Iran: Obama Rejects a Public "Red Line" on Nuclear Capability (Porter)

Gareth Porter writes for Inter Press Service:

President Barack Obama's refusal in a White House briefing earlier this month to announce a "red line" in regard to the Iran nuclear programme represented another in a series of rebuffs of pressure from Defence Secretary Robert Gates for a statement that the United States will not accept Tehran's existing stocks of low enriched uranium.

The Obama rebuff climaxed a months-long internal debate between Obama and Gates over the "breakout capability" issue which surfaced in the news media last April.

Iran Special: The Supreme Leader and One Voice on Nuclear Talks with US?

Gates has been arguing that Iran could turn its existing stock of low enriched uranium (LEU) into a capability to build a nuclear weapon secretly by using covert enrichment sites and undeclared sources of uranium.

That Gates argument implies that the only way to prevent Iran having enough bomb-grade uranium for nuclear weapons is to insist that Iran must give up most of its existing stock of LEU, which could be converted into enough bomb-grade uranium for one bomb.

But Obama has publicly rejected the idea that Iran's existing stock of LEU represents a breakout capability on more than one occasion. He has stated that Iran would have to make an overt move to have a "breakout capability" that would signal its intention to have a nuclear weapon.

Obama's most recent rebuff of the Gates position came in the briefing he gave to a select group of journalists Aug. 4.

Peter David of The Economist, who attended the Aug. 4 briefing, was the only journalist to note that Obama indicated to the journalists that he was not ready to lay down any public red lines "at this point". Instead, Obama said it was important to set out for the Iranians a clear set of steps that the U.S. would accept as proof that the regime was not pursuing a bomb.

Obama appeared to suggest that there are ways for Iran to demonstrate its intent not to build a nuclear bomb other than ending all enrichment and reducing its stock of low enriched uranium to a desired level.

Iran denies any intention of making nuclear weapons, but has made no secret that it wants to have enough low enriched uranium to convince potential adversaries that it has that option.

At a 2005 dinner in Tehran, Hassan Rowhani, then secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, told George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that Iran didn't need a nuclear weapon, as long as it had the "mastery of the fuel cycle" as a deterrent to external aggression.

Gates raised the issue of the Iranian ability to achieve a breakout capability in a three-page memorandum addressed to national security adviser Jim Jones in January 2010, as first reported in the New York Times Apr. 18.

In reporting the Gates memo, David E. Sanger of the New York Times wrote, "Mr. Gates's memo appears to reflect concerns in the upper echelons of the Pentagon and the military that the White House did not have a well-prepared series of alternatives in place in case all the diplomatic steps finally failed."

In the statement issued on the memo Apr. 18, Gates said it "identified next steps in our defense planning process where further interagency discussion and policy decisions would be needed in the months and weeks ahead."

The Sanger article appeared eight days after differences between Obama and Gates over the Iranian breakout capability issue had surfaced publicly in April....

Thus far the Obama administration has not given emphasis to the threat of U.S. attack on Iran. Instead it has sought to use the threat of an Israeli attack on Iran as leverage, even as it warns the Israelis privately not to attempt such an attack.

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Iran Music Special: The Kanye West No-War Rap

Kanye West, backed by Jay-Z and Swiss Beatz, puts out the word in "Power": "Bring out troops back from Iraq, Keep 'em out of Iran/ So the next couple of bars I'm-a drop 'em in Islam."

(Viewer advisory: The language is not for the faint-hearted.)

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G5tc0Vdgo_Q[/youtube]

Full lyrics....

The Latest from Iran (27 August): One Voice in Iran?

2000 GMT: The Prevention of Mourning. Iranian security forces have reportedly prevented families from observing the 22nd anniversary of the mass execution of their relatives in Iranian prisons.

Human Rights and Democracy Activists of Iran report that security forces set up road blocks at Kharavan Cemetery and stopped the families from visiting the resting places of their kin. It is claimed that a number of people were arrested and some were beaten.

In the summer of 1988, Iran executed hundreds of political prisoners on the charge of membership in dissident groups and buried them in mass graves at Khavaran.

NEW Iran: Conservatives v. Ahmadinejad (Jedinia)
NEW Iran Special: The Supreme Leader and One Voice on Nuclear Talks with US?
The Latest from Iran (26 August): Ahmadinejad v. “Seditionists”

1920 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Ghorban Behzadian Nezhad, the manager of Mir Hossein Mousavi's 2009 Presidential campaign, has been sentenced to five years in prison.

