigliano, a CIA spokesman, disputed that characterization, saying, "This anonymous source appears driven by ignorance, malice or both."

A former agency official said the payments were necessary because "the head of state is not going to tell you everything" and because Karzai often seems unaware of moves that members of his own government make.

The disclosure comes as a corruption investigation into one of Karzai's senior national security advisers - and an alleged agency informant - puts new strain on the already fraying relationship between Washington and Kabul.

Read full article....

Iraq: The US Strategy for a Government (Visser)

Reidar Visser writes for historiae.org: "One cannot fail to get the impression that either US policy is grossly contradictive, or there is an unspoken underlying policy of détente with Iran in Iraq, at the expense of the governance of that country and its citizens."...

As the end of the US combat mission in Iraq is drawing to a close (31 August), there are two basic approaches to the ongoing, stalemated process of government formation in Iraq.

The first approach assumes that Iraq’s citizens are more interested in issues like security, health and services than in sectarian bickering and that it is possible to form a government based on common views on basic political issues instead of taking into consideration calculations relate to ethno-sectarian identities. Typically, this kind of government would be a “minimum-winning” one, i.e. just above the 163 mark needed to secure a parliamentary majority (and hence strong enough to pass whatever legislation it wishes to pass) but not much above that (in order to maximise the prospect for developing internal coherence and avoiding the multiplication of sinecures inside government).

Iraq Follow-Up: 64 Dead in Bombings — What is the Significance? (Cole)

This kind of government would offer the best chances of maximising the autonomy of the Iraqi government versus a hostile regional environment. It is also the approach that presents the best fit with the Iraqi constitution; by way of contrast the idea that all winning lists need to be represented or that all ethno-sectarian groups must be included in government has no constitutional basis as such.

The second, opposite approach, is focused on armistice rather than governance. It presupposes that no proper, issue-based government in Iraq is possible due to assumed insurmountable ethnic and religious tensions, and that the aim should therefore be to make sure as many players as possible are “inside the tent” where they would be less likely to create trouble. These ideas do not come from the constitution; rather they are inspired by Western models of “consociational” democracy and power-sharing and point in the direction of an oversized cabinet with a weak prime minister. It is therefore important to point out that the case of Iraq fits badly with the standard criteria cited by theoreticians of consociational democracy as prerequisites for success – including a relatively low case-load on the political system, a public willingness to accept backroom politics (or the existence of alternative means of expressing the popular will when government becomes invisible, such as frequent referendums), and not least internal coherence in the sub-communities included in government through a formula of power-sharing. Typically in the Iraqi case it would be vitally important that the Sadrists be represented if this kind of “armistice” approach is followed, since the whole idea is to make a compact between what is believed to be the “main tribes” of the community instead of transcending tribal and ethnic loyalties altogether (as in the governance-focused approach). Needless to say, this kind of government is unlikely to develop any internal coherence and will often experience paralysis. It will, in other words, easily fall prey to the schemes of regional powers.

After some initial confusion as far as Washinghton’s preferences are concerned (first it seemed there was a desire to see all four big winners included in an “armistice government”, then some suggested there was interest in a “governance government” of just Iraqiyya and State of Law) it is now possible to situate US policy within this dichotomy. Firstly, it seems clear that the idea of building an issue-based, progressive government is not seen as realistic by Washington: Ambassador Chris Hill recently repeated the view that the Kurds “had to be included”, simply on an ethno-sectarian basis. Thus the US proposal for Iraqiyya and State of Law to move closer together does not really seem to be based on a vision of them excluding the others; rather the idea seems to be that the two would take the most important positions and give the rest to the others in what would still be an oversized power-sharing formula.

