Iran: Obama Rejects a Public "Red Line" on Nuclear Capability (Porter)

Gareth Porter writes for Inter Press Service:

President Barack Obama's refusal in a White House briefing earlier this month to announce a "red line" in regard to the Iran nuclear programme represented another in a series of rebuffs of pressure from Defence Secretary Robert Gates for a statement that the United States will not accept Tehran's existing stocks of low enriched uranium.

The Obama rebuff climaxed a months-long internal debate between Obama and Gates over the "breakout capability" issue which surfaced in the news media last April.

Iran Special: The Supreme Leader and One Voice on Nuclear Talks with US?

Gates has been arguing that Iran could turn its existing stock of low enriched uranium (LEU) into a capability to build a nuclear weapon secretly by using covert enrichment sites and undeclared sources of uranium.

That Gates argument implies that the only way to prevent Iran having enough bomb-grade uranium for nuclear weapons is to insist that Iran must give up most of its existing stock of LEU, which could be converted into enough bomb-grade uranium for one bomb.

But Obama has publicly rejected the idea that Iran's existing stock of LEU represents a breakout capability on more than one occasion. He has stated that Iran would have to make an overt move to have a "breakout capability" that would signal its intention to have a nuclear weapon.

Obama's most recent rebuff of the Gates position came in the briefing he gave to a select group of journalists Aug. 4.

Peter David of The Economist, who attended the Aug. 4 briefing, was the only journalist to note that Obama indicated to the journalists that he was not ready to lay down any public red lines "at this point". Instead, Obama said it was important to set out for the Iranians a clear set of steps that the U.S. would accept as proof that the regime was not pursuing a bomb.

Obama appeared to suggest that there are ways for Iran to demonstrate its intent not to build a nuclear bomb other than ending all enrichment and reducing its stock of low enriched uranium to a desired level.

Iran denies any intention of making nuclear weapons, but has made no secret that it wants to have enough low enriched uranium to convince potential adversaries that it has that option.

At a 2005 dinner in Tehran, Hassan Rowhani, then secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, told George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that Iran didn't need a nuclear weapon, as long as it had the "mastery of the fuel cycle" as a deterrent to external aggression.

Gates raised the issue of the Iranian ability to achieve a breakout capability in a three-page memorandum addressed to national security adviser Jim Jones in January 2010, as first reported in the New York Times Apr. 18.

In reporting the Gates memo, David E. Sanger of the New York Times wrote, "Mr. Gates's memo appears to reflect concerns in the upper echelons of the Pentagon and the military that the White House did not have a well-prepared series of alternatives in place in case all the diplomatic steps finally failed."

In the statement issued on the memo Apr. 18, Gates said it "identified next steps in our defense planning process where further interagency discussion and policy decisions would be needed in the months and weeks ahead."

The Sanger article appeared eight days after differences between Obama and Gates over the Iranian breakout capability issue had surfaced publicly in April....

Thus far the Obama administration has not given emphasis to the threat of U.S. attack on Iran. Instead it has sought to use the threat of an Israeli attack on Iran as leverage, even as it warns the Israelis privately not to attempt such an attack.

Read full article....

Iran Music Special: The Kanye West No-War Rap

Kanye West, backed by Jay-Z and Swiss Beatz, puts out the word in "Power": "Bring out troops back from Iraq, Keep 'em out of Iran/ So the next couple of bars I'm-a drop 'em in Islam."

(Viewer advisory: The language is not for the faint-hearted.)

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G5tc0Vdgo_Q[/youtube]

Full lyrics....

The Latest from Iran (27 August): One Voice in Iran?

2000 GMT: The Prevention of Mourning. Iranian security forces have reportedly prevented families from observing the 22nd anniversary of the mass execution of their relatives in Iranian prisons.

Human Rights and Democracy Activists of Iran report that security forces set up road blocks at Kharavan Cemetery and stopped the families from visiting the resting places of their kin. It is claimed that a number of people were arrested and some were beaten.

In the summer of 1988, Iran executed hundreds of political prisoners on the charge of membership in dissident groups and buried them in mass graves at Khavaran.

NEW Iran: Conservatives v. Ahmadinejad (Jedinia)
NEW Iran Special: The Supreme Leader and One Voice on Nuclear Talks with US?
The Latest from Iran (26 August): Ahmadinejad v. “Seditionists”

1920 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Ghorban Behzadian Nezhad, the manager of Mir Hossein Mousavi's 2009 Presidential campaign, has been sentenced to five years in prison.