1715 GMT: The President's (Suspended) Man. Robert Tait of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty offers a lengthy overview of the case of Presidential aide and former Tehran Prosecutor General Saeed Mortazavi, one of three officials suspended this week for alleged involvement in the post-election abuses and killings at Kahrizak Prison. Included is this observation from EA:

The speculation is whether or not as part of this unity deal [brokered by the Supreme Leader], in which Ahmadinejad and Ali Larijani would make the public appearance of making up, that they now would offer a couple of bigger names on Kahrizak....When [Iranian authorities] said 11 were guilty of some involvement with Kahrizak, including the two [people] who were condemned to death, those were all relatively low-level people and there were rumbles of dissatisfaction, not just from the families but from some folks in the conservative establishment.

1700 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. The Guardian of London reports that Iranian authorities are preventing the children and laywer of Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, sentenced to death for adultery, from visiting her in Tabriz Prison.

Ashtiani's son Sajad, 22 and daughter Saeedeh, 17, were told at the prison yesterday that their mother was unwilling to meet them. Ashtiani later said, in a phone call to Sajad, that she had been told by guards that nobody had come to visit her children had abandoned her.

Ashtiani's government-appointed lawyer, Houtan Kian, has been unable to visit her since her "confession" to involvement in her husband's murder was televised. Kian's house in Tabriz was raided this week by government officials who confiscated documents and laptops.

Ashtiani's other lawyer, Mohammad Mostafaei, was forced to flee Iran after Iranian authorities tried to arrest him.

1535 GMT: Mousavi Latest. Mir Hossein Mousavi, meeting veterans of the Iran-Iraq War, has said that today’s situation of Iranian society is “unsafe” and stressed that the only way to return safety and security is through the honouring of people’s will and their movements.

Mousavi cited fear of repression, fear of unemployment, and fear of organised corruption, all of which have become dominant in Iranian society, are signs of extensive oppression and injustice.

1530 GMT: Your Friday Prayers Update. Ayatollah Mohammad Emami-Kashani taking the podium today and he made it short and sweet.

1. Everybody turn out for Qods Day next Friday (but for Palestine and not against the Iranian Government, OK?)

2. Floods in Pakistan have been terrible and everyone should help the relief effort.

1520 GMT: Sanctions Watch. The Governor of the Central Bank of Iran, Mahmoud Bahmani, says Tehran is withdrawing its assets from European banks to counter new sanctions.

The pre-emptive measure is to counter any European decision to freeze Iranian assets, Bahmani said: "The Central Bank of Iran...had predicted such a scenarios (asset freeze) six months ago and adopted the necessary countermeasures."

1355 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. RAHANA updates on attorney Mohammad Oliyaifard, who has been detained since 8 March. The lawyer, who represented a number of clients facing the death penalty, was sentenced to one year in prison for anti-regime propaganda after he spoke to foreign media about the execution of minors.

0945 GMT: Taking Control. Peyke Iran claims from Iranian media that all non-government organisations will be put under the supervision of police and intelligence services until the end of this Iranian year (March 2011).

0940 GMT: We have posted a separate feature from Mehdi Jedinia, "Conservatives v. Ahmadinejad".

0925 GMT: Sedition Watch. Pro-Ahmadinejad MP Zohreh Elahian, backing Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati and Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi, has pronounced that foreign embassies have given part of the $1 billion allocated for "regime change" to leaders of "fitna" (sedition). Indeed, she claimed that support for the heads of "fitna" is higher than the published figures.

0915 GMT: Regime Schizophrenia "Women are Fabulous/No They're Not". President Ahmadinejad has praised the role of women in Iranian politics, saying that with four women in the Cabinet, the taboo of women in politics has been broken.

Ahmadinejad that, while Iran's women are a model to the world, 70% percent of women in households in capitalist countries are beaten but remain to keep the family together.

MP Mousa Qorbani, a member of Parliament's Judicial Commission, does not seem to have gotten the President's message, however. He has declared that when women go to work, they cause unemployment. Qorbani said that he was in Saudi Arabia and did not see a single women working there --- "if we implement this in Iran, many problems will be solved".

0900 GMT: Not-So-Tough Talk Today. Revolutionary Guard Commander Ramezan Sharif has denounced "imperialist media" for falsely portraying a threat to Iran's neighbours by publishing interviews with "virtual" commanders, trying to present a brutal face of the Revolutionary Guard. Sharif asserted that Iran's military power is only for defense and "in no way meant to menace befriended regional countries".

0815 GMT: The Battle Within. An intriguing report from Mehdi Karroubi's Saham News....

The website claims that Saeed Haddadian, a leader of Basij paramilitary groups, has publicly declared, "We no longer support Ahmadinejad and won't stand up against clerics for him."