Secondly, Washington has now introduced a specific suggestion for how to solve the tug-of-war between the leaders of the two biggest blocs, Nuri al-Maliki and Ayyad Allawi, regarding the premiership. The proposed solution would involve giving one of the two men (i.e. the loser in the premiership contest) compensation in the shape of the presidency for the national security council. Conceptually, then, this kind of proposal – described by American officials as a “way of increasing the number of chairs” – seems to be leaning towards the “power-sharing” end of the government-formation typology, since governance in Iraq today would mean reducing the number of chairs, not increasing them. This is especially so because the security council chosen as the key device for solving the problem (let’s face it, the idea is to create two premierships and kick the problems further down the road), is conceptually related to other institutional innovations supported in particular by the Kurds in the post-2005 period with the aim of further reducing the prospect of a strong government in Baghdad. There are striking similarities between the composition of the national security council of 2006 and the oil and gas commission proposed in 2007 (unsurprisingly, the president of the Kurdish region is supposed to sit on both), and the aim of having consensus decisions in these forums means that they are likely to remain ineffective and weak.

Whatever one may think of this US strategy, the challenges and the uphill struggle it faces seem rather obvious. Firstly, at the procedural level, and judging from leaks from the talks held so far, it seems designed to fit a scenario in which Maliki would continue as premier and Allawi would get the newly revived post as head of the national security council. There are several problems here. In the first place, Allawi does not seem particularly interested, since he is still hoping for the premiership instead. Secondly, if Maliki is to continue as premier he also needs to be the candidate of the biggest bloc in parliament, meaning that unless he allies with Allawi in a bloc (in which case no further partners would be needed and a more governance-focused cabinet could be formed instead of a power-sharing one), a Maliki premiership, as per the apparent US preference, is predicated on the survival of the Shiite alliance of both State of Law and the Iraqi National Alliance, i.e. Iran’s preferred scenario (otherwise Maliki would not have the seats to form the biggest bloc).  Again, absent a bilateral deal with Iraqiyya, the sole legal path to a second Maliki premiership is a perpetuation of a Shiite alliance on the pattern of the United Iraqi Alliance in 2006, and even that would be disputed by Iraqiyya for being a much too flexible reading of the constitutional article 76 on the entitlement of the biggest bloc to form the government since it involves post-election bloc formation.

In other words, this outcome would be the exact opposite to what Joe Biden and other US leaders have been telling Washington lately about a supposed decline in Iranian influence in Iraq. Not a big surprise, though: Ambassador Chris Hill told a USIP audience in Washington last week that he expected the next Iraqi premier to be a Shiite – an assertion that completely lacks any basis in the Iraqi constitution and represents exactly the kind of sectarian paradigm of Iraqi politics that Iran prefers. One cannot fail to get the impression that either US policy is grossly contradictive, or there is an unspoken underlying policy of détente with Iran in Iraq, at the expense of the governance of that country and its citizens. Had Washington truly put Iraqi interests first, it would instead have aimed to draw a wedge between the two Shiite-led alliances by having one inside government and the other on the outside, thereby allowing the one in government to develop a more lasting bond with the other main forces in Iraqi politics, without being susceptible to cheap tricks like the de-Baathification revival that brought Iraqi politics to a standstill earlier this year.

Read full article....

Iran: Conservatives v. Ahmadinejad (Jedinia)

Mehdi Jedinia writes for the Institute of War and Peace Reporting on tensions between the President and the Motalefeh Party:

Protests by the Green Movement, the reformist opposition in Iran, may have faded from the streets of Tehran, but President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is now at loggerheads with a new opponent, a long-established party of religious conservatives.

In formal terms, the Motalefeh party is still allied with Ahmadinejad, having backed his campaign for re-election last year. But the conflict between them is becoming ever more apparent.

The conflict is being played out indirectly, in the form of strife between the bazaar merchants who support the conservative Motalefeh party and the Ahmadinejad government. But there have also been more direct hostile exchanges between the president and the party. Ahmadinejad has dismissed Motalefeh as a relic of the past that is irrelevant in the modern world.