1715 GMT: The President's (Suspended) Man. Robert Tait of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty offers a lengthy overview of the case of Presidential aide and former Tehran Prosecutor General Saeed Mortazavi, one of three officials suspended this week for alleged involvement in the post-election abuses and killings at Kahrizak Prison. Included is this observation from EA:

The speculation is whether or not as part of this unity deal [brokered by the Supreme Leader], in which Ahmadinejad and Ali Larijani would make the public appearance of making up, that they now would offer a couple of bigger names on Kahrizak....When [Iranian authorities] said 11 were guilty of some involvement with Kahrizak, including the two [people] who were condemned to death, those were all relatively low-level people and there were rumbles of dissatisfaction, not just from the families but from some folks in the conservative establishment.

1700 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. The Guardian of London reports that Iranian authorities are preventing the children and laywer of Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, sentenced to death for adultery, from visiting her in Tabriz Prison.

Ashtiani's son Sajad, 22 and daughter Saeedeh, 17, were told at the prison yesterday that their mother was unwilling to meet them. Ashtiani later said, in a phone call to Sajad, that she had been told by guards that nobody had come to visit her children had abandoned her.

Ashtiani's government-appointed lawyer, Houtan Kian, has been unable to visit her since her "confession" to involvement in her husband's murder was televised. Kian's house in Tabriz was raided this week by government officials who confiscated documents and laptops.

Ashtiani's other lawyer, Mohammad Mostafaei, was forced to flee Iran after Iranian authorities tried to arrest him.

1535 GMT: Mousavi Latest. Mir Hossein Mousavi, meeting veterans of the Iran-Iraq War, has said that today’s situation of Iranian society is “unsafe” and stressed that the only way to return safety and security is through the honouring of people’s will and their movements.

Mousavi cited fear of repression, fear of unemployment, and fear of organised corruption, all of which have become dominant in Iranian society, are signs of extensive oppression and injustice.

1530 GMT: Your Friday Prayers Update. Ayatollah Mohammad Emami-Kashani taking the podium today and he made it short and sweet.

1. Everybody turn out for Qods Day next Friday (but for Palestine and not against the Iranian Government, OK?)

2. Floods in Pakistan have been terrible and everyone should help the relief effort.

1520 GMT: Sanctions Watch. The Governor of the Central Bank of Iran, Mahmoud Bahmani, says Tehran is withdrawing its assets from European banks to counter new sanctions.

The pre-emptive measure is to counter any European decision to freeze Iranian assets, Bahmani said: "The Central Bank of Iran...had predicted such a scenarios (asset freeze) six months ago and adopted the necessary countermeasures."

1355 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. RAHANA updates on attorney Mohammad Oliyaifard, who has been detained since 8 March. The lawyer, who represented a number of clients facing the death penalty, was sentenced to one year in prison for anti-regime propaganda after he spoke to foreign media about the execution of minors.

0945 GMT: Taking Control. Peyke Iran claims from Iranian media that all non-government organisations will be put under the supervision of police and intelligence services until the end of this Iranian year (March 2011).

0940 GMT: We have posted a separate feature from Mehdi Jedinia, "Conservatives v. Ahmadinejad".

0925 GMT: Sedition Watch. Pro-Ahmadinejad MP Zohreh Elahian, backing Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati and Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi, has pronounced that foreign embassies have given part of the $1 billion allocated for "regime change" to leaders of "fitna" (sedition). Indeed, she claimed that support for the heads of "fitna" is higher than the published figures.

0915 GMT: Regime Schizophrenia "Women are Fabulous/No They're Not". President Ahmadinejad has praised the role of women in Iranian politics, saying that with four women in the Cabinet, the taboo of women in politics has been broken.

Ahmadinejad that, while Iran's women are a model to the world, 70% percent of women in households in capitalist countries are beaten but remain to keep the family together.

MP Mousa Qorbani, a member of Parliament's Judicial Commission, does not seem to have gotten the President's message, however. He has declared that when women go to work, they cause unemployment. Qorbani said that he was in Saudi Arabia and did not see a single women working there --- "if we implement this in Iran, many problems will be solved".

0900 GMT: Not-So-Tough Talk Today. Revolutionary Guard Commander Ramezan Sharif has denounced "imperialist media" for falsely portraying a threat to Iran's neighbours by publishing interviews with "virtual" commanders, trying to present a brutal face of the Revolutionary Guard. Sharif asserted that Iran's military power is only for defense and "in no way meant to menace befriended regional countries".

0815 GMT: The Battle Within. An intriguing report from Mehdi Karroubi's Saham News....

The website claims that Saeed Haddadian, a leader of Basij paramilitary groups, has publicly declared, "We no longer support Ahmadinejad and won't stand up against clerics for him."

0730 GMT: We've posted a morning special: "The Supreme Leader and One Voice on Nuclear Talks with US?"

0625 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Eleven days after his return to prison, former Deputy Minister of Interior Mostafa Tajzadeh has finally been able to phone his family. He said he is in good spirits and sharing a cell with journalist/filmmaker Mohammad Nourizad, who was summoned back to jail more than a week ago but has not been able to contact relatives.