0730 GMT: We've posted a morning special: "The Supreme Leader and One Voice on Nuclear Talks with US?"

0625 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Eleven days after his return to prison, former Deputy Minister of Interior Mostafa Tajzadeh has finally been able to phone his family. He said he is in good spirits and sharing a cell with journalist/filmmaker Mohammad Nourizad, who was summoned back to jail more than a week ago but has not been able to contact relatives.

0615 GMT: Qods Day. Almost a year ago Qods Day, in which many people mark solidarity with Palestine also  brought --- despite the Iranian Government's attempt to suppress dissent ---  one of the largest post-election demonstrations.

This year's Qods Day is next Friday, and the Green posters are appearing:



Meanwhile....

Economy Watch

Kalemeh offers a report that only 10% of state-owned companies under Iran's "privatisation" drive are actually going into the private sector. The rest are allegedly being brought by concerns connected with the Government, notably the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps.

Freedom of the Press

Iranian journalist/blogger Kouhyar Goudarzi, held in Evin Prison since December, is one of the recipients of the 2010 John Aubuchon Freedom of the Press Award, given by the US National Press Club to individuals who have contributed to the cause of press freedom and open government.

Goudarzi was one of 17 detainees who went on hunger strike earlier this month.

Afghanistan Follow-Up: US Government v. Karzai (and the CIA) on "Corruption" (Miller/Partlow)

Yesterday we posted an article from The New York Times on the battle between the US and Kabul over whether an aide to Afghan President Hamid Karzai should face trial for corruption. We suggested it pointed "to how difficult and vicious the politics may become".

Guess what? Less than 24 hours later, we have our proof. And here's the twist: Obama Administration officials are not only sniping at Karzai. They're also ready to take down the CIA. Greg Miller and Joshua Partlow report for The Washington Post:

Afghanistan: Latest US v. Karzai Fight over Corruption (Filkins/Mazzetti)

The CIA is making secret payments to multiple members of President Hamid Karzai's administration, in part to maintain sources of information in a government in which the Afghan leader is often seen as having a limited grasp of developments, according to current and former U.S. officials.

The payments are long-standing in many cases and designed to help the agency maintain a deep roster of allies within the presidential palace. Some aides function as CIA informants, but others collect stipends under more informal arrangements meant to ensure their accessibility, a U.S. official said.

The CIA has continued the payments despite concerns that it is backing corrupt officials and undermining efforts to wean Afghans' dependence on secret sources of income and graft.

The U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said a significant number of officials in Karzai's administration are on the payroll. Paul Gimigliano, a CIA spokesman, disputed that characterization, saying, "This anonymous source appears driven by ignorance, malice or both."

A former agency official said the payments were necessary because "the head of state is not going to tell you everything" and because Karzai often seems unaware of moves that members of his own government make.

The disclosure comes as a corruption investigation into one of Karzai's senior national security advisers - and an alleged agency informant - puts new strain on the already fraying relationship between Washington and Kabul.

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Iraq: The US Strategy for a Government (Visser)

Reidar Visser writes for historiae.org: "One cannot fail to get the impression that either US policy is grossly contradictive, or there is an unspoken underlying policy of détente with Iran in Iraq, at the expense of the governance of that country and its citizens."...

As the end of the US combat mission in Iraq is drawing to a close (31 August), there are two basic approaches to the ongoing, stalemated process of government formation in Iraq.

The first approach assumes that Iraq’s citizens are more interested in issues like security, health and services than in sectarian bickering and that it is possible to form a government based on common views on basic political issues instead of taking into consideration calculations relate to ethno-sectarian identities. Typically, this kind of government would be a “minimum-winning” one, i.e. just above the 163 mark needed to secure a parliamentary majority (and hence strong enough to pass whatever legislation it wishes to pass) but not much above that (in order to maximise the prospect for developing internal coherence and avoiding the multiplication of sinecures inside government).

Iraq Follow-Up: 64 Dead in Bombings — What is the Significance? (Cole)

This kind of government would offer the best chances of maximising the autonomy of the Iraqi government versus a hostile regional environment. It is also the approach that presents the best fit with the Iraqi constitution; by way of contrast the idea that all winning lists need to be represented or that all ethno-sectarian groups must be included in government has no constitutional basis as such.