Hezb-e Motalefeh-ye Eslami (the Islamic Coalition Party), to give it its full current name, was founded in 1962 and its supporters in Iran’s bazaars helped fund the return and ascent to power of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the 1979 revolution.

When Ahmadinejad first stood for election in 2005, Motalefeh members initially backed his rival Ali Larijani and later former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, as he emerged as the stronger candidate. It was only when Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad entered a second-round run-off, and it became apparent that the latter was the preferred choice of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, that Motalefeh swung behind him.

In last year’s election, Motalefeh again supported Ahmadinejad, but that did not mean the relationship was rosy. The party’s founding father and former leader, Habibullah Asgaroladi, subsequently made an attempt to mediate between Green Movement leaders Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi and the Supreme Leader – and was harshly criticised by Ahmadinejad allies for his pains.

Nor has the party received much in return for its electoral support. The Ahmadinejad camp has assiduously kept Motalefeh members away from positions of power, so that it is largely marginalised in government apart from a pocket of supporters among middle-ranking staff at the foreign ministry.

Motalefeh itself is divided internally over the question of continued support for Ahmadinejad. A younger faction is keen to back the president to the hilt, on the grounds that the Supreme Leader favours him. But many veterans – in a party founded in tradition and conservatism – would like to see him go, but are not saying so openly since there is no one else they see as a viable successor.

They are critical of government economic policies that has made domestic business and international trade more difficult for the merchant class. Perhaps surprisingly given Ahmadinejad’s reputation abroad, they have also accusing him of showing insufficient respect for religious values. For example, when Ahmadinejad remarked that he did not back a renewed police crackdown on women whose dress strays from the prescribed form of hejab, Motalefeh’s secretary-general Mohammad Nabi Habibi said that if the comment had come from someone from the opposition, they would have been arrested and prosecuted.

The main focus of their anger, though, is that Ahmadinejad has worked so hard to keep Motalefeh out of the positions of power that were once its by right. He prefers to bring in his own people and rely on their loyalty rather than on the older heavyweights of the Islamic Republic.

The relationship continues to sour. Mohammad-Nabi Habibi, the party’s current secretary general, has repeatedly criticised the Ahmadinejad administration over the past few months.

The feeling is mutual. Before last year’s presidential election, Ahmadinejad told Motalefeh leaders that their endorsement of him was worthless, as their party was not popular enough to deliver significant numbers of votes.

The two-week strike in July that shut Tehran’s Grand Bazaar and spread to markets in Tabriz, Mashhad and Hamadan was the most extensive industrial action seen in Iran since the revolution. The merchants’ protest was in response to a government plan to impose higher taxes on them and subject their accounts to greater scrutiny. After protracted negotiations, the government partially retreated and the Society of Islamic Guild and Bazaar Associations, the prime mover behind the strike – and closely linked with Motalefeh – was able to claim it had ended the strike on its own terms. (See Tehran Merchants in Showdown With Government for more on the strike.)

But the government was not about to give up so easily....

Read full article....

Israel-Palestine: The Hamas Factor

First, Hamas accused its rival Palestinian party, Fatah, of “waging war on Islam and Allah” by detaining and firing hundreds of imams and shutting down hundreds of centers for teaching the Koran in the West Bank". Then, last Sunday, it postponed a meeting with Fatah indefinitely, due to the Palestinian Authority's decision to enter direct talks with Israel.

On Tuesday, Hamas' exiled leader Khaled Mashaal said that direct talks are "illegitimate" and are "the result of coercion by Washington". He called on Fatah to "wake up" and added: "Do not allow for these adventures and sins to take place under your name."

Middle East Inside Line: “Warm” Turkish-Israeli Relations; Latest on Israel-Palestine Talks

Meshaal also called on Cairo and Jordan to "boycott" the negotiations: "The results of these negotiations will be catastrophic for the interests and the security of Jordan and Egypt."

On Wednesday, while Hamas detained four members of the rival Islamic Jihad, a source told Haaretz that the Palestinian Authority has arrested dozens of Hamas and Islamic Jihad militants in the West Bank over the past two weeks. In a contrasting sign, Gaza's sole power plant, generating 25% of the electricity for the area, was reactivated after Hamas rulers reached agreement on fuel payments to Ramallah.

Despite all these developments, no one is mentioning Gaza and Hamas ahead of the beginning of the direct talks between the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority. Reuters' Douglas Hamilton points to the "ghost at the Mideast banquet":

Even if Israel and the Palestinians can scale a mountain of skepticism and reach a peace treaty in the next 12 months, 40 percent of Palestinians would be part of it in name only, because they live in the Gaza Strip.

Gaza's Islamist Hamas rulers say they will never give Israel what it most wants from a Middle East deal, which is recognition of the Jewish state and a legitimate place in the Middle East.

A settlement to "establish a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza," as key texts have put it for 20 years, would start life with a fictional element. As things stand now, about 1.7 million Palestinians would be excluded from statehood.

So, what can be done? One option is an Israeli reoccupation of Gaza; in contrast, Hamas could be recognised and invited to the negotiations in Washington. The first possibility would not only discredit Israel in the eyes of the international community but would double violence against West Jerusalem. The second possibility cannot be tolerated by West Jerusalem, given the social and political situation in Israel, and the Palestinian Authority will not be receptive.

Daniel Byman puts forth an intermediate option:

If Hamas cannot be uprooted, it might be convinced to not disrupt peace talks with violence and tone down its rhetoric. In order for Hamas to want a lasting cease-fire, Israel and its allies must change the organization’s decision-making calculus — a process that will require both incentives and threats.

One way to go about this would be for Israel to allow the regular flow of goods into Gaza with international, rather than Israeli, monitors manning the crossing points. Israeli intelligence would still watch what goes in and out to ensure that the monitors did their job, but symbolically the switch would be important.

In exchange, Hamas would commit to a lasting cease-fire and agree to stop all attacks from the territory under its control. Hamas would also close the tunnels and end its smuggling.

Such a deal would allow Hamas to claim credit for improving the lives of Gazans, and it could use the resulting increase in the flow of goods to reward its supporters. For Israel, the regular rocket attacks would come to a complete halt and the threat of renewed attacks would diminish.

This still appears to be wishful thinking. Hamas' priority is not to increase its per capita GDP and become a financial rival of the West Bank. Whatever the economic progress, the Gazan leadership would risk the appearance of being no more than a complementary organisation to Fatah. Instead, Hamas needs its social organisations to obtain as much support as possible from Gazans, in the face of "difficulties", to position itself as preferable to Fatah.

Handing the reins to an international organisation would also raise issues for Hamas, notably over its "transparency" on political and economic areas, and it would take away one of its biggest political weapons --- its claim of insufficient aid for Gazans --- used for the "legitimisation" of its struggle against Israel.

Nor should one expect Hamas to be silent over the prospect of direct talks with a lasting cease-fire. Such a peace agreement could herald the the hardest days for the organisation as it positioned itself both against Israel and against the Palestinian Authority and Fatah.

So, what is left? Hamas will settle for no less than political recognition. If that is not possible in the short term, because of Israel's internal position as well as negotiating stance, then it must be envisaged further down the road. Hammering Hamas after an Israel-Palestinian Authority peace agreement is far more risky than putting in effort for a Hamas-Fatah agreement for a single body representing Palestinians. Only then, can there be a Palestinian leadership with a stronger position, with more acceptance of its legitimacy, both in the eyes of Palestinians and of the rest of the world.

So, if the short-term answer to the "Hamas factor" is No Dialogue Now, that cannot stand --- provided one is looking for stability --- for No Dialogue Later.

The Latest from Iran (26 August): Ahmadinejad v. "Seditionists"

2115 GMT: Economic Number of the Day. Deutsche Welle reports that the Ahmadinejad Government is now more than $140 billion in debt.

2010 GMT: Family Protection. Back to our first item of the day....

The Los Angeles Times offers an overview of the Family Protection Bill currently being considered by the Parliament, with Iranians offering a range of views on its provisions. The legislation has prompted criticism because of its provisions on the registration of temporary marriage (rejected yesterday by the Majlis) and on relaxing the conditions on polygamy.

2005 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Safe World for Women has published a special on human rights activists Shiva Nazar Ahari, detained since July 2009 and facing a possible death sentence on the charge of "moharab" (war against God).

Kurdish journalist Ejlal Qavami has been freed from interrogation.

1845 GMT: Parliament v. Government. MP Elyas Naderan, a leading critic of the Government, is at it again: he claims there is no serious will to implement subsidy cuts and says the Government is offering no information on implementation.

Members of Parliament for Zanjan have protested the dismissal of the head of Zanjan University, Professor Yousef Sobouti (see 0625 GMT).

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The Latest from Iran (25 August): Unity?

1840 GMT: A Basij Empire? According to Peyke Iran, the head of the Basij paramilitary, Mohammad Reza Naqdi, has offered a vision of 7000 new Basiji bases: "Today we have 3.5 million active Basij; we must raise it to 20 million."

1830 GMT: Ahmadinejad Tough Talk. Rooz Online, drawing from Iranian sources, claims that the President has been dishing out critical comments in meetings: he called former President Hashemi Rafsanjani and former Presidential candidate Nategh Nouri "mofsed" (rotten people) and said that "seditionists" have not been dealt with yet.

1815 GMT: The President's Man Turns? Mehdi Kalhor, a former advisor to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has harshly criticised the President in a lengthy interview with Khabar Online.

Kalhor talked about Ahmadinejad's "wrong urban planning", including "forced migration" from Tehran, mis-management of the Mehr Housing Project, with the wasting of money by the Revolutionary Guard, and subsidy cuts.

Kalhor brought up the post-election conflict: "We have to find a sensible solution for many of last year's problems; there is still fire under the ashes." And he added this provocative comment about the President's loyalties: "I was insulted many times instead of [Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim] Mashai."

1800 GMT: Is This Iran's Nuclear Strategy? Some thoughts on the latest statement from Iran's head of atomic energy, Ali Akbar Salehi, proposing a joint consortium with Russia for production of fuel for the Bushehr nuclear plant (see 0835 GMT):

With the possibility of talks with the "5+1" (US, UK, France, Germany, Russia, China) this autumn, it appears Iran is playing down its need to enrich uranium to 20%, stressing instead the cooperation with Russia on low-level nuclear enrichment for power stations as well as finding domestic sources of uranium for an expanding system of nuclear energy production.

The presentation is that Iran is a responsible, low-enriching state, working under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency and with the help of Russia. In essence, it is a proposal to the Western powers of what a nuclear Iran would look like if sanctions were eased and/or concessions were made.

Salehi's statement is therefore much more than a proposed arrangement for Bushehr and other plants. It is a challenge to Russia to endorse this vision of Iran's nuclear future, giving Moscow the opportunity to serve as a broker between Iran and the West.

1555 GMT: Sanctions Watch. Turkey's Industry and Trade Minister Nihat Ergun has said that joint projects with Iran will continue despite United Nations and United States sanctions on Tehran.

1545 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Radio Zamaneh has more on the reformist Islamic Iran Participation Front's statement of concern about the return to detention of senior member Mostafa Tajzadeh and journalist/filmmaker Mohammad Nourizad.

The IIPF calls describes the blackout of information since Tajzadeh and Nourizad were summoned back to prison 11 and 8 days ago, respectively, as the “apex of lawlessness of the cruel-hearted jailors". The organisation condemned the violence against political prisoners and said that this will lead to the “fall of the Islamic Republic".

1500 GMT: Freedom Corner. Journalist and women's rights activist Mahboubeh Abbasgholizadeh and Mexican journalist Pedro Matías Arrazola have won Germany's Johann Philipp Palm Prize for freedom of expression and of the press.

1240 GMT: Missiles and Bombs. Edward Yeranian of Voice of America has a look at Iran's military posing, including yesterday's firing of a new version of a medium-range missile. EA makes an appearance by being just a bit cynical about the Tehran show of big muscles:

It is the other side of the threat narrative, that just as you get these whipped up stories in the United States about 'there could well be an Israeli attack on Iran,' that this is how Iran strikes back. If you are going to promote the fact that Tehran might be attacked, (Iran) will promote the fact that (it) can defend (itself).

And we also make the inconvenient --- well, inconvenient for some in the Government --- linkage to internal matters: "Facing all types of political pressure within the system, and we are not just talking about pressure from the (opposition) Green Movement or reformists, but pressure from other conservatives and from clerics within the system, that you want to present this image of authority, this image of control."

And for some more threat chatter, over to Reuters:

Iran has stockpiled enough low-enriched uranium for 1-2 nuclear arms but it would not make sense for it to cross the bomb-making threshold with only this amount, a former top U.N. nuclear official was quoted as saying.

In unusual public remarks about Iran's disputed nuclear programme Olli Heinonen, the former chief of U.N. nuclear inspections worldwide, told Le Monde newspaper that Iran's uranium reserve still represented a "threat."

0900 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Britain's leading publication on universities, Times Higher Education, picks up the story --- reported in EA on 19 August --- that Durham University has gone public with its concern over the health and situation of detained Ph.D. student Ehsan Abdoh-Tabrizi, writing an open letter to the Iranian Ambassador to Britain.

The university, in consultation with Abdoh-Tabrizi, had pursued the case quietly since the student was detained during a visit to Iran last December. However, it had grown frustrated with a lack of response from Iranian officials to its correspondence.

0855 GMT: One Way Around the Sanctions? Press TV reports that creditors of Daewoo Electronics, South Korea's third-largest electronics firm, have reached a deal to sell the company to Iranian home appliance maker Entekhab Industrial Group.

South Korea recently joined international sanctions against Tehran.

0850 GMT: The Election "Coup"? Green Correspondents carries a lengthy statement by reformist politician Ali Shakouri-Rad about the complaint brought by seven of his colleagues --- all in detention --- over alleged military interference before and after the 2009 Presidential election. Shakouri-Rad reviews the audio of the Revolutionary Guard commander outlining the military's tactics to suppress oppression.

0845 GMT: Fashion Watch. HRANA claims that Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi has said that "bad hijab" is a crime.

0835 GMT: A Nuclear Solution? Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, has said that Tehran has made a proposal to Russia for joint production of nuclear fuel for the Russian-built Bushehr plant: "We have made a proposal to Russia for the creation of a consortium, licensed by that country, to do part of the work in Russia and part of it in Iran. Moscow is studying this offer."

0830 GMT: MediaWatch. William Yong and Robert Worth of The New York Times pick up on the formal order from the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance barring media from mentioning Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mehdi Karroubi by name.

Iraj Jamshidi, the editor of the recently banned newspaper Asia, tells them, “They [the Iranian Government] have already made it clear indirectly that news about these figures is banned,” said Under the current climate, no one dares to interview Mr. Moussavi or Mr. Karroubi. They want them to be forgotten.”

Interestingly, Yong and Worth tuck away in the story the news --- which may be far more politically important --- that Presidential aide and former Tehran Prosecutor General Saeed Mortazavi is one of the three officials suspended for connections to the Kahrizak Prison abuses.

0818 GMT: Tough Talk Today (Sedition and World War II Edition). Press TV, quoting Fars News, gets to the press conference of Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi that we noted yesterday.

The "highlight" is Moslehi's assurance from his imagination, backing up the magic figure put out by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the head of the Guardian Council, of a US-Saudi backing of opposition figures for "regime change": "This issue is true. A fund of over even one billion dollars can be imagined.

Moslehi then gave his proof: "We have found clear clues about foreign support for the leaders of sedition. [Iranian state media have been ordered not to refer to Mir Housavi Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami by name: thus "leaders of sedition.] For example, a man who collected news for the leaders of sedition was arrested and confessed to receiving aid from the CIA intelligence services." Another person who has fled the country used to write statements for the sedition leaders, he continued: "The individual has acknowledged receiving support from intelligence services."

But, Moslehi assured, there was really nothing to worry about: wise and timely measures adopted by Iran's security forces had thwarted all the plots.

Press TV also features an attempt by Iranian officials, reaching back to World War II, to get some of that $1 billion from its foes: "Vice-President for Parliamentary Affairs Mohammad-Reza Mir-Tajeddini said Wednesday that Iran sought to demand compensation since it sustained heavy damages despite its neutrality in the war....'More than 4,000 documents have been prepared and we are compiling more on the issue,' he went on to say".

0635 GMT: Cartoon of Day. Nikahang Kowsar, in Rooz Online, portrays --- with the help of the image of Mir Hossein Mousavi --- the Iranian regime's model of national reconciliation.



0630 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Kurdish author and civil rights activist Behzad Kurdestani has been detained. The reason for arrest is unknown.

0625 GMT: Academic Purge. Deutsche Welle offers an overview of Government pressure on academic officials, claiming more than 20 university presidents have been dismissed in recent months in a "purification" of academia.

Mehdi Karroubi has protested the dismissal of Professor Yousef Sobouti, the President of Zanjan University. Sobouti's removal brought vocal protests by Zanjan students earlier this week.

0615 GMT: Story of the Day: Revolutionary Guard and Ministry of Intelligence Fight It Out....

Rah-e-Sabz claims that the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps had installed monitoring systems in a seven-story building frequented by high-ranking politicians.

Last week some of the politicians detected the surveillance and, unaware of who carried it out, asked the Ministry of Intelligence to check the building. The Ministry denied responsibility and sent technical specialists, who inevitably discovered many IRGC cameras and microphones. As the specialists were leaving, they were accosted by a group of Revolutionary Guard. A fight followed, with guns even being drawn.

Rah-e-Sabz claims that the order for surveillance was given by Hossein Taeb, the chief of the IRGC's Intelligence Bureau. It adds that one of the missions was to gather information on Presidential Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, who has fallen out of favour with the Supreme Leader. The IRGC are allegedly sending reports directly to Ayatollah Khamenei.

0555 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Massoud Shafiee, the lawyer for three Americans --- Sarah Shourd, Joshua Fattal and Shane Bauer --- arrested in July 2009 when they walked across the Iraq-Iran border, has written Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi to request review of the case, in part of Shourd's deteriorating health: “I told the authorities in charge of this case that this woman is sick and has an acute gynecological illness, asking them to at least allow her to be transferred to the the Swiss Embassy until her trial time, which of course they turned down."

Shafiee said, “The charge of espionage is unwarranted" against his clients; however, even "in the impossible event that my clients were guilty of the charge of espionage, the punishment for this charge is one year in prison".

The lawyer added that the three Americans have not had any interrogation sessions during the past six to seven months.

The mother of Sarah Shourd has asked concerned people to write Iranian authorities to press for the release of the detainees. President Adbullah Wade of Senegal, who is also chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, added his voice to those calling for the freeing of the trio.

0545 GMT: Family Protection. Straight into the news this morning....

The Parliament has rejected one of the provisions of the Family Protection Bill, which has been heatedly opposed by women's rights groups and many other activists. Article 21 for legal registration of "temporary marriages" was rejected with only 45 of 290 MPs voted for it.

The vote on Article 23, which makes it easier for men to pursue polygamy by dismissing the current conditions for the first wife’s consent and for proof of financial means, is still ahead.