0615 GMT: Qods Day. Almost a year ago Qods Day, in which many people mark solidarity with Palestine also  brought --- despite the Iranian Government's attempt to suppress dissent ---  one of the largest post-election demonstrations.

This year's Qods Day is next Friday, and the Green posters are appearing:



Meanwhile....

Economy Watch

Kalemeh offers a report that only 10% of state-owned companies under Iran's "privatisation" drive are actually going into the private sector. The rest are allegedly being brought by concerns connected with the Government, notably the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps.

Freedom of the Press

Iranian journalist/blogger Kouhyar Goudarzi, held in Evin Prison since December, is one of the recipients of the 2010 John Aubuchon Freedom of the Press Award, given by the US National Press Club to individuals who have contributed to the cause of press freedom and open government.

Goudarzi was one of 17 detainees who went on hunger strike earlier this month.

Iran: Conservatives v. Ahmadinejad (Jedinia)

Mehdi Jedinia writes for the Institute of War and Peace Reporting on tensions between the President and the Motalefeh Party:

Protests by the Green Movement, the reformist opposition in Iran, may have faded from the streets of Tehran, but President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is now at loggerheads with a new opponent, a long-established party of religious conservatives.

In formal terms, the Motalefeh party is still allied with Ahmadinejad, having backed his campaign for re-election last year. But the conflict between them is becoming ever more apparent.

The conflict is being played out indirectly, in the form of strife between the bazaar merchants who support the conservative Motalefeh party and the Ahmadinejad government. But there have also been more direct hostile exchanges between the president and the party. Ahmadinejad has dismissed Motalefeh as a relic of the past that is irrelevant in the modern world.

Hezb-e Motalefeh-ye Eslami (the Islamic Coalition Party), to give it its full current name, was founded in 1962 and its supporters in Iran’s bazaars helped fund the return and ascent to power of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the 1979 revolution.

When Ahmadinejad first stood for election in 2005, Motalefeh members initially backed his rival Ali Larijani and later former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, as he emerged as the stronger candidate. It was only when Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad entered a second-round run-off, and it became apparent that the latter was the preferred choice of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, that Motalefeh swung behind him.

In last year’s election, Motalefeh again supported Ahmadinejad, but that did not mean the relationship was rosy. The party’s founding father and former leader, Habibullah Asgaroladi, subsequently made an attempt to mediate between Green Movement leaders Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi and the Supreme Leader – and was harshly criticised by Ahmadinejad allies for his pains.

Nor has the party received much in return for its electoral support. The Ahmadinejad camp has assiduously kept Motalefeh members away from positions of power, so that it is largely marginalised in government apart from a pocket of supporters among middle-ranking staff at the foreign ministry.

Motalefeh itself is divided internally over the question of continued support for Ahmadinejad. A younger faction is keen to back the president to the hilt, on the grounds that the Supreme Leader favours him. But many veterans – in a party founded in tradition and conservatism – would like to see him go, but are not saying so openly since there is no one else they see as a viable successor.

They are critical of government economic policies that has made domestic business and international trade more difficult for the merchant class. Perhaps surprisingly given Ahmadinejad’s reputation abroad, they have also accusing him of showing insufficient respect for religious values. For example, when Ahmadinejad remarked that he did not back a renewed police crackdown on women whose dress strays from the prescribed form of hejab, Motalefeh’s secretary-general Mohammad Nabi Habibi said that if the comment had come from someone from the opposition, they would have been arrested and prosecuted.

The main focus of their anger, though, is that Ahmadinejad has worked so hard to keep Motalefeh out of the positions of power that were once its by right. He prefers to bring in his own people and rely on their loyalty rather than on the older heavyweights of the Islamic Republic.

The relationship continues to sour. Mohammad-Nabi Habibi, the party’s current secretary general, has repeatedly criticised the Ahmadinejad administration over the past few months.

The feeling is mutual. Before last year’s presidential election, Ahmadinejad told Motalefeh leaders that their endorsement of him was worthless, as their party was not popular enough to deliver significant numbers of votes.

The two-week strike in July that shut Tehran’s Grand Bazaar and spread to markets in Tabriz, Mashhad and Hamadan was the most extensive industrial action seen in Iran since the revolution. The merchants’ protest was in response to a government plan to impose higher taxes on them and subject their accounts to greater scrutiny. After protracted negotiations, the government partially retreated and the Society of Islamic Guild and Bazaar Associations, the prime mover behind the strike – and closely linked with Motalefeh – was able to claim it had ended the strike on its own terms. (See Tehran Merchants in Showdown With Government for more on the strike.)

But the government was not about to give up so easily....

Read full article....

Israel-Palestine: The Hamas Factor

First, Hamas accused its rival Palestinian party, Fatah, of “waging war on Islam and Allah” by detaining and firing hundreds of imams and shutting down hundreds of centers for teaching the Koran in the West Bank". Then, last Sunday, it postponed a meeting with Fatah indefinitely, due to the Palestinian Authority's decision to enter direct talks with Israel.

On Tuesday, Hamas' exiled leader Khaled Mashaal said that direct talks are "illegitimate" and are "the result of coercion by Washington". He called on Fatah to "wake up" and added: "Do not allow for these adventures and sins to take place under your name."

Middle East Inside Line: “Warm” Turkish-Israeli Relations; Latest on Israel-Palestine Talks

Meshaal also called on Cairo and Jordan to "boycott" the negotiations: "The results of these negotiations will be catastrophic for the interests and the security of Jordan and Egypt."

On Wednesday, while Hamas detained four members of the rival Islamic Jihad, a source told Haaretz that the Palestinian Authority has arrested dozens of Hamas and Islamic Jihad militants in the West Bank over the past two weeks. In a contrasting sign, Gaza's sole power plant, generating 25% of the electricity for the area, was reactivated after Hamas rulers reached agreement on fuel payments to Ramallah.

Despite all these developments, no one is mentioning Gaza and Hamas ahead of the beginning of the direct talks between the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority. Reuters' Douglas Hamilton points to the "ghost at the Mideast banquet":

Even if Israel and the Palestinians can scale a mountain of skepticism and reach a peace treaty in the next 12 months, 40 percent of Palestinians would be part of it in name only, because they live in the Gaza Strip.

Gaza's Islamist Hamas rulers say they will never give Israel what it most wants from a Middle East deal, which is recognition of the Jewish state and a legitimate place in the Middle East.

A settlement to "establish a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza," as key texts have put it for 20 years, would start life with a fictional element. As things stand now, about 1.7 million Palestinians would be excluded from statehood.

So, what can be done? One option is an Israeli reoccupation of Gaza; in contrast, Hamas could be recognised and invited to the negotiations in Washington. The first possibility would not only discredit Israel in the eyes of the international community but would double violence against West Jerusalem. The second possibility cannot be tolerated by West Jerusalem, given the social and political situation in Israel, and the Palestinian Authority will not be receptive.

Daniel Byman puts forth an intermediate option:

If Hamas cannot be uprooted, it might be convinced to not disrupt peace talks with violence and tone down its rhetoric. In order for Hamas to want a lasting cease-fire, Israel and its allies must change the organization’s decision-making calculus — a process that will require both incentives and threats.

One way to go about this would be for Israel to allow the regular flow of goods into Gaza with international, rather than Israeli, monitors manning the crossing points. Israeli intelligence would still watch what goes in and out to ensure that the monitors did their job, but symbolically the switch would be important.

In exchange, Hamas would commit to a lasting cease-fire and agree to stop all attacks from the territory under its control. Hamas would also close the tunnels and end its smuggling.

Such a deal would allow Hamas to claim credit for improving the lives of Gazans, and it could use the resulting increase in the flow of goods to reward its supporters. For Israel, the regular rocket attacks would come to a complete halt and the threat of renewed attacks would diminish.

This still appears to be wishful thinking. Hamas' priority is not to increase its per capita GDP and become a financial rival of the West Bank. Whatever the economic progress, the Gazan leadership would risk the appearance of being no more than a complementary organisation to Fatah. Instead, Hamas needs its social organisations to obtain as much support as possible from Gazans, in the face of "difficulties", to position itself as preferable to Fatah.

Handing the reins to an international organisation would also raise issues for Hamas, notably over its "transparency" on political and economic areas, and it would take away one of its biggest political weapons --- its claim of insufficient aid for Gazans --- used for the "legitimisation" of its struggle against Israel.

Nor should one expect Hamas to be silent over the prospect of direct talks with a lasting cease-fire. Such a peace agreement could herald the the hardest days for the organisation as it positioned itself both against Israel and against the Palestinian Authority and Fatah.

So, what is left? Hamas will settle for no less than political recognition. If that is not possible in the short term, because of Israel's internal position as well as negotiating stance, then it must be envisaged further down the road. Hammering Hamas after an Israel-Palestinian Authority peace agreement is far more risky than putting in effort for a Hamas-Fatah agreement for a single body representing Palestinians. Only then, can there be a Palestinian leadership with a stronger position, with more acceptance of its legitimacy, both in the eyes of Palestinians and of the rest of the world.

So, if the short-term answer to the "Hamas factor" is No Dialogue Now, that cannot stand --- provided one is looking for stability --- for No Dialogue Later.