The second, opposite approach, is focused on armistice rather than governance. It presupposes that no proper, issue-based government in Iraq is possible due to assumed insurmountable ethnic and religious tensions, and that the aim should therefore be to make sure as many players as possible are “inside the tent” where they would be less likely to create trouble. These ideas do not come from the constitution; rather they are inspired by Western models of “consociational” democracy and power-sharing and point in the direction of an oversized cabinet with a weak prime minister. It is therefore important to point out that the case of Iraq fits badly with the standard criteria cited by theoreticians of consociational democracy as prerequisites for success – including a relatively low case-load on the political system, a public willingness to accept backroom politics (or the existence of alternative means of expressing the popular will when government becomes invisible, such as frequent referendums), and not least internal coherence in the sub-communities included in government through a formula of power-sharing. Typically in the Iraqi case it would be vitally important that the Sadrists be represented if this kind of “armistice” approach is followed, since the whole idea is to make a compact between what is believed to be the “main tribes” of the community instead of transcending tribal and ethnic loyalties altogether (as in the governance-focused approach). Needless to say, this kind of government is unlikely to develop any internal coherence and will often experience paralysis. It will, in other words, easily fall prey to the schemes of regional powers.

After some initial confusion as far as Washinghton’s preferences are concerned (first it seemed there was a desire to see all four big winners included in an “armistice government”, then some suggested there was interest in a “governance government” of just Iraqiyya and State of Law) it is now possible to situate US policy within this dichotomy. Firstly, it seems clear that the idea of building an issue-based, progressive government is not seen as realistic by Washington: Ambassador Chris Hill recently repeated the view that the Kurds “had to be included”, simply on an ethno-sectarian basis. Thus the US proposal for Iraqiyya and State of Law to move closer together does not really seem to be based on a vision of them excluding the others; rather the idea seems to be that the two would take the most important positions and give the rest to the others in what would still be an oversized power-sharing formula.

Secondly, Washington has now introduced a specific suggestion for how to solve the tug-of-war between the leaders of the two biggest blocs, Nuri al-Maliki and Ayyad Allawi, regarding the premiership. The proposed solution would involve giving one of the two men (i.e. the loser in the premiership contest) compensation in the shape of the presidency for the national security council. Conceptually, then, this kind of proposal – described by American officials as a “way of increasing the number of chairs” – seems to be leaning towards the “power-sharing” end of the government-formation typology, since governance in Iraq today would mean reducing the number of chairs, not increasing them. This is especially so because the security council chosen as the key device for solving the problem (let’s face it, the idea is to create two premierships and kick the problems further down the road), is conceptually related to other institutional innovations supported in particular by the Kurds in the post-2005 period with the aim of further reducing the prospect of a strong government in Baghdad. There are striking similarities between the composition of the national security council of 2006 and the oil and gas commission proposed in 2007 (unsurprisingly, the president of the Kurdish region is supposed to sit on both), and the aim of having consensus decisions in these forums means that they are likely to remain ineffective and weak.

Whatever one may think of this US strategy, the challenges and the uphill struggle it faces seem rather obvious. Firstly, at the procedural level, and judging from leaks from the talks held so far, it seems designed to fit a scenario in which Maliki would continue as premier and Allawi would get the newly revived post as head of the national security council. There are several problems here. In the first place, Allawi does not seem particularly interested, since he is still hoping for the premiership instead. Secondly, if Maliki is to continue as premier he also needs to be the candidate of the biggest bloc in parliament, meaning that unless he allies with Allawi in a bloc (in which case no further partners would be needed and a more governance-focused cabinet could be formed instead of a power-sharing one), a Maliki premiership, as per the apparent US preference, is predicated on the survival of the Shiite alliance of both State of Law and the Iraqi National Alliance, i.e. Iran’s preferred scenario (otherwise Maliki would not have the seats to form the biggest bloc).  Again, absent a bilateral deal with Iraqiyya, the sole legal path to a second Maliki premiership is a perpetuation of a Shiite alliance on the pattern of the United Iraqi Alliance in 2006, and even that would be disputed by Iraqiyya for being a much too flexible reading of the constitutional article 76 on the entitlement of the biggest bloc to form the government since it involves post-election bloc formation.

In other words, this outcome would be the exact opposite to what Joe Biden and other US leaders have been telling Washington lately about a supposed decline in Iranian influence in Iraq. Not a big surprise, though: Ambassador Chris Hill told a USIP audience in Washington last week that he expected the next Iraqi premier to be a Shiite – an assertion that completely lacks any basis in the Iraqi constitution and represents exactly the kind of sectarian paradigm of Iraqi politics that Iran prefers. One cannot fail to get the impression that either US policy is grossly contradictive, or there is an unspoken underlying policy of détente with Iran in Iraq, at the expense of the governance of that country and its citizens. Had Washington truly put Iraqi interests first, it would instead have aimed to draw a wedge between the two Shiite-led alliances by having one inside government and the other on the outside, thereby allowing the one in government to develop a more lasting bond with the other main forces in Iraqi politics, without being susceptible to cheap tricks like the de-Baathification revival that brought Iraqi politics to a standstill earlier this year.